PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MAY
JUNE | 1964

NEW WINDS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Czechoslovakia: Destalinization

Rumania: The Separate Path

Hungary: Literary Renascence

THE MILITARY AND SOVIET POLITICS

THE REVOLUTIONARY: MYTHS & MYSTIQUES

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Reflections on a Happy (?) Birthday

HAD NIKITA SERGEIEVICH KHRUSHCHEV had his way, his 70th birthday would probably have been celebrated with more fanfare than was the case at the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow this April 17. Not that there was a shortage of the type of fulsome speeches and messages which one would expect to have disappeared with the proclaimed disappearance of the "personality cult." The "closest friend and dearest brother" of "the industrious peoples of the Soviet East"; Khrushchev, "sincerely loved and deeply respected" by the peoples of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Belorussia. "The Ukrainian writers will never forget . . . all the good Nikita Sergeievich has done for Ukrainian literature" (Yuri Zbanatski, a Ukrainian writer). "For us, Soviet composers, the great attention and solicitude shown by Nikita Sergeievich to our musical art has always been particularly dear" (Dmitri Shostakovich).

The military, too, whatever their disagreements with the party's First Secretary, were filled to the brim with enthusiasm and proper historical perspective: Writing in the April 17 issue of *Izvestia*, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei A. Grechko recalled Khrushchev's "enormous personal contributions to the achievement of the victory over German fascism." In addition, *Izvestia* published a "rare photograph" dating back to September 1920 and showing about 30 participants in a "meeting of political workers of the 9th Kuban army"—among them Khrushchev, then an instructor in the political department of the army. The photograph was accompanied by the text of a certificate issued to him in connection with a certain military mission—a rather ordinary document, but bolstered by an editorial reference to the memoirs of "old Communists who worked together with Khrushchev" at that time, and who remember him as a "militant commissar, a skillful organizer, a man thirsty for knowledge, and a responsive comrade."

Still, 1964 is not 1949 (when the USSR celebrated Stalin's 70th birthday), nor even 1959, when Khrushchev was credited by speakers at the 21st Party Congress for, among other things, "pointing a clear road for Soviet biology," and for the successes in "building and launching artificial earth satellites and cosmic rockets," in the "development of the chemical industry," and in the "building of electric power plants and power lines."

No doubt, the relatively sparse mention of Khrushchev's more concrete achievements is due, at least in part, to the fact that so many of his pet projects over the past ten years have come to grief. It would be rather indelicate, after all, to say much about Khrushchev's contributions to Soviet agriculture—when virtually all of his campaigns, from massive corn-cultivation to inundating the Siberian virgin lands with grain, have turned out to be miserable fiascos. And why dwell on his remarkable administrative talents when all his successive reorganizations in industry, agriculture, and the party have yielded such meager results? And what about the grandiose promises to overtake the United States in the production of meat and butter, and to usher in "full communism" within the lifetime of the present generation—a promise now superseded by the more mundane advocacy of a hearty portion of goulash in every proletarian plate? Whatever his power, Khrushchev's prestige, when all is said and done, cannot be very high.

IN NO AREA is this prestige any lower, of course, than in that of international communism. It may be argued—and with good reason—that despite his incredible setbacks Khrushchev's personal power in the Soviet party and state remains as firm as ever. Not so, however, in international communism: there his failures have not only brought a lowering of his personal and his party's prestige, but a virtual destruction of his (and the CPSU's) once unquestionable right to lead, to rule, to dictate. The German party may try to assure their

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"dear Nikita Sergeievich" that he has been "largely responsible" for making "the Communist world movement . . . the most influential political force of our time" (*Neues Deutschland,* April 17), but chances are that Nikita Sergeievich, no novice to bombast, knows better. . .

Nothing, indeed, illustrates this sad state of affairs more saliently than the behavior of some of the Communist parties during Khrushchev's birthday celebrations. Some of the largest parties did not send any delegations at all, the Italian CP contenting itself with dispatching, as a present, a portrait of Khrushchev executed by R. Guttuso, a party member with an eclectic style that doesn't always sit well with the Russian leaders. The Indonesian party sent a message pointedly reminding the celebrant that "in a situation characterized by differences of opinion in the world people's revolutionary movement, the Indonesian Communists have no other thought than that this situation should be of a temporary nature and that it should be settled by our unceasing and common efforts"—this after Khrushchev had made it quite clear, during his tour of Hungary earlier in the month, that he would like nothing better than to have an international Communist conference that would excommunicate the Chinese comrades once and for all. Even Gomulka, next to Kadar Khrushchev's most reliable ally, indicated in his speech at the Kremlin Palace that Khrushchev's proposed solution was distasteful to him. And the Japanese Communist Party sent a message of a brevity unheard of in the annals of Communist rhetoric. It read: "Congratulations on your 70th birthday"—period.

THE LESSONS of such statements are surely not lost upon Khrushchev. True, he was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Gold Star medal, and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But what good are these tributes when you have to dissociate yourself from a political measure which you had advocated only two weeks ago, and when it becomes clearer with every passing day that the once monolithic movement is being torn asunder, and that Moscow's position is being successfully questioned, ignored, and defied?

There are those, of course, who see the current disarray as much as a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict (which the Soviet Communist Party had assuredly not wished to precipitate) as of Khrushchev's deliberate attempt to infuse a greater degree of flexibility and even democracy into a once totally regimented and hence ineffectual political movement. This view is but a part of a larger school of thought which has grown in strength over the past year or so, and this may be a good time to subject it to some critical scrutiny.

Briefly, what with the more accommodating foreign policy line of the Soviet Union ever since the Cuban crisis of October 1962, and with the approaching succession crisis in the Kremlin, there has been a tendency in the non-Communist world to view Khrushchev in an increasingly favorable light—indeed with something almost bordering on affection. Khrushchev, one hears, is "reasonable." He is a "pragmatist" and, as such, fairly contemptuous of the kind of ideological rigidity that characterized his predecessor. He is something of a liberal: *viz.,* his destalinization campaign, his denunciation of terror, his benign treatment of his opponents. Unlike Stalin, whose pursuit of power overshadowed all other considerations, Khrushchev is sincerely interested in improving the lot of the Soviet citizen. Unlike the various (unnamed) "Stalinists" in his entourage—and, to be sure, unlike his rivals in Peking—he wishes to be at peace with the rest of the world. Kinder to intellectuals, delightfully "human" and "earthy," more respectful of truth, he is in short about the best Communist leader the world could possibly expect.

There is so little *genuine* historical perspective in this view—admittedly oversimplified in this version—so much questionable logic, that one is almost at a loss in trying to cope with it. Let us, then, admit first of all that there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth to it. To claim —as some still do—that the Soviet Union of 1964 is the same as that of Stalin's day is to indulge in an absurdity unworthy of any serious consideration. And it is true, too, that a large share of the credit for the basic political, economic, and cultural transformations that have taken place in the Soviet Union over the past decade does belong to Khrushchev.

But what is so easily forgotten and misunderstood is that the changes in Russia were long overdue in 1953, and that *any* political leader inheriting Stalin's mantle would have been forced, if only by objective imperatives, to rescue the country from the catastrophic situation to which the paranoic dictator had brought it (a sagging agriculture, a malfunctioning industry, a petrified bureaucracy, a sterile culture, a stultifying political atmosphere, to mention only some of the most salient characteristics). It was after all none other than Beria, the dreaded head of the secret police, who—as we now know—wished to reach an understanding with the West even at the expense of abandoning East Germany. And

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hasn't Khrushchev adopted virtually the entire Malenkov program after stripping him of all his power and then—ignominiously—ousting him from the party?

But the "objective imperatives" go beyond those bequeathed by Stalin to his successors: they also lie in the consequences of some of Khrushchev's actions. Indeed, virtually all of his policies may be viewed as attempts to cope with the unruly forces which he himself had so inadvertently unleashed: aware of the plight of culture under Stalin, he loosened the reigns of party control and offered the artist and the intellectual a greater amount of leeway; but then came the Pasternak affair in 1958, and his vulgar and violent diatribes against liberal artists and intellectuals in 1962 and 1963. Stalin's relations with the East European satellites could no longer be implemented by his successors, so Khrushchev, in an attempt to establish some kind of bloc discipline without outright terror and coercion, mended his fences with Yugoslavia, acquiesced in Poland's "quiet revolution" (though at the same time brutally crushing the Hungarian revolt)—and at the same time opened himself to the extraordinary defiance not only of tiny, far-away Albania, but of neighboring Rumania as well. In fact, were it not for Khrushchev's attempt to force Rumania into a subservient economic position vis-à-vis Russia, that country might still be on his side in the struggle against Peking.

What is true for the East European Communist bloc is true for the Communist movement as a whole. In trying to revive a moribund movement, Khrushchev succeeded in creating chaos and an unhealthy striving for independence. His reply has been to crush this trend, to enforce discipline, to restore the predominant position of the Soviet Union. If he hasn't succeeded, it has not been for want of effort. . . .

And what of Khrushchev's claim to historical truthfulness—the "revelations" about Stalin's crimes and lies? The Lenin Museum in Moscow, which had at one time been devoted more to Lenin's "most faithful disciple" than to Lenin himself, has now been completely denuded of any references to Stalin: he has become another "non-person." But of Khrushchev, who didn't even know Lenin, there are no more and no less than 18 pictures, including a carefully cropped photograph showing Khrushchev (*sans* Bulganin) laying a wreath at Karl Marx's grave in London in April 1956. Khrushchev's treatment of his opponents does indeed differ from that of Stalin's: while the latter cropped off heads, Khrushchev crops photographs—after destroying his adversaries politically. No one can question which method is preferable: but neither is consonant with the values of a civilized society.

And what of Khrushchev's ostensible "moderation" and "caution" in foreign policy? How does "saber-rattling" during, say, the Suez crisis in 1956 fit into this mold? Or Soviet actions in the Congo? Or the missile gamble in Cuba—something which the super-cautious Stalin would probably have been aghast at? The Sino-Soviet conflict, the firm reaction of the United States, and last, perhaps, but not least Khrushchev's advancing age may indeed force the Soviet Union onto a more rational and moderate course in its relations with the West—but again, not because of a lack of the kind of "adventurism" which in the West is so frequently and incorrectly ascribed to Khrushchev's predecessor. . . .

NOR LET US, in *our* assessment of Khrushchev, forget to mention a few other salient characteristics of his tenure: the revival of the death penalty for economic crimes and the institution of mob-justice ("anti-parasite laws, comrade's courts, etc.); the persistence and indeed rise of officially sanctioned antisemitism; the advocacy of a principle ("peaceful coexistence") which demands the right to propagate the Soviet view all over the world while making it a crime to disseminate Western views *within* the USSR; the production of *sputniks* and the purchase of wheat to avoid bread-rationing—the list is long and impressive.

If there is any image Khrushchev would like to imprint upon posterity it is, no doubt, that of a fearless and consistent anti-Stalinist. But surely it is fitting to remind ourselves, on this occasion, that for the bulk of his life Khrushchev was not just a passive onlooker, but a highly active and vociferous co-architect of the Stalin era. It was "not by accident"—to use a favorite Marxist phrase—that Khrushchev had not only survived the Stalin years, but had risen, during that time, to ever more prominent and powerful positions. And it is no accident, therefore, that he has been so reluctant to tell the *true* story of the purges and the terror of the 1930's, that he has attempted to shift the blame for complicity in Stalin's crimes to others while intimating that he himself was either ignorant of them, or helpless, or—most fraudulent of all—actually opposed to them.

A birthday, of course, calls for *some* form of observance. But all things considered, need we be any more complimentary, any more flattering, than the Communist Party of Japan? . . .

A.B.

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Winds of Change

EDITORS' NOTE: Barely a year ago (in the July-August 1963 issue), we introduced two articles on East Germany by referring to that country, along with Rumania and Czechoslovakia, as "the more Stalinist of the East European regimes." Nothing has happened in Ulbricht's imperium *to justify a retraction of this term of opprobrium, but there is little doubt, as Mr. Taborsky's article makes clear, that the processes of change, so evident in the Soviet orbit as a whole, have finally made themselves felt in Czechoslovakia, too. Rumania (see article by Mr. Braham), presents a somewhat different picture: there, too, "polycentrism" has made deep inroads, but in a peculiarly nationalistic, rather than liberal direction. As for Hungary, the country which had experienced the most dramatic revulsion against Soviet and local Communist oppression, it has undergone, in the last few years, a unique metamorphosis from Stalin-like brutality to a "liberalism" of almost Polish or Yugoslav proportions. Mr. Tikos illustrates this change by concentrating on the Hungarian literary scene, and particularly on works which grapple with the past traumas of that unhappy country.*

In the course of the past year students of East European communism have focused much of their attention on Czechoslovakia, and with good reason. After years of ideological and political drabness and benumbing conformism, Czechoslovak politics suddenly came to life in 1963. The victims of the monster-trials of the early 1950's were rehabilitated (a number of them posthumously) and several leading Stalinists were forced out of their party and government positions. A strong campaign, in which nationalist-oriented Slovak Communists have played a prominent part, was launched against dogmatism and "neo-dogmatism" in all spheres of public life. Controls over the arts and literature were relaxed to a degree never attained during the previous mild thaws of the post-Stalin era, and in the realms of philosophy, historiography and education "Stalinist distortions" came under fire. So swift and far-reaching were the political developments that by the end of the year the position of Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) and President of the Republic, seemed in jeopardy. Thus, a decade after the death of Joseph Stalin, Czechoslovakia at long last appeared to be breaking out of the neo-Stalinist fold.

The Post-Stalin Decade

Before exploring more fully the developments of 1962-64 and assessing their significance, a brief account of the major trends during the earlier post-Stalin years is in order. Although the Czechoslovak regime has until recently been ranked among the most Stalinist and the most rigid in Eastern Europe, the country did partake in the political turbulence and the thaws of the post-Stalin era.[1] The death of the Soviet dictator was followed in the spring and summer of 1953 by a series of workers' strikes in many

[1] On the Czechoslovak developments from 1953 to 1957 see Edward Taborsky, "Political Developments in Czechoslovakia since 1953," *Journal of Politics*, Feb. 1958, pp. 89 ff.

Mr. Taborsky, one-time personal aide to President Benes of Czechoslovakia, is presently Professor of Government at the University of Texas (Austin). He is author of Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 *(Princeton University Press, 1961).*

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Czechoslovakia: Out of Stalinism?

By Edward Taborsky

parts of the country, culminating in a riot in Pilsen, the industrial metropolis of Western Bohemia, where the local Communist administration was thrown out by rebellious citizens and regular army reinforcements had to be sent in to restore Communist rule. Furthermore, encouraged by the 1953 exodus from the Hungarian collective farms, a sizable number of Czechoslovakia's peasants reverted to private farming in 1953 and 1954.

In 1956, the 20th CPSU Congress ushered in a new era of high hopes and substantial intellectual ferment. Following the example set by their Polish, Hungarian and Soviet colleagues, Czechoslovak writers began openly criticizing the party's dictatorial practices and asking for more creative freedom. University student organizations sent the government sharply-worded resolutions raising such demands as access to foreign literature, abolition of the index of prohibited books, fewer lectures on Marxism-Leninism and a revision of past political trials.

The clamor for liberalization reached its climax at the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union (April 1956) which to the unpleasant surprise of its managers turned into a forum of vigorous protest against the entire system of party controls over literature and art.[2] The regime suffered a serious shock; by Novotny's own admission, many party members had succumbed to "reformist illusions about harmony and reconciliation of class interests," held views "reflecting petty-bourgeois criticism of party policy," and even attempted to "smuggle" into the party views "calling, under the pretext of 'freedom,' for a return to pre-February conditions" (*i.e.*, those existing prior to the Communist coup of February 1948).[3]

However, the promise of the 1956 thaw was to remain largely unfulfilled. Fearful of the dangers to the system inherent in the spread of "liberalistic tendencies" in the country, the party leadership moved quickly to a resolute counterattack. Kindly official invitations that people "throw away their fears" and embark on "courageous criticism of shortcomings"—the attitude that was characteristic in the months immediately following the 20th CPSU Congress—were replaced in the summer of 1956 by sharp attacks upon the "internal enemy" and by an ominous emphasis on "the role of the state security organs as guardians of socialist achievements of the people."[4] In due time those who had stood in the forefront of the liberalization struggle were removed from their positions and replaced by diehard Stalinists. In 1960, a new Committee of Socialist Culture was set up under the chairmanship of Ladislav Stoll, one of the most doctrinaire of Czechoslovak cultural apparatchiks, to watch over the ideological content of cultural activities and assure the "completion of the cultural revolution" as decreed by the 11th Party Congress in 1958.

[2] *Literarni noviny* (Prague), Apr. 28, and 29, 1956.

[3] Novotny's speech at the National Party Conference, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), June 12, 1956.

[4] *Ceskoslovensky prehled* (New York), III, July-Aug., 1956, p. 3.

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True, the swing of the political pendulum never fully returned to the harsh extremes of the Stalin era. From time to time articles mildly critical of excessive orthodoxy and of some past manifestations of the "personality cult" were tolerated, and a certain number of manuscripts written in disregard of the newly reinstated standards of socialist realism were published in modest editions. Public censure, ostracism, demotion and denial of material amenities superseded the rougher Stalinist devices as methods of securing political compliance. Some of the many victims of earlier purges were clandestinely released from jail, though not officially rehabilitated, and Czechoslovakia's "little Stalin," Klement Gottwald, the late party chief and President, was somewhat downgraded and his embalmed body removed from the Mausoleum to be reburied, in October 1962, next to "other leading fighters of the party." But the substance of the "personality cult" was barely scratched. Most significantly, none of the big purgers in the party leadership who had earlier been officially credited with unmasking the "traitors" [5] and who bear the main responsibility for the excesses of the Stalin era, were demoted, let alone removed from office. Thus Communist Czechoslovakia entered the 1960's with a rigid neo-Stalinist government auguring little hope of any relaxation. Yet, rather unexpectedly, things began to pick up in 1962.

An Arrest and Its Aftermath

The first and most dramatic indication of trouble came with the sudden arrest in February 1962 of Rudolf Barak, Politburo member, Vice Premier, and for eight years, until 1961, Minister of the Interior. As subsequently indicated by Novotny, Vladimir Koucky (a ranking secretary of the party's Central Committee), and Lubomir Strougal (Barak's successor as Interior Minister), Barak's guilt lay much less in his alleged "illegal management of state funds" and "gross violations of socialist legality," as the charges originally emphasized, than in his having "aimed at the highest function in the state," trying to gain it through "anti-party activity and by creating distrust in the organs of the party and the government." [6]

The particulars of the Barak case are still obscured, but there is sufficient *prima facie* evidence that while personal rivalry lay at the heart of the matter, the progress of destalinization in Czechoslovakia and the revision of the political trials of the 1950's were among the issues that divided Novotny and his Interior Minister. Novotny, with a history of deep involvement in the trials, fought tenaciously against public rehabilitation of the victims; as late as July 11, 1956, he declared that "the examination of the facts up to now has shown that there are no reasons for the rehabilitation of Slansky." [7] Barak, on the other hand, who at the time of the Slansky trial had not even been a member of the Central Committee, was uncompromised in this respect and stood only to gain if the case was reopened. Indeed, as chairman of the commission charged with revising the 1951-54 trials, he insisted (*n.b.*, only two days following Novotny's denial of any reasons for rehabilitating Slansky) that "crude violations of socialist legality" had occurred in the 1950's, "even long after the fall of Slansky" [8]—that is, when Novotny already presided over the party as First Secretary.

Some of the accusations levelled at Barak suggest that the former Interior Minister was bent on enhancing his position in the party and his popularity in the country by pushing destalinization further than Novotny and his associates considered safe. After his arrest, Barak was denounced for "petty-bourgeois attitudes" and only "pretended loyalty to the cause of socialism"; [9] eventually, Novotny himself accused Barak's supporters of revisionism and "social democratism." [10] Even more interesting, however, it was charged that Barak had engaged in "anti-party activities"; [11] had "forbidden officials of the Ministry of Interior from keeping in touch with the personnel of the Central Committee and had himself basically ignored the appropriate Central Committee department"; had "grossly violated party secrecy and by so doing most seriously hurt the highest

[5] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 18, 1952.
[6] Novotny's speech at the Slovnaft Refinery near Bratislava. *Rude pravo*, Feb. 23, 1962, and Novotny's, Koucky's and Strougal's speeches at the 12th CPCS Congress, *Rude pravo*, Dec. 5-8, 1962.
[7] Quoted in P. Tigrid's "Jak tomu opravdu bylo se Slanskym a druhy—Dejstvi II," (How it Really Was With Slansky and his Companions—Act II) *Svedectvi* (Paris), No. 22, 1963, p. 139.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] CTK (Czechoslovak Press Bureau), Mar. 24, 1962.
[10] Novotny's speech of April 12, 1962, published only a year later in a volume of *Resolutions and Documents of the Central Committee of the CPCS*. See Free Europe Committee's *Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj*, Apr. 22, 1963.
[11] Novotny in a speech before the CPCS Central Committee, *Rude pravo*, February 9, 1962.

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interests of the party."[12] It is reasonable to assume that there is some substance to these accusations, and if so, the intriguing question is: for whose benefit did Barak withhold information and divulge party secrets? Not, one must assume, the Western powers, for in that case he would surely have been tried for treason. Only two possible clients remain: factional supporters within the CPCS, or perhaps even the CPSU.[13]

In any case, feeling gravely imperiled by Barak's ambition, his relative popularity with the party's rank-and-file, and his knowledge of disagreeable "historical truth" (which Barak had once proposed to reveal),[14] Novotny decided to silence the new pretender to party leadership. After a secret trial before a military court Barak was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for stealing public funds. Later on, in a lame attempt to shift the blame for the regime's failure to assess publicly the responsibility for the 1951-54 trials and rehabilitate the victims, Novotny and his associates accused the imprisoned Barak of having impeded the revision of the trials by conducting investigations "inconsistently," by concealing "important facts indicating incorrect behavior of state security organs," and by supplying the highest party organs with a "false report" in 1957.[15]

The hasty "solution" of the Barak problem, however, caused much resentment and did little to strengthen the regime. Reports coming from Czechoslovakia in the late spring and early summer of 1962 spoke of gatherings of factory workers and ordinary party members urging Barak's release; at the same time, rumors began cropping up about Khrushchev's loss of faith in Novotny, and the latter's impending fall.[16]

But the most important factor weakening the position of the party's leadership was the growing economic crisis. In 1961 and again in 1962, the targets for gross industrial production remained unfulfilled. The annual rate of industrial growth, which had averaged a claimed 11 percent for the 1950-60 period, fell to 8.9 percent in 1961 and 6.2 in 1962. Similarly, again according to official figures, the annual rise in labor productivity in industry began to fall off sharply, declining from 7.7 percent in 1960 to 5.7 in 1961 and 3.1 in 1962. The growth of national income, which according to official reports had averaged 8.5 percent per annum between 1950 and 1960, sank to a meager 0.7 in 1962. Heavy losses were caused by an excessive output of rejects, estimated at 175 million dollars in 1961 alone; by absenteeism and other violations of "socialist labor discipline," which caused a loss of 2,308,000 work shifts in 1962; and by pilfering to the tune of 100 million dollars worth of merchandise in 1962. Wage funds were being regularly overdrawn, and while the number of administrative personnel in industry kept growing (by 59,000 between 1958 and 1962), planned reductions of production costs remained unfulfilled. Furthermore, agricultural production, which had been stagnating for many years, plummeted in 1962 to 6 percent below the 1961 figure, falling thus by 2.6 percent under the 1936 level. So miserable became the total economic picture that the Third Five-Year Plan, launched with boastful fanfares in 1961, had to be scrapped in its third year and replaced with a hastily improvised "more realistic" stop-gap plan for 1963 calling for negligible rises in industrial production and labor productivity (1 and 0.7 percent over 1962, respectively), and a modest increase (2.9 percent over 1961) in agricultural output.[17]

The Facade Crumbles

The worsening of living conditions caused by these economic failures led naturally enough to widespread popular discontent. People were becoming more and more impatient with the party's bungling ways, and increasing criticism was heard objecting to such government policies as the large-scale export of goods needed at home and economic aid to underdeveloped coun-

[12] Strougal's speech before 12th Party Congress, *Rude pravo*, Dec. 8, 1962.

[13] It is interesting to note that *Zeri i Populit*, the Albanian Communist Party daily, welcomed the fall of Barak whom it labeled an imperialist spy engaged in selling state secrets and accused him of having conspired with "the Soviet professional provocateur" Andropov while both attended the congress of the Albanian Communist Party in February 1961. See *Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj*, FEC, No. 379, Mar. 5, 1962.

[14] Barak speech at the National Conference of the CPCS, *Rude pravo*, June 13, 1956.

[15] Novotny's and Strougal's speeches at the 12th CPCS Congress, *Rude pravo*, Dec. 5 and 8, 1962.

[16] Such reports appeared also in various newspapers in the West, such as *Sunday Times* and *Sunday Express* of Apr. 8, 1962, *Die Presse* (Vienna), July 10, 1962, and *Christian Science Monitor*, June 25, 1962.

[17] The increase over 1962 was to be 9.5 percent, but due to the 6 percent decrease in 1962 it amounted only to a 2.9 percent rise over the level attained in 1961. The economic data in this paragraph are drawn from: *Rude pravo*, Jan. 25, Feb. 2 and July 17, 1963; *Prace* (Prague), June 28, July 4 and Aug. 27, 1963; and *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), Jan. 9, 1963.

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tries, especially Cuba. Such grumbling in turn gave encouragement to those who were resentful about the lack of progress on destalinization and the party's tough policy on cultural affairs.

The much-postponed 12th Party Congress, convoked in December 1962, thus met under the pressure of severe economic and political problems, and its proceedings were watched with a good deal of expectancy. Yet it appeared at first that the congress would dash all hope for any substantial departure from the neo-Stalinist course set by its predecessor in 1958. Except for a clash between the Chinese CP delegate and the Czechoslovak spokesmen dutifully parroting Moscow's line on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the proceedings were dull, uneventful and neo-Stalinist in tone. As a remedy for the economic crisis, Novotny recommended that "uncontrolled tendencies" threatening unbalanced economic growth be eliminated by strengthening "democratic centralism" through additional controls; in other words, the party decreed a retreat from the economic decentralization measures of 1958. In unimaginative imitation of Soviet prescriptions for similar ills, the congress ordered the creation of a Central Committee and Government Commission for Control of Agricultural Production, supplemented by a system of agricultural production administrations at the district level. Simultaneously, a network of people's control commissions, headed by a Central People's Control Commission, was set up in conjunction with a parallel system of party control commissions to oversee the operation of the entire economy.

On the political plane, in trite clichés reminiscent of the era of the "personality cult" which they claimed to have left behind, Novotny and his top associates lashed out at "manifestations of petty-bourgeois radicalism," "anarchistic concepts of socialist democracy," "liberal apolitical trends of some, mainly intellectual, circles," and "kowtowing to eccentricities of bourgeois culture." [18] The delicate issue of destalinization was dealt with in a niggardly and cursory fashion. While announcing that thirty (sic!) persons unjustly sentenced in the trials of the Stalin era had been absolved of the original charges, Novotny, backed by two of his foremost associates, Hendrych and Bacilek, persisted in the view that there was no need for any rehabilitations. Some of the accused, he argued, though innocent of certain crimes for which they had been sentenced (such as "Titoism"), were nonetheless guilty of other crimes for which they had not been tried.[19] Thus the announcement that another commission had been appointed to restudy the materials of the 1949-54 trials and report its findings within four months offered little hope that justice would finally be done.

With the congress over, it appeared that Novotny and his fellow-purgers had reasserted their hold over the party and that they would continue, undisturbed, their business-as-usual attitude. Yet the first sign of a gathering political storm arrived before long. It came with the sudden resignation in March 1963 of Josef Urvalek, President of Czechoslovakia's Supreme Court. Since Urvalek had been elevated to the highest judicial office in the country in reward for his services as chief prosecutor in the Slansky trial, a political explanation of his sudden departure seemed more plausible than the officially stated "reasons of health." [20] Shortly thereafter, on April 3, 1963, the CPCS Central Committee issued a laconic announcement that the work of the party commission set up to investigate "violations of party principles and socialist legality in the period of the personality cult" had been completed and the matter turned over to the Supreme Court and the Procuracy General "for appropriate action." [21] Then, on May 14 came the news that Karol Bacilek, who as Minister of National Security had headed the police apparatus during the trials era, had been deprived of his seat on the party Presidium and relieved of his post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Although he was retained as member of the CPCS Central Committee, here was a clear sign that the top-most purgers themselves were finally meeting up with their nemesis.

Ironically, the beginning of a public review of the Stalin era could not have come at a less opportune moment for the party stalwarts. April and May of 1963 happened to be the months during which three major organizations with earlier records of open dissent with the party leadership—the Union of Slovak Writers, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, and the Union of Slovak Journalists—were to hold their congresses. Thus three major forums for the public airing of grievances were provided at just the right time and all three bristled with scathing criticisms of the party's procrastination in setting things right and with forceful

[18] For a discussion of the 12th CPCS Congress see *East Europe* (New York), No. 1, 1963, pp. 45 ff.

[19] Novotny's statement in *Rude pravo*, June 12, 1956, and Nov. 22, 1961, his speech at the 12th Congress, *Rude pravo*, Dec. 5, 1962, as well as speeches by Bacilek and Hendrych, *Rude pravo*, Dec. 7 and 9, 1962.

[20] *Rude pravo*, Mar. 7, 1963.

[21] *Ibid.*, Apr. 5, 1963.

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demands for a resolute clean sweep of all the remaining heritage of the "personality cult," no matter where the ax might fall.[22]

Thus, in a stirring speech at the conference of Slovak writers, Laco Novemesky—a leading Slovak Communist, jailed in 1954 as a "bourgeois nationalist" and now solemnly reinstated in the Slovak Writers' Union—characterized his case as "only an infinitesimal part of something much bigger, much more monstrous and much more horrible"; as something that no one had "the right to forget out of magnanimity or to circumvent out of opportunism." In conclusion, he challenged the party leadership "to give the people the whole truth, without embellishment, and without swindles," no matter how great a price had to be paid for it.[23]

Though more restrained in criticism than its Slovak counterpart, the Third Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, held in May, proceeded in the same vein, and before it ended, a number of notorious Stalinists had to yield their seats on the union's presidium. But the climax came at the Congress of the Slovak Journalists' Union, which met three days after the adjournment of the Writers' Congress. In a step unparalleled in the entire era of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, Miro Hysko, professor of journalism at Bratislava University and one-time editor-in-chief of the Slovak Communist Party daily *Pravda*, rose to publicly denounce Viliam Siroky, the Prime Minister, for his sinister part in the persecution of the Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" and to challenge Novotny himself by calling for an investigation not merely of "the time of the infamous political trials," but also of the period after 1956.[24]

Nothing could have dramatized more strikingly the shifting power relationships in Communist Czechoslovakia than Hysko's action.

[22] Proceedings of these meetings were reported in *Kulturny zivot*, May 4, 1963, *Literarni noviny*, June 1, 1963, and *Rude pravo*, May 23 and 24, 1963.

[23] *Kulturny zivot*, May 4, 1963. For an English translation of Novomesky's speech see *East Europe*, 12, 7 July 1963 pp. 27-29.

[24] *Pravda*, June 3, 1963. For excerpts in English see *East Europe*, 12, 8, Aug. 1963, pp. 22-24.

Two Views of Historical Truth

At a time when our papers, too, carried irrefutable evidence that the political trials between 1950 and 1954 were doubtful in their very essence, at this very time the unjustly convicted Communists were left to languish in prison and the names of those who had been rehabilitated were kept secret in a dishonest way, although previously we had written about them publicly as criminals in the papers and in the mass circulation pamphlets. Between 1956 and 1962 we were told continuously by authoritative quarters about the consequences of the personality cult and about the fact that, as far as the investigation [of the trials] was concerned, everything was in order.

. . . The order of the day for us now is the struggle for the realization of the right to voice and publish correct—that is, Marxist-Leninist—views even though they may conflict with the subjectivist views of official functionaries. . . .

Miro Hysko, Professor of Journalism at Bratislava University, Pravda (Bratislava), June 3, 1963.

[Certain opinions recently expressed in the press] often stem from a profoundly wrong interpretation of party policy in the past decade, particularly in the period from the 20th CPSU Congress up to our 12th Congress. Against historical truth and in direct contrast to the viewpoints taken by the 12th Congress, certain journalists try to make the public believe that this very period of the party's activity had been most strongly marked by influences of the personality cult.

Everyone who in this period did not stand apart must clearly realize that since the 20th CPSU Congress, the policy of the party as a whole in its orientation and concrete aims has been consciously and permanently antidogmatic and has fully supported the CPSU's efforts for making a Leninist course prevail in domestic and foreign policy, as well as in the international Communist movement against dogmatic, sectarian and nationalist trends.

—Vladimir Koucky, Secretary of the CPCS CC, Rude pravo, April 11, 1964.

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One can well imagine what would have happened, even as late as 1959 or 1960, to a man who all but accused one of the top-ranking government officials, and with him the entire party leadership, of complicity in multiple political murder. In 1963, however, the accuser not only got away with it, but his indictment of the country's Prime Minister appeared on the pages of the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia, and his feat prompted Novotny to journey hurriedly to Slovakia to deliver a nervous speech in his own and Siroky's defense.[25] Nor were the subsequent sacrificial offerings of lesser scapegoats and other frantic endeavors and counter-attacks by the party leadership of any avail. On September 22, 1963, a stern communique announced that "for deficiencies in his work, insufficient application of the party line in directing the activities of the government, and for some faults in his political activity in the past, as well as because of his unsatisfactory health," [26] Viliam Siroky was removed from both the party Presidium and the office of Prime Minister. Along with him, Jaromir Dolansky was relieved as Vice-Premier, and a cluster of lesser Stalinist figures also lost their jobs.

Thus, by October 1963, all but one of the top Stalinist purgers were either dead or downgraded. According to the final report of the party reviewing commission, 481 cases stemming from the era of the "personality cult" had been reviewed and all but seventy of the victims acquitted or granted full or partial amnesty. Some of the victims of the purges, however, among them Rudolf Slansky, continued to be held responsible for "gross violations of party statutes and principles," and their original expulsion from the party was therefore reaffirmed. Finally, as an overt gesture toward the new Pope, several jailed Roman Catholic bishops were pardoned and Archbishop Josef Beran, the Primate of Czechoslovakia, was released from confinement. None of the high clerics, however, was readmitted to the exercise of his religious functions.

Ideological Ferment

The struggle over the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia was accompanied by unprecedented activity in all walks of the country's intellectual and artistic life. In flagrant disregard of the orthodox directives of the 12th CPCS Congress, Czechoslovakia's intellectuals presented the party leaders in 1963-64 with a challenge that surpassed, in vigor and ideological boldness as well as in the number and status of the challengers, anything previously experienced by the Prague regime. Revisionism, which had hitherto been rather timid and inarticulate in Czechoslovakia by comparison with Poland and Hungary, suddenly blossomed forth. From several magazines and cultural organizations whose editorial boards and steering committees had gradually assimilated a few liberal minds, there came a barrage of revisionist arguments aimed at the dogmatism and neo-Stalinism entrenched in the party apparatus.

Ignoring Novotny's warning that "no one must touch our Communist Party, its program, our socialist system," [27] the revisionists took issue with some of the fundamental party tenets which hitherto had been held sacrosanct. They rejected "the dogma of the immaculateness of proletarian origin" [28] and "the sectarian-dogmatic interpretation of the leading role of the proletariat." [29] They scored the "hypertrophic application" of class bias, and denounced the class criterion as a "fictitious value," a "harmful anachronism" and a "monstrous sectarian excess" that had seriously distorted the concept of morality.[30]

Against the "scholastic clinging of dogmatists to the letter of the classics of Marxism-Leninism," they stressed the imperative necessity of "the ideals of socialist humanism," pleaded for a "humanization" of Marxism, and questioned the concept of "collective happiness." [31] They lashed out at the disregard of individual needs and the lopsided emphasis on the collective interests of society.[32] They reproved the stagnation of Marxian ethics, the tendency of the party leaders to "consider morality as something secondary, as some old and unnecessary rubbish preserved in people's minds merely as a survival of old religious and bourgeois education." [33] They even managed to find journals willing to publish such heretical statements as the view that party members were

[25] *Rude pravo*, June 13, 1963.
[26] *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1963.
[27] Novotny's speech in Ostrava, *Rude pravo*, Mar. 24, 1963.
[28] Rasla in *Kulturny zivot*, Nov. 16, 1963.
[29] Rudolf Hoffman in *Kulturny zivot*, No. 42, 1963.
[30] Ivan Klima in *Literarni noviny*, Jan. 25, 1964, Ondrej Pavlik in *Kulturny zivot*, Aug. 17, 1963, and Jan Tomecek in *Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1963.
[31] Jaromir Janousek's review of Jiri Cvetl, *Clovek a svetovy nazor* (Man and a World View), 1962, in *Filosoficky casopis*, No. 5, 1963, pp. 708 ff; and Frantisek Andrascik in *Kulturny zivot*, Dec. 7, 1963.
[32] Jan Tomecek, in *Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1963.
[33] Ondrej Pavlik in *Kulturny zivot*, Aug. 7, 1963.

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not always unconditionally obligated to fulfill the directives of higher party organs, or that the mass organizations should exercise the right of popular control over the party.[34]

For the first time since the 1948 Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, fresh unorthodox ideas also found their way into economic thought, hitherto an exclusive arena of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Prompted by the disastrous performance of their country's economy in recent years, as well as by the writings of some of their Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian, and even Soviet colleagues, several important Czechoslovak economists began in 1963 and 1964 to oppose publicly various precepts and taboos of Stalinist economic doctrine. They criticized the "canonized model of planned socialist economy" and the suitability of the Soviet economic model for more advanced industrial countries, such as Czechoslovakia.[35] They attacked the "cult of the plan" as an integral part of the proscribed "personality cult" and urged that production be exposed to the pressures of the market.[36]

Voices were raised against the "entire system of teaching political economy" as leading to a dogmatic way of thinking, to an underestimation of the accomplishments of capitalism, and to a disregard of "the fundamental contradictions in socialism, the negative aspects and retarding forces in socialism." The party was urged to implement the law of supply and demand, a "law hundred times evicted, but hundred times returned." [37] Noting, heretically, that "capitalism was applying the results of the scientific-technical revolution much more quickly and consistently" than Communist Czechoslovakia,[38] some economists asserted that collectivization and nationalization must not be considered ends in themselves, and that the preference given to capital over consumer goods production must cease.[39] The Head of the Department of Economics of Bratislava University went even so far as to express the belief that it was necessary to "begin to criticize socialism as a social system." [40]

Nor have other fields of knowledge and creative work been spared revisionist intrusions. As could have been anticipated after the writers' and journalists' gatherings in the spring of 1963, it is in the fields of literature and literary criticism that revisionist feelings have surged highest. More surprising, however, has been their impact on historiography, traditionally one of the disciplines most afflicted by doctrinal rigidity in Communist countries. "Disrespect for historical truth," refusal to allow historians access to sources and archives, and falsification of historical documents—these are just a few samples of the criticisms to which the historiography of the era of the "personality cult" has been subjected in 1963 and 1964.[41] Simultaneously, the repentant historians began correcting at least some of the distortions of the Stalin era, such as "the incorrect, derogatory and sectarian view" of the role of the Czechs and Slovaks who had fought against the Germans on the Western front in World War II, or the disparaging attitude adopted toward the Slovak and Prague anti-German uprisings of 1944 and 1945.[42] Naturally, the history of the Communist Party itself is to be rewritten, although it is rather unlikely, to say the least, that the entire truth will be told in this delicate field.

Many more telling instances of revisionist inroads could be cited from these and other fields, such as education, law, philosophy, religion, sociology (once again recognized as a legitimate science), and even modern mythology (the stocky figure of "Father Frost," who had been imported from Russia as an atheist substitute for "Baby Jesus," Central Europe's Santa Claus, became another victim of destalinization). Unfortunately, lack of space does not permit any further elaboration.

Conclusions

What is the significance of all these developments? How far has destalinization in Czechoslovakia really progressed? Will the gains that have been made last, or will they be dissipated

[34] Vladimir Manak in *Kulturny zivot*, No. 28, 1963, and Frantisek Zdobina citing Helena Sleisova in *Rude pravo*, Oct. 3, 1963.
[35] R. Selucky in *Kulturny zivot*, Aug. 10, 1963.
[36] R. Kocanda in *Rude pravo*, Jan. 8, 1964.
[37] Milos Ondracek, in *Hospodarske noviny*, Dec. 13, 1963.
[38] R. Selucky in *Kulturni tvorba*, Jan. 30, 1964.
[39] Ondracek, *op. cit.*, also, Evzen Loebl in *Kulturny zivot*, Sept. 28, Oct. 5 and 12, 1963.
[40] Z. Haba in *Hospodarske noviny*, Nov. 8 and 15, 1963.
[41] See, for instance Z. Richtova in *Dejiny a soucasnost*, No. 7, July 1963; Jan Kren in *Kulturni tvorba*, May 23 and 30, 1963; K. Pichlik in *Dejiny a soucasnost*, No. 8, Aug., 1963; V. Vavra and E. Cejka in *Kulturni tvorba*, Aug. 1, 1963.
[42] T. Brod and E. Cejka, *Na zapadni fronte* (On the Western Front), warmly welcomed by reviewers; G. Husak in *Kulturny zivot*, Aug. 3, 1963; A. J. Liehm in *Literarni noviny*, Sept. 7, 1963.

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again like most of the benefits of previous thaws? Or is there a real chance this time of expanding them in the future?

To arrive at some tentative answers, let us single out the most important elements of the recent developments, especially those that are without precedent in previous periods of liberalization:

1) In striking contrast to earlier attempts at destalinization, the present wave has hit the very pinnacle of Communist power in the state, causing the removal of several top-ranking Communists and barely missing the number-one man. Thus, the old Stalinist clique, which had managed to ride out all previous storms unscathed, has finally been broken—surely the most significant single aspect of the recent developments.

2) All the major revisionist victories—the virtual elimination of the old Stalinist leadership, the rehabilitation of the victims of the 1951-54 trials, and the conquest of a notable measure of freedom of criticism and cautious dissent in a number of sensitive areas—have been gained through a stubborn uphill struggle against the solid front of party stalwarts fighting tooth and nail against every liberalizing effort. Unlike some of the previous thaws, this one has not been the usual safety-valve operation of granting concessions from above and keeping them within foreordained bounds.

3) Revisionists, including most of the boldest critics of the party's restrictive policies, have succeeded this time in obtaining a substantial number of seats in the governing bodies of several important cultural organizations, such as the Czechoslovak and Slovak writers' unions, as well as on the editorial boards of such widely-read magazines as *Kulturny zivot* and *Literarni noviny*. They have thus gained an important organizational footing and access to invaluable media of communication, so that they no longer have to go begging to neo-Stalinist officials in order to get their views before the public.

4) A major role in making the revisionist successes possible must undoubtedly be ascribed to recent economic setbacks. Since Czechoslovakia ranks (together with East Germany) as the most advanced industrial country of the Communist orbit, and since her industrial slowdown has now entered its fourth consecutive year,[43] more and more Czechs and Slovaks, including many Communists, have begun to suspect that the "bourgeois" theory of the inevitable levelling-off in the pace of economic growth when a country has reached higher production plateaus might not be altogether wrong. Noting a similar though less pronounced economic slackening in the Soviet Union, they have begun to question the "theory of the undiminished rate" of their economic development.[44] What is more, many influential Czechoslovak economists now doubt whether anything but a very drastic and quite unorthodox revamping of the entire economic system could ever restore a respectable rate of economic growth. Coming shortly after "outproducing capitalism" had been officially proclaimed the decisive weapon for attaining Communist victory on a global scale, these gnawing doubts about the much-adver-

When Do Liberals Become Sectarians?

Recently the Ideological Commission and the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party occupied themselves with an analysis of the situation of our cultural periodicals, and, together with an appreciation of positive features on the basis of voluminous factual background material, they expressed their grave concern over the ideological orientation of certain periodicals and the sometimes inadequate social responsibility of their editors. It is necessary to mention this here because a substantial part of the criticized articles belong to the field of social sciences or their doubtful and confused popularization.

The issue is not only that certain self-appointed combatants against dogmatism in this field open the doors to liberalism and sometimes even bourgeois ideology. Their disproportionately loud utterances are often also accompanied by terror against the views of their opponents, by extreme intolerance, intimidation and silencing; that is, by methods of grossest sectarianism.

—Vladimir Koucky, Secretary of the CPCS CC, Rude pravo (Prague), April 11, 1964.

[43] Once again, not even the modest 1 percent increase planned for industrial production and the 0.7 percent increase planned for labor productivity were fulfilled in 1963. The volume of industrial production fell even below the 1962 level and so did the national income. Agricultural production fared better than in 1962, but still remained below 1960 on a per capita basis. *Prace*, Jan. 28, 1964. For a recent analysis of Czechoslovak economic problems, see, John M. Montias, "A Plan for All Seasons," *Survey* (London), No. 51, Apr. 1964, p. 63.

[44] Jan Kovacik in *Praca*, Feb. 9, 1964.

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tised superiority of Soviety-type economies have gravely damaged the Communist leaders' prestige and improved the position of their critics.

5) Another boost for the revisionist cause in Czechoslovakia came from the persistent secular trend towards liberalization in most of the other countries of the Soviet bloc, including the Soviet Union itself. It was the recrudescence of neo-Stalinism throughout the Soviet orbit following the suppression of the Hungarian uprising that, more than anything else, cut short the Czechoslovak thaw of 1956. *Mutatis mutandis*, the gradual return of more liberal trends in the early 1960's in the USSR, Hungary, and even traditionally rigid Bulgaria and Rumania, as well as the stepped-up rapprochement between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, could not but embolden the ordinarily cautious Czechoslovak revisionists. Indeed, references to "anti-dogmatist" gains in other parts of the bloc, especially the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland, have been occasionally used by advocates of a similar course in Czechoslovakia.

6) The cause of Czechoslovak revisionism has also profited from the fact that the Slovaks rather than the Czechs have assumed the leading role. In view of the longstanding sensitivity of Czech-Slovak relations, a violent suppression of revisionism might have been construed as a revival of anti-Slovakism and Czech chauvinism, and this the Prague regime could ill afford under the delicate circumstances of 1963-64.

While the confluence and mutual interaction of the factors so far mentioned help to explain why destalinization has made good headway in Communist Czechoslovakia, there are other important aspects of the situation which are likely to favor the present conservative party leadership:

(a) Although most of the chief purgers of the Stalin era have now lost their high party positions, they have not been replaced by men of discernibly liberal views. Neither Lenart, who has replaced Siroky, nor Dubcek, who has stepped into Bacilek's shoes, nor Koucky, the new leading spokesman on matters of ideology, appears to be anything but a staunch party *apparatchik* much in the fashion of Novotny and Hendrych. Their statements and behavior up to now have reflected strictly conservative attitudes. Thus while gaining a useful foothold in various cultural organizations, the revisionists have remained excluded from the leading party organs.

(b) The new leadership, including so far Novotny himself, seem to be enjoying the active backing of Khrushchev who for a number of reasons has a great stake on containing revisionism in acceptable bounds and in preserving the stability of existing party line-ups in Eastern Europe. Indeed, during the troubled days of 1962-63, Novotny and his people have been in frequent consultations with the Kremlin. Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's public praise of Novotny as "our close friend," "a loyal son of the Czechoslovak people," and "an indefatigable fighter for communism," on the occasion of the solemn extension of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in December 1963, was clearly meant to bolster Novotny's position.[45]

(c) The industrial workers, whose active support would be needed if revisionist criticism were to be translated into significant political action, have so far been rather passive. Apart from certain abortive stirrings following Barak's arrest in 1962, a good deal of grumbling about various material shortages and a growing cynicism concerning the party's promises, there has been as yet no indication of any major political unrest among the workers or their spokesmen. While the writers' and journalists' gatherings of April-May 1963 seethed with discontent, the congress of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, held roughly at the same time, proceeded tamely along well-trodden dogmatist lines.

(d) Nor have Czechoslovakia's non-Communists thus far made any move to exert their influence. While rejoicing undoubtedly at the party's inner fracas and secretly wishing the revisionists luck, they have evidently been skeptical as to the outcome and thought it therefore wiser to sit on the fence. In a marked contrast to their counterparts in Poland, Czechoslovakia's puppet "non-Communist" parties have continued all along in their usual sycophantic behavior and utter subservience to the leadership of the Communist Party.[46]

(e) Finally, note should be taken of the greatly stepped-up counter-offensive unleashed by the regime toward the close of 1963. An "Ideological Plenum" of the CPCS Central Committee met in a two-day session in December 1963 and its proceedings amounted to one long anti-revisionist tirade. It viciously criticised "the harmless and untenable licentious-

[45] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 13 and 17, 1963.

[46] See, for instance, the proceedings of the All-State Conference of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and of its Central Committee, *Rude pravo*, Jan. 12, 1963, *Svobodne slovo*, Apr. 2, 1963, and *Rude pravo*, Oct. 11, 1963. Also, the sessions of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party, *Rude pravo*, Jan. 12, 1963, and Jan. 6, 1964.

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ness" of the press, scored the "shameful role" played by the leading revisionist magazines, accused the revisionists of attempts "slyly to discredit responsible party workers" and of "political blackmail," called for a tightening of party controls over all communications media, and hinted even at the necessity of replacing undesirable members of editorial boards with "deeply convinced Communists." [47]

[47] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 20-23, 1963.

Thus the revisionist-conservative duel that characterized the Czechoslovak political scene in the last two years seems to be inconclusively tied for the time being. It appears unlikely that the party leadership could once again push the situation back to where it had been before the latest revisionist drive began. But it is just as unlikely that the revisionists could hope for any further meaningful advancement of their cause in the nearest future—unless some radical development in the Soviet party hierarchy should produce an unexpected new opening.

Rumania: Onto the Separate Path

By Randolph L. Braham

The winds of change that have swept across Eastern Europe with varying intensity since 1953 seem finally to have engulfed Rumania. But while the belated paving of the new, specifically Rumanian "road to communism" has occasionally involved spectacular and hitherto unthinkable deviations from the Soviet master blueprint for the Communist world, it has not—so far at least—been accompanied by the type of "liberalization" that characterizes the "national communism" of Yugoslavia or Poland. The Rumanian Workers' [Communist] Party remains firmly in power, and according to present indications the control of the central organs over the management of the economy and other areas of public life is to be strengthened further.

Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the quiet revolution that has taken place in Rumania during the past two years. It has brought about significant changes in the country's internal and international affairs, changes which reflect above all the disarray in the once monolithic Communist bloc. For indeed, without the ever widening split within the world Communist movement, Rumania's recent display of independence and economic nationalism would be inconceivable. The stiffening resistance of the Rumanian leadership to Khrushchev's plans for the economic integration of the bloc, its ostentatious neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, its conspicuous rapprochement with Albania, its refusal to attend the high-level conference of Soviet and East European leaders in East Berlin in June 1963, its eagerness to expand trade and cultural relations with the West, and the spectacular measures recently adopted for the de-Russification of Rumanian life—all these things vividly testify to the growing strength of nationalism in this once most servile of Soviet satellite states.

Paralleling to some extent the historical experience of Yugoslavia, the "revolt" in Rumania began with a refusal to sacrifice national economic goals of industrialization for

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the sake of enhancing the overall productive efficiency of the Comecon nations as a bloc. This resistance to Khrushchev's plan for the integration and specialization of the economies of the bloc nations, at first strictly economic in nature, gradually acquired some political overtones that were even more disquieting to the leaders in the Kremlin. Bucharest's decision to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Albania, the publication in Rumania of the now famous Chinese letter of June 14, 1963, and increasing Rumanian diplomatic and economic activities in the West must have convinced the Soviet leaders of the determination of the Rumanian Communist regime to pursue policies calculated to advance its own national interests.

The seriousness of the issues involved was indicated by the many hectic top-level conferences held in various Communist capitals and the veritable pilgrimages of Soviet and satellite leaders to Bucharest during the years 1961-63. From all discernible signs, the attempts that were made to dissuade the Rumanians from following a "narrow, independent" course failed. Despite this, the Soviet leaders, apparently mindful of the lesson of 1956 and anxious not to amplify the already grave divisions in the Communist camp, have adhered to a soft line in their dealings with the Rumanians.

Rumania's differences with the Soviet Union stemmed from the ambitious industrialization program embodied in the Six-Year Plan and long-range development plan (to 1975) adopted by the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in June 1960. From Moscow's point of view, the Rumanian commitment to rapid, full-scale industrialization and modernization conflicted with the Soviet plan for the multilateral integration and specialization of the Comecon members' economies. The Rumanians, on the other hand, feared that under the Soviet plan, which had the support of the industrially more advanced Comecon countries, Rumania would be kept a primary supplier of raw materials, with an industry geared solely to the manufacture of petrochemical, lumber, food and light industrial products.

Although the Rumanians agreed at the Moscow Comecon conference of June 6-7, 1962, to support and abide by the "principles of international socialist division of labor," they subsequently made it clear that they expected these principles to be applied in accordance with the provisions of the Moscow Declaration of 1960. This position was underlined in a rather remarkable communique issued at the conclusion of an enlarged special plenum of the Central Committee (March 5-8, 1963). The communique went noticeably out of its way to reaffirm the correctness of the stand taken by the party and government leaders and to praise the manner in which Alexandru Birladeanu, chief Rumanian Comecon delegate, had carried out his responsibilities at the various Comecon sessions. While acknowledging the "validity" of the principles of international division of labor, the statement vigorously stressed the importance of implementing them in accordance with the principles of "national independence and sovereignty, full equality of rights, comradely mutual assistance, and mutual benefit."

After the Comecon conference of June 1962, a number of top-level Communist delegations, including those headed by Khrushchev (June 1962), Ulbricht (September 1962), and Podgorny (May-June 1963), went to Bucharest to attempt to persuade the Rumanians of the wisdom of economic integration. The Rumanians, however, stuck tenaciously to their position both on nationalist-economic and doctrinal grounds, invoking Lenin's thesis that the creation of capital-goods industry, with particular emphasis on machine-making, is a necessary step in the process of building a fully-developed socialist state. The struggle reached a climax in the summer of 1963, ending in the virtual capitulation of the more advanced Comecon nations to Rumania. The Soviet plan of integration and specialization was shelved at the Moscow inter-party conference of July 24-26, 1963, which, to the great satisfaction of the Rumanians, reaffirmed the principles of "equality, strict observance of sovereignty, and mutual comradely assistance" as enunciated in the Moscow Declaration of 1960, and emphasized that "the best possible basis for multilateral coordination of plans is provided by bilateral consultations between member states." [1]

With the victory of bilateralism over multilateralism and of "national" industrialization over multilateral integration and specialization firmly established, Comecon seems to have entered a new phase of relative tranquility. Although no spectacular successes have as yet been achieved, the Comecon nations appear to be manifesting a more cooperative spirit, as

[1] For further details, see J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," *Survey* (London), No. 49, October 1963, pp. 19-34. (Just as the present article was going to press, an important new "policy analysis" made public in Bucharest following a week-long special session of the Central Committee re-emphasized Rumania's opposition to any outside interference in its industrialization program and to the establishment of any supranational control body for Comecon. See *Scinteia* [Bucharest], April 26, 1964.)

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reflected, for example, in the agreements reached late last year for a partial pooling of freight-car facilities, establishment of the Comecon Bank for Economic Cooperation, and concerted development of chemical industries.[2]

Rumania's conspicuous display of economic independence can to a large extent be attributed to the increasingly discernible "national Communist" conceptions of the Rumanian leaders. Although they are still among the least popular Communist rulers in Eastern Europe, these leaders—now mostly home-trained, non-intellectual persons of Rumanian ethnic origin and Greek Orthodox religious background—seem to have impressed the traditionally Russophobe Rumanians [3] with their ambitious plans to exploit the country's vast natural resources for the achievement of comprehensive industrialization.

Especially noticeable is the changing image of Gheorghiu-Dej, who has now become the symbol of Rumania's economic independence. A strongman who avoids dramatic gestures, the chief of state and party has consistently followed a prudent, though often ruthless, policy that has enabled him to remain in power through all the twists and turns of the postwar "people's democratic" era. Paradoxically enough, up until his recent economic "revolt," he had managed to survive mainly by consistently, though not always enthusiastically, toeing the Moscow line. He seems to have a political sixth sense and a keen sensitivity to changing political winds that have made him singularly successful in adjusting to, and even anticipating, many of the decisions taken by the Kremlin. Thus, for example, when the 22nd CPSU Congress (October 1961) called for a renewal of destalinization, Gheorghiu-Dej could "demonstrate" that Rumania had to a large extent already accomplished such a program. Although, on the eve of the Congress, he had laid a wreath at the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum to honor "the brilliant teacher of the world Communist movement, V. I. Lenin, and . . . his disciple, J. V. Stalin," he fully agreed the next day with Khrushchev's new exposure of Stalin's crimes.

Reporting on the 22nd Congress to the Plenum of the Rumanian party Central Committee (November 30-December 5, 1961), Gheorghiu-Dej implied that the anti-Stalin campaign in Rumania had already begun in 1952 (in Stalin's lifetime!) with the elimination of the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu group, and had been carried further with the purging of Iosif Chisinevschi and Miron Constantinescu in 1957. In order to divest himself of responsibility, he attributed the crimes committed during the Stalin era to the activities of these already-purged comrades. In March 1962 he paid further deference to the political requirements of the times by instituting a series of formal destalinization decrees, but these measures were conspicuously devoid of any real elements of "liberalization" such as accompanied the drive against the personality cult in Poland, or even Hungary. They pertained primarily to the removal of Stalin's name, as well as those of living Rumanian and foreign Communists, from streets, squares, parks and a variety of enterprises and institutions.[4]

Indeed, in spite of the spectacular changes in some areas of Rumanian policy in recent years, the country continues to be the most heavily policed in the Soviet East European bloc. The party's grip on every aspect of national life—its control over artists, writers, scientists, students, workers, and all other segments of the population—remains in many respects as tight as it ever was, even at the height of the Stalin era. Should the present position of the Chinese Communists ever prevail in the world Communist movement, Gheorghiu-Dej could well prove that he has been a Stalinist all along!

The vehicle of control is still the party, and there is nothing in the presently available evidence to show that Gheorghiu-Dej's position at the helm is challenged. While the technical echelons of the party hierarchy have received added responsibilities and the party membership rolls have been considerably enlarged,[5] the

[2] These measures were adopted at the 9th and 10th sessions of the Comecon Executive Committee, held in Moscow (October 15-22, 1963) and Bucharest (December 17-21, 1963), respectively. For the texts of the communiques, see *Scinteia*, Oct. 24 and Dec. 22, 1963.

[3] Although Communist historians emphasize Russia's contributions to the establishment of Rumania as an independent state, the Rumanians have long been deeply antagonistic towards the Russians, particularly resenting the loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the USSR.

[4] For further details of the destalinization process in Rumania, see G. M. Razi, "Rumania: Don't Rock the Boat!," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May-June), 1962, pp. 18-21.

[5] Under a decision of the Central Committee Plenum of April 23-25, 1962, the regulations governing admission to party membership were eased, making it possible for former members of the peasant and bourgeois parties to join. The Plenum also abolished the formerly required period of candidacy for persons who had distinguished themselves in industry and agriculture or

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decision-making process is still concentrated in the hands of Gheorghiu-Dej's entourage.[6]

By virtue of the governmental changes of March 1961, the party First Secretary emerged also as head of state, symbolizing the formal unification of the party and government apparatuses. The major modification in the governmental structure was the abandonment of the Soviet-style Presidium (of the Grand National Assembly) as the chief executive organ and its replacement by a 17-member State Council similar to the one adopted earlier in Czechoslovakia. The changes also involved a reduction in the number of ministries and the establishment of economic councils—"the Rumanian *sovnarkhozy*"—intended to operate under the auspices of the executive committees of the regional people's councils.[7] While the reorganization was presumably designed to increase the efficiency of the state administration, it resulted in fact in a closer subordination of the administrative powers of the government apparatus to the party Politburo and Central Committee than is to be found in any other East European country. At the same time, a 39-member commission was established under the chairmanship of Gheorghiu-Dej to draw up a new constitution. This document has yet to be announced,[8] but it is expected to follow the Czechoslovakian example of 1960 and formalize Rumania's transition from a "people's democracy" to a "socialist republic."

Since the governmental changes of 1961, the Rumanian Communists have pursued an increasingly dynamic and flexible, if not always successful, domestic and international policy. In the domestic sphere, the ambitious drive for rapid and comprehensive industrialization has been coupled with the relentless execution of the agricultural collectivization program launched soon after the proclamation of the people's democratic regime in 1948. This program was completed in April 1962, and the Ministry of Agriculture was then abolished and the administration of "socialist collective and state farms" transferred to a Higher Council of Agriculture.[9] Hopes for higher agricultural yields, however, do not seem to have been fulfilled; in fact, in the year following the completion of collectivization, the level of net agricultural production actually declined.[10] Nor does the present picture look much rosier in consumer goods production and housing. Although the party and government have been trying to increase the output of light industrial products and the level of housing construction, they have not been willing to divert adequate investment funds from capital goods industry to ensure progress in these areas.

Rumania seems to have been more successful in the international sphere, especially in the drive to assert its economic independence and break through the isolation that characterized its position during the Stalin era. Taking advantage of the increased maneuverability afforded by the dissensions in the Communist world, especially the Sino-Soviet conflict, Rumania has conspicuously broadened its contacts with both the non-Comecon Communist states and the free world. While maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet-bloc nations, Rumania has reestablished full diplomatic relations with Albania,[11] developed its political and

made important contributions to Rumania's economic development. Such persons could henceforth be immediately accepted as full members. By the summer of 1963, party enrollment had increased to an all-time high of 1.1 million, or about 5.6 percent of the total population. "Munca Organizatorica la Nivelul Sarcinilor Actuale," *Lupta de Clasa* (Bucharest), Vol. 43, No. 7, July 1963, pp. 3-13.

[6] For a background study of the present Rumanian leadership, see D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," *Slavic Review*, No. 3 (October), 1961, pp. 477-494.

[7] For the various decrees relating to the governmental changes of 1961, see *Buletinul Oficial al Marii Adunari Nationale a Republicii Populare Romine* (Bucharest), Vol. 10, No. 9, March 25, 1961, pp. 137-44.

[8] *Ibid.* Although more than three years have passed since the establishment of the commission, no concrete steps have yet been taken towards adoption of the new constitution.

[9] The measures relating to the reorganization of agriculture were taken at the close of a special four-day session of the Grand National Assembly (April 27-30, 1962). For the text of the proceedings and decrees, see *Scinteia*, April 28, May 1, May 13, and May 15, 1962.

[10] The decline was due to a combination of inefficiency and bad weather. According to a survey of the US Department of Agriculture, net agricultural production in 1962-63 was expected to be 4 percent below the 1961-62 level; total grain production for 1962 was estimated about 10 percent lower than in 1961, and about 20 percent below the planned goal. The rate of mechanization in 1962-63 also seems to have slowed down in comparison with 1960-61. The number of tractors supplied in 1962 and planned for delivery in 1963 was 20 percent below the 1961 level. The absence of any increase in net agricultural production during the first three years of the Six-Year Plan means that "virtually all of the 70 to 80 percent increase planned for 1965 is still to be accomplished." *The Eastern Europe Agricultural Situation. Supplement No. 3 to the 1963 World Agricultural Situation.* Washington, D.C., US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1963, pp. 38-42.

[11] The cordiality of Rumanian-Albanian relations presents a striking contrast to the coolness between Albania and the other Soviet satellites. At the time of the funeral of Medar Shtylla, late head of the Albanian People's Assembly, Tirana Radio (Dec. 21, 1963) gave special publicity to the fact that both the Rumanian and Chinese Ambassadors had laid wreaths at the ceremony. The Rumanian-Albanian trade agreements for 1963 (March 7, 1963) and 1964 (Dec. 28, 1963), moreover, called for "considerable increases" in trade.

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cultural ties with China, and embarked on an ambitious cooperative investment program with Yugoslavia.

But even though the Rumanians seem to be going out of their way to foster good relations and broaden their contacts with Peking,[12] they have consistently made it clear that they support Moscow in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. During the Sino-Soviet ideological talks in Moscow last summer, for example, the Rumanians published a pamphlet written by a member of the party Central Committee supporting "peaceful coexistence" and cooperation with the West.[13] The pamphlet fully endorsed the Soviet thesis that international problems should be solved through negotiation and mutual concessions, and it rejected as absurd the Chinese Communist position relative to the exporting of revolutions. Later, in the fall of 1963, Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer made a major foreign policy statement in which he called for an end to polemics in the Sino-Soviet split and for the admission of "all socialist countries" into Comecon, at the same time criticizing China implicitly by calling it "inadmissible" for Communist countries to launch "indiscriminate accusations [against one another], such as 'treason to the interests of the peoples of the socialist camp . . .' and 'smoothing the path for the return of capitalism'." [14]

Maurer's "objective" public stand seems to have made a deep impression on Moscow, for early in March 1964 he was selected to head a top-level Rumanian party delegation to Peking. This initiative presumably had the encouragement of the Soviet leaders, who had often avowed their desire to end the public ideological debate with the Chinese,[15] and appears to have been aimed at averting a formal split between the Soviet and Chinese parties. However, the Sino-Rumanian talks, which took place in Peking from March 3 to 10, apparently failed to achieve any positive results. This was indicated both by the brief and indifferent wording of the communique issued at the end of the talks and by the fact that the send-off given to the delegation was markedly devoid of the fanfare and organized public enthusiasm that had marked its arrival. Although it had been originally intimated that the conferees would exchange views on "the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist and workers' movement," the communique stated only that "questions of common concern" had been discussed and that the talks had taken place "in a friendly atmosphere." After a brief stopover in the North Korean capital, Maurer went to Gagry, on the Black Sea, where he conferred with Khrushchev (March 15-16), indirectly confirming the Soviet leader's interest in the Rumanian mission.

Though the mission obviously failed, the Rumanians have continued to manifest an increasingly "neutralist" position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. They have consistently opposed a "showdown" conference of the world Communist parties that might formalize the intra-Communist split. Desirous of avoiding public polemics with Peking, the Rumanians, in contrast to the other Soviet satellites, have refused to express public support of Khrushchev's resolute stand against Mao. This became particularly clear during the Moscow celebrations in honor of Khrushchev's 70th birthday on April 17 last. The conspicuous absence of Gheorghiu-Dej and the last-minute arrival of Maurer and Stoica made it quite apparent that the Rumanians, while supporting Moscow's ideological position, are opposed to the tactics followed by the Soviet leaders towards the Chinese.

Rumania's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute was reviewed at a special Central Committee meeting of April 15-22, which had been convened—ostensibly to hear a report on the Maurer mission to Peking—just two days after the publication of Suslov's attack on Peking (*Pravda*, April 3). The Soviet leader's attack marked the end of the moratorium on public ideological debate which Moscow had unilaterally adopted six months earlier. The timing of the Central Committee meeting and the decision to award Khrushchev the "Star of the Rumanian People's Republic"—the country's highest decoration—suggest that the Rumanian Communists, in their characteristic prudent manner, were anxious both to arm themselves against any possible accusation of deviationism from the Moscow line, and at the same time to avert the convocation of a "showdown" inter-

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[12] In 1963, Rumania entered into a number of agreements with Peking relating to cultural exchanges (July 6), scientific cooperation (July 8), and trade (Dec. 28). It is interesting to note that while the trade agreement for 1964 calls "for an increase in volume over the preceding year," Rumanian-Chinese trade had previously declined from 356.3 million *lei* in 1959 to 174.1 million lei in 1961. (N. Suta, *op. cit.*)

[13] H. Dona, *Un Principiu de Baza al Politicii Externe a RPR—Coexistenta Pasnica.* Bucharest, Editura Politica, June 1963.

[14] I. G. Maurer, "The Inviolable Foundation of the Unity of the International Communist Movement," *World Marxist Review* (Prague), Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1963, pp. 11-20. Originally published in *Scinteia*, November 4, 1963.

[15] Moscow had actually avoided open polemics against the Chinese for almost six months prior to the departure of the Rumanian delegation. The evident failure of the delegation's mission has been followed by Soviet resumption of the offensive.

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national conference of Communist parties, of which the Rumanians evidently do not wholeheartedly approve.*

Rumania's rapprochement with China has not deterred the Bucharest leaders from simultaneously fostering a steady amelioration of relations with the Yugoslavs, whom the Chinese denounce as "traitors to Marxism-Leninism." Although Rumania had been in the front line of the battle against Tito during the 1948-55 period of Soviet-Yugoslav antagonism, Rumanian-Yugoslav relations have improved considerably since 1957. This improvement culminated in a nine-day official visit to Yugoslavia by Gheorghiu-Dej in November last year, when the leaders of the two governments formally signed the long-awaited agreement on the construction and exploitation of the "Iron Gates" hydroelectric power and navigation complex on the Danube. The agreement envisages an investment of $400 million in the project, which, when completed in the early 1970's, is expected to produce 10 billion kilowatt-hours of power annually. The fact that this very costly project was undertaken outside the framework of Comecon impressively demonstrates both the confidence of the two governments in the continuation of Yugoslav-Rumanian friendship and their growing economic independence.[16]

Even more significant, perhaps, are the moves which Rumania has made to expand trade relations with the non-Communist world, especially Western Europe, and to broaden diplomatic and cultural-scientific contacts with the West. It has concluded agreements with a number of Western countries (including Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Iceland) reciprocally raising diplomatic representation between them to ambassadorial level, and it has also entered into a variety of technical, scientific and cultural accords with individual Western governments.[17] These accords have been supplemented by increased exchanges of visits by governmental,[18] parliamentary, technical-scientific, and academic delegations, as well as artistic groups.

Despite the fact that the propaganda image of the United States in Rumania continues to be that of chief "imperialist villain," Rumanian-American relations have undergone perceptible improvement since 1960, when an agreement was concluded for the settlement of claims of US nationals arising out of war damages, nationalization of American property, and commercial and financial debts.[19] This was followed by agreements for modest but potentially promising cultural-scientific exchanges,[20] and there have recently been some portents of a possible resumption of economic contacts. In October 1963, for example, the US Commerce Department granted a license permitting a private American company to provide technical data for the "design, procurement, equipment, construction, installation and operation of a basic oxygen steel mill" in Rumania.[21] The friendlier tone of Rumanian-US relations was also evidenced last year by the unprecedented presentation on Rumanian television, on the July 4th anniversary of US independence, of a special program consisting of American popular music and a documentary film.

There have been various indications of Rumania's growing international stature in recent years. In particular, Bucharest has assumed an increasingly active and important role in Balkan and Danubian affairs, as well as in the United Nations, where Rumania was

(*Continued on page 22*)

* Since this was written, the Rumanian party has made public an official statement (*Scinteia*, April 26) revealing that in March it urged the Soviet and Chinese parties to agree to participate in a three-party commission, with the Rumanian party acting as mediator, to prepare the way for the holding of a new conference of "all Communist parties of the world, and not merely certain parties." The purpose of the conference, as described in the Rumanian statement, would be merely "to discuss and finalize" an appeal to all the Communist parties "to solve controversial issues in conformity with the norms jointly established at the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences."

[16] The Rumanians also maintain close trade relations with the Yugoslavs. The latest trade agreement was signed on December 24, 1963, covering the type and volume of goods to be exchanged in 1964.

[17] *E.g.*, Rumania signed an agreement with Italy (Sept. 17, 1963) on cultural-scientific and technical exchanges for 1963-64, one with France (Sept. 20) for 1963-65, and one with Belgium (Nov. 13) for five years.

[18] Especially noteworthy was the visit of a Rumanian delegation, headed by Gheorghiu-Dej and Maurer, to Indonesia, India and Burma in the fall of 1962. The Rumanians have long been reported anxious to obtain Indian and Brazilian ore for their developing steel industry in order to lessen their dependence on the USSR.

[19] The Rumanian-US agreement of March 20, 1960, provided for the payment by Rumania of a lump-sum settlement of $24,526,370.

[20] The most recent of these agreements was signed on December 19, 1963, for exchanges during 1964. Under earlier agreements, for instance, a Rumanian troupe of folk singers and dancers visited the United States in the fall of 1962; a highly successful "US Transport" exhibit was held in Rumania in the fall of 1963; a group of American oil industrialists and technicians visited Rumanian oil installations in September-October 1963, and a Rumanian delegation headed by Ion Dumitru, Deputy Minister of the Petroleum and Chemical Industry, visited similar installations in the US.

[21] *East Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 12, December 1963, p. 63. Another indication of better Rumanian-US relations was Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman's visit to Rumania in August 1963.

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Nationalism in Bucharest . . .

WE MET PURELY by chance, at a small seaside resort in Italy, where I rested my bones after finishing with a particularly boring reporting assignment. The woman was old, Jewish and Viennese-looking. Her son was dark-haired, thoughtful-looking, in early middle age. At first we had difficulty with the language—fluent but labored French on their side, equally labored and German-accented Italian on my side. But then we switched to German, and the ice was broken.

The story they told me was almost my own, only transposed in time by about thirty years. The two were Rumanian Jews, highly educated people, the old woman the widow of a once successful lawyer, and the son some sort of a highly-placed technical administrator, or ex-administrator, with a respectable education in modern economics and considerable knowledge of Western economic theories. They had to wait here, in a cheap hotel, for their transatlantic passage tickets, which had been paid for by American relatives.

I was amazed. Hadn't the Rumanian Communists put an end to all Jewish emigration back in 1949? And weren't Jews who as much as inquired about chances of joining their relatives in Israel being put in jail?

The son smiled, a bit sadly: "You didn't know? Here, have a look!" And he pulled from his pocket two valid Rumanian passports, with foreign visas stamped on them. Clearly, I didn't know—nor did any other people, especially newspaper people (as far as I was informed), know a thing about the fate of the dark-haired man, whom I shall call Dr. Iliescu, and that of, perhaps, a few hundred, or thousand, ex-Rumanians like him. As it developed in the course of his narrative, my information was out of date by about a year or eighteen months.

RUMANIA, DR. ILIESCU told me, was going through a unique process of "destalinization," the major ingredient of which was a highly idiosyncratic nationalism manifested not only in the country's foreign (and especially foreign-trade) policies, but in its domestic policies as well. After having grudgingly granted, for some 13 or 14 years after the disappearance of the "National Front Government" of Petru Groza, some modicum of "cultural autonomy" to its national minorities (though not to the Jews), Rumanian communism has now apparently returned to the pan-Rumanianism of its predecessor, and has embarked upon a policy of "Rumanizing" the entire country. Not only has Russian been suppressed as a compulsory subject of school instruction, but the minority languages (German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romany, the Gypsy tongue) have again been abolished as media of teaching in the former "minority" schools; they have now been granted the position of "first foreign language" taught. Lutheran churches of the Transylvanian "Saxons" and Catholic ones of the "Swabian" Germans in the former Banate district, as well as Calvinist chapels and Catholic places of worship of the Hungarians, are being closed; and the process of abolishing Jewish synagogues continues as before. Newspapers, book publishing, theater playing, and folk singing in the minority tongues are gradually petering out. Ambitious youngsters, eager to get on in life, have to "Rumanize" their names, and speak and write perfect Rumanian. Those who are not willing to do so are told to join their "capitalist" connections in the West or their "revisionist" co-nationals in Hungary or Bulgaria. Elderly people, in receipt of a pension or otherwise unemployable, are particularly "encouraged" to stop living at the expense of the "people" and to draw their support from their "reactionary" relations abroad.

Nevertheless, officially permitted emigration, though going on steadily, does not amount to more than a trickle. The reasons for this were made abundantly clear to me by Dr. Iliescu.

IT WAS ALMOST literally the same story (and Dr. Iliescu, who had obviously read and heard much about the fate of the German Jews under Hitler, even used similar expressions) which I and my family had experienced so many years ago. Applicants for permission to leave the country have to trudge over a long and weary road from one government office to another, waiting for hours in long queues in the streets or in musty-smelling corridors. Once they reach an official's desk, they obtain a signed and stamped document—though, of course, for a high fee, frequently including a "golden handshake" for the man behind the office desk—which affirms, among other things, that the

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. . . A Conversation Piece

applicant's income tax and social security contributions have been fully paid up to the (often hypothetical) date of his departure; that he has no debts to the recently opened deferred-payment shops; that there is no "moral" or political reason why permission ought to be withheld; and that he "owes" the state no maintenance for an aged relative—for when the Communist "welfare state," some years ago, increased its old-age pensions, it also issued a regulation that people earning above a certain minimum have the duty to "refund" to the state the pensions of close relatives such as fathers, mothers, or older brothers and sisters. Either these relatives must be taken out of the country by the applicants at their own expense and with a visa which is not easy to obtain for virtually unemployable persons, or the applicant has to "capitalize" his "debt" to the state in respect of the pension he is obliged to pay.

The applicant, often treated deferentially by civil servants of the old Austrian school, or brutally by survivors from the semi-oriental "Iron Guard" of King Carol—exactly as my father had been addressed reverently as "Herr Geheimrat" by maudlin old Prussian policemen who even wished him a good journey out of the Third Reich, or as "filthy Jew-swine" by young Nazi officeholders—has not reached the end of the road yet. In almost all cases, he has to negotiate with the State Bank and the State Museum Directorate about "valuables" to be left behind. These comprise every "work of art," even if such "artifacts" are only indifferently painted family portraits; books; all jewelry; table silver (that is, if he has any left after frequenting the black market in order to finance his way out of the country); and furniture, which has to be sold at cut prices to friends or "donated" to children's homes, "workers' rest homes," or "houses of culture"—the transport, naturally, to be paid for by the donor. Cash and savings accounts, with the exception of the price of a railroad ticket and meal vouchers for meals en route, must be transferred to a blocked "Emigration Account" at the State Bank. My new friend used the Nazi term for this final extortion: *"Reichsfluchtsteuer"* (Reich-escape-tax), which Hitler imposed on the Jews who left before 1939.

As all foreign correspondence is censored, and relations with people living abroad are suspect, the applicants are often hauled in by the police and accused of treacherous intentions. Sometimes they are kept under arrest for some time, without being brought to trial. On release, they usually find that their jobs are gone. This happens most frequently when the would-be emigrant visits a foreign embassy or legation—as he is forced to do, sooner or later, to get his visa.

Germans living in Rumania are often *kolkhoz* farmers. Once they have made the necessary contact with a foreign embassy, they are expelled from the *kolkhoz*, and as their wages are paid them partly in kind, their families are exposed to starvation.

"But then, emigrating must cost a fortune?" I asked. Dr. Iliescu nodded sadly: "It does, indeed. And if I had not had an aunt and several cousins in the West who sent me, in gift parcels, the valuable goods that fetch high prices in the black, or 'gray' market (textiles, cosmetics, etc.), I would never have made it, financially."

THE GREATEST indignity comes last: No one is permitted to take with him, in his pocket diary, more than fifteen foreign addresses. (This list, too, has to be presented and officially stamped). When he finally crosses the frontier of his inhospitable homeland, the frontier guards and customs officer, obviously on orders from above, ruthlessly destroy all special permissions obtained for "exporting" golden wedding rings, watches, fountain pens, and small personal trinkets, confiscating such small articles of personal jewelry, and also some of the lists of addresses.

Thus, as the migrants arrive in Vienna or Istanbul (their tickets are never issued for a longer distance), they have to beg maintenance from relief committees and waste precious weeks reestablishing foreign contacts, sending telegrams and letters confirming their arrival and asking both for financial help and for assistance in finding a new job abroad.

Such is the new nationalist "nationality" policy of Communist Rumania. As I listened to Dr. Iliescu, it all sounded grimly familiar.

—A Correspondent

(To protect his informants, the author of this report, now working for a British newspaper, must remain unidentified.)

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elected to a two-year term on the Security Council (1962-63), and has served on the 17-nation Geneva Disarmament Committee. Rumanian actions in the UN have, moreover, manifested an increasingly discernible independence of the Soviet bloc. During the 1963 session of the General Assembly, Rumania twice voted differently from the rest of the bloc: on November 20, the Rumanian representative on the Political Committee of the Assembly voted for a US-backed resolution favoring a denuclearized zone in Latin America;[22] and on November 30, Rumania, together with Hungary, abstained from voting on a Soviet-supported resolution recommending a regional distribution of jobs in the UN Secretariat.

Impressive as the recent gains in Rumania's international prestige have been, however, they have contributed less to the popularity of the regime at home than have certain domestic measures appealing to the traditional nationalism of the Rumanian people. The Rumanians have always regarded themselves as the inheritors and defenders of Roman-Latin civilization in a sea of Slavs and Magyars. Catering to this sentiment, the Rumanian Communist leaders took the first steps in a new "Rumanization" policy soon after the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Labeling the Transylvanian Magyars' overt manifestation of sympathy and ethnic solidarity with their compatriots in Hungary as "chauvinism" and "bourgeois nationalism," the regime moved to break the "national isolation" of the potentially most troublesome segment of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the student body: in February 1959, the Hungarian Bólyai University of Cluj was amalgamated with the Rumanian Babes University of the same city to form what is now called the Babes-Bólyai University, a predominantly Rumanian institution of higher learning.[23] Another step in the same policy was the action taken by the regime at the end of 1960 to "re-Rumanize" geographic names, involving a return to traditional pre-Communist nomenclature.[24]

But perhaps the most popular aspect of recent Rumanian policy has been the trend towards a partial "de-Russification" of Rumanian life. The first overt manifestation of this tendency came at the height of the Rumanian dispute with Comecon towards the end of 1962 and involved a clash over the historical interpretation of the *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944, and the contribution of the Rumanian Communists to the defeat of Nazism. The dispute grew out of a book by a Soviet historian which, in describing Rumania's involvement in World War II, failed to acknowledge the Rumanian Communists' claimed role in the 1944 coup.[25] To correct this "mistake," Gheorghiu-Dej himself gave the "correct" Rumanian version of the 1944 events in a speech to the Grand National Assembly on December 29, 1962, commemorating the 15th anniversary of the "people's democratic" regime. He stated:

In the conditions of the victorious offensive of the Soviet Army and of the powerful upsurge of the people's anti-fascist fight, the ruling classes panicked and the state apparatus of the military-fascist dictatorship began to fall apart. Our country's only active political force, the Rumanian Communist Party, polarizing around it all the anti-fascist patriotic elements, implemented the policy which aimed at achieving a coalition of all political groups and forces which were in favor of Rumanian withdrawal from the fascist war.[26]

This dispute, like the clash with Comecon, ended in a Rumanian victory. Another Soviet historian, in a subsequently published article, conceded the correctness of the Rumanian Communist interpretation.[27]

Following this implicit downgrading of the Red Army's role in the liberation of the coun-

[22] Some observers, however, interpreted this vote as inspired by a Soviet desire to exploit the Latin background of the Rumanians and use them as a "Trojan horse" for Communist penetration of Latin America.

[23] For further details on the position of the Magyar minority in Rumania, see J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," *The World Today*, Vol. 19, No. 11, November 1963, pp. 498-506.

[24] These changes were approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 24, 1960. *Inter alia*, the city of Stalin was renamed Brasov, and the regions of Baia Mare, Constanta, Craiova, Oradea, Pitesti and Timisoara were redesignated by their traditional Rumanian names of Maramures, Dobrogea, Oltenia, Crisana, Arges and Banat, respectively. The "Magyar Autonomous Region" was renamed "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region," emphasizing the Rumanian character of the area.

[25] The book in question was V. B. Ushakov's *The Foreign Policy of Hitlerite Germany*. See *East Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1963, p. 51.

[26] *Ibid.*, quoting from *Scinteia*, December 30, 1962. This version was reiterated by Nicolae Ceausescu, a member of the Politburo, in a speech commemorating the 19th anniversary of the coup. See *Scinteia*, August 23, 1963.

[27] Ushakov's "mistake" was rectified in an article ("The Victory of Socialism in the Rumanian People's Republic") by E. D. Karpeschenko, a member of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the Academy's journal *New and Newest History*. See *East Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1963, p. 52.

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try, the Rumanians have moved cautiously towards a rediscovery of the "progressive" elements in their own national history and culture. Russian names previously given to theaters, cultural centers, and other establishments have been gradually replaced.[28] In September 1963, the Maxim Gorky Institute of Russian Language and Literature, a center of Soviet educational influence, was deprived of its separate identity and incorporated into the Faculty of Slavic Languages and Literature of the newly-established Institute of Foreign Languages and Literature of the C.I. Parhon University of Bucharest, marking one of a series of measures which have gradually de-emphasized Russian-language studies in Rumanian educational institutions.[29] In October 1963, the Rumanian-language edition (*Timpuri Noi*) of the Soviet propaganda monthly *New Times* (the only Soviet periodical published in Rumanian) was discontinued, and a new magazine entitled *Lumea* (The World) was introduced in its place. Judging from the first few issues, this new magazine consists largely of reprints from Western newspapers and periodicals, including *The New York Times, The New York Herald-Tribune, New Republic* and *Newsweek*. There has also been a growing tendency to "re-Latinize" Rumanian orthography, reversing the "Slavification" measures taken in the 1950's. A leading figure in this movement has been Rumania's most honored poet, Tudor Arghezi, who has enjoyed the confidence of the regime for many years.[30]

The gradual de-emphasizing of Russian influences and the modest but promising expansion of cultural-scientific contacts with the West have been accompanied by a relative easing of internal tensions. Like their counterparts in Hungary and Poland, the Rumanian Communist leaders have become increasingly convinced of the wisdom and necessity of winning the loyalty and cooperation of the people in order to ensure the attainment of their ambitious plans. In their drive for popularity and acceptance, they have imitated some of the devices used by the Hungarians and the Poles—without, however, adopting their neighbors' basic domestic reforms. Wherever possible, they have substituted pressure and persuasion for coercion, and they have taken a series of measures calculated to appease the intellectuals. There is greater tolerance of dissent and innovation, as reflected in the occasional appearance of livelier articles in the press and the fact that subdued political jokes are again heard on the streets of Bucharest. In clubs, parks, and cafes, one can also detect less hesitation to grumble and criticize.

Nevertheless, Rumanian intellectuals have not displayed as much restiveness as their Hungarian and Polish—or even their Czechoslovak—colleagues: they have not yet produced a Tibor Dery, a Leszek Kolakowski, or a Ladislav Mnacko. This can be attributed in part to the firmer grip of the Rumanian Communists and perhaps also, in some degree, to the greater opportunism of the Rumanian intellectuals. The present manifestations of "intellectual freedom" are, to a large extent, government-condoned if not government-sponsored, and their continuation is undoubtedly dependent on the future political requirements of the party.

The limits of official tolerance in the literary field have been illustrated by the tribulations of a play written by Teodor Mazilu, a young Rumanian dramatist. The play, "Stupid People in the Moonlight," was favorably received in the fall of 1962 and even obtained the official stamp of approval of the Dramaturgy Section of the Rumanian Writers' Union, which evaluated it as "original and refreshing." After being awarded a first prize by the Congress of Young Actors, it was staged at the Lucia Sturdza Bulandra Theater in Bucharest, where it was acclaimed by enthusiastic audiences. After a short while, however, the play was suddenly banned as a "vulgar and ideologically false comedy." The regime apparently could not tolerate the parody of socialist-realist principles that some sections of the play implied, and it was also annoyed by the audience's sympathetic reception of the "negative" rather than the "positive" characters. The banning of the play warned Rumanian artists that they dare not overstep the bounds set by the party, but at the same time the public discussion

[28] Towards the end of 1963 for example, the Maxim Gorky movie theater became the Union, the Alexandr Popov became the Dacia, and the 1 Mai became the Excelsior.

[29] Russian ceased to be a compulsory subject at Rumanian universities after 1956 and was formally dropped as a requirement in the competitive examinations for university admission in 1957. Last year the compulsory study of Russian was also eliminated for pupils below the eighth grade, and there are now plans to eliminate it in the upper grades as well. Another interesting development was the closing last fall of a large book store in Bucharest specializing in Russian-language books.

[30] Arghezi has particularly objected to the spelling of the country's name as "Rominia" instead of the traditional "Romania." He expressed his feelings on the subject in an article entitled "Acasa," in *Gazeta Literara* (Bucharest), Vol. 10, No. 42, October 17, 1963, p. 1. His campaign seems to be having some success. According to a *New York Times* article of January 20, 1964, newly-minted coins are again inscribed "Romania."

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evoked by the regime's action provided a positive indication of the gradually changing political climate.

In the final analysis, it is evident that the Rumanians do not enjoy the degree of freedom that presently prevails in Poland or Hungary. There is no doubt that they welcome the conscious effort of the regime in recent years to identify itself with nationalist aspirations, and that they wholeheartedly support its demonstrations of "independence" from Soviet control. But there is also little doubt that the majority of Rumanians still consider Communist rule a product of foreign domination, and they certainly entertain no illusions about the dictatorial nature of that rule. Indeed, notwithstanding the many encouraging developments of the last few years, the basic elements of the party dictatorship remain unchanged. While terror has been replaced by more subtle techniques of control, the secret police is still ubiquitous and remains the final guarantor of the regime's authority. Nor does the adoption of a genuine "liberalization" program in the near future appear at all likely in view of the regime's commitment to rapid, full-scale industrialization and modernization.

In the international field, though Rumania has succeeded in asserting a greater degree of independence through skillful exploitation of dissensions in the Communist camp, its long-run freedom of action remains narrowly circumscribed. It is closely linked to the Soviet Union in many ways: *geographically,* by a long common border; *militarily,* through the Warsaw Pact; *ideologically,* through a common interpretation of Marxism-Leninism; and *economically,* by Comecon and a network of bilateral intra-bloc arrangements.

Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the many significant changes that have brought about the emergence of a new brand of Rumanian "national communism." While today this involves destalinization without liberalization, and a peculiar combination of Stalinist economics and "de-Russification," it is not altogether inconceivable that the continuing winds of change might eventually bring about "Rumanization" with genuine "liberalization."

Hungary: Literary Renascence

By Laszlo M. Tikos

Like the other countries within the Soviet orbit, Hungary in the 1960's remains a Communist dictatorship, yet the present-day Hungarian political climate differs so markedly from that prevailing in the rest of the Communist bloc that one cannot help wondering why this is so. The more one ponders the question in the light of the happenings of the last few years, the more evident it becomes that it was the bittersweet days of 1956 which predestined Hungary to evolve along different lines. Some Western commentators have viewed the current Hungarian scene as signifying that the "freedom fighters did win the revolt against Khrushchev, after all, even though the Communist rulers are still in charge of things." [1] More cautious Western opinion speaks only of a "liberalization" of communism, implying by this that the process is taking place despite

[1] "A Look Inside Hungary—Seven Years After the Uprising," *US News and World Report,* Dec. 30, 1963, p. 50.

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Communist rule. Hungary's Communist rulers, on the other hand, deny any such implication and insist that the evolution of recent years is the product of their "genuine Communist" policy.[2]

Whatever may be the case, the Hungarian man in the street could not care less about matters of definition. For him it is the results that are important. And the results are: greater personal, spiritual, and political freedom, an increased measure of national independence and economic well-being, and an end of isolation from the West—all things that the 1956 revolution stood for and that now are more in evidence than at any other time since the Communist takeover in 1948. Yet, all these advances are still severely limited by the institutional and ideological dogmas of the Communist dictatorship.[3]

The New Literary Climate

This paradoxical situation is strikingly evident in Hungary's literary life. To gain a general picture of Hungarian literature today, one need only peruse some of the very good literary magazines and some of the not-so-good newspapers. The phenomena which strike one most of all can, perhaps, be summed up under three heads: 1) the surprising degree of freedom being allowed to the "grand old men" of Hungarian literature, many of them former "sinners" against communism; 2) the tolerance displayed toward Western literature as well as toward Hungarian writers who tend increasingly to ignore socialist-realist precepts; and 3) the fact that topics formerly considered taboo are now being dealt with in published writings.

The cases of Tibor Dery, Laszlo Nemeth, Gyula Hay, and Zoltan Zelk illustrate the first of these phenomena. Dery, who was imprisoned after the 1956 revolution but granted amnesty in 1960, is publishing again;[4] his books have been translated into other languages, and he has been allowed to travel and lecture abroad, both in the Soviet Union and in West European countries.[5] Laszlo Nemeth's controversial new play, "The Great Family," [6] has been successfully produced even though some of his short stories have drawn severe official criticism.[7] Gyula Hay, whose articles in the 1956 issues of *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Literary Journal) contributed more than anything else to the spiritual reawakening of Hungary in that period, and who paid for this with three and a half years in jail, was allowed to go to Hamburg last fall to discuss the filming of one of his plays to be made in West Germany.[8]

Evidences of the second phenomenon are equally striking. Translations of Western literary works now appear regularly in the excellent monthly *Nagyvilag* (Great World), where the writings of Hemingway and Kafka receive the same treatment as those of Sholokhov and Solzhenitsyn. At the same time, the majority of recently published Hungarian works hardly qualify as models of socialist realism. As examples, one may cite Endre Fejes' much-debated novel *The Rust Cemetery*, which presents a very unconventional and bitter portrayal of the life of a worker's family;[9] Ferenc Baranyi's excellent poem "Good-bye in Stockholm," [10] telling of the anguish felt by a Hungarian who visits some of his émigré friends living in Sweden, and who is not sure, upon leaving, that he will ever see them again; and Mihaly Vaci's poem "Siamese Twins," [11] describing the bitter feelings of a Hungarian, always faithful to the party, at the thought that those who fled the country in 1956 are now enjoying prosperity abroad and able to send financial help to their relatives in Hungary, while he, the faithful one, has no hope of ever getting the small automobile and other material comforts he longs for. Much of

[2] Janos Kadar's statement in *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 12, 1963.

[3] "Khrushchev and the Intellectuals" (A Discussion), *East Europe*, Vol. 13 (1964), No. 2, p. 11.

A student of literature and instructor in Russian, Mr. Tikos took part in the Hungarian Revolution as member of the Revolutionary Committee of the College of Keszthely. In November 1956 he fled his homeland and continued his studies in West Germany, whence he saw himself sentenced, in absentia, *by a Military Court in Györ to 15 years in jail. At present teaching Russian at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), Mr. Tikos will soon publish a book on the Hungarian-born Soviet economist E. S. Varga.*

[4] Tibor Dery, "G. A. ur X-ben" (Mr. G. A. in X), *Uj Iras*, Nov. 1963.

[5] Peter Bender, "Ungarn 1963," *Die Zeit*, Hamburg, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 8; Stephen Vajda, "Ungarns junge Literatur," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Dec. 28, 1963.

[6] Ervin Szombathelyi, "The Great Family," *Nepszava* Nov. 3, 1963, p. 7; *Naplo* (Veszprem), Oct. 5, 1963, p. 6.

[7] See unsigned article, "Debate on the Periodical *Alföld*," in *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 24, 1963.

[8] Reported by Radio Budapest, Oct. 3, 1963.

[9] Pal Pandi, "The Rust Cemetery," *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 1, 1963.

[10] *Kortars*, Oct. 1963, p. 1443.

[11] *Uj Iras*, Oct. 1963, pp. 1213-14.

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this contemporary Hungarian writing has been justly characterized by William Juhasz as a "literature of solitude," bitterness, and disillusionment.[12]

It is the third phenomenon, however, that is the most interesting. Topics formerly considered strictly *verboten* are being handled now, although writers are still under threat of punishment if they go beyond certain limits. One notable taboo that appears to have been relaxed somewhat is the hitherto flat prohibition of anything critical of Soviet policies or behavior. Such criticism is of course still barred from direct political commentary, but it has been allowed to creep into recent literary writing, as evidenced by the publication last November of Sandor Csoori's *"Cuban Diary."* [13] This brief essay describes the author's trip to Cuba in late 1962, when memories of the missile crisis were still painfully fresh in Cuban minds. In it, Csoori notes with down-to-earth frankness and objectivity how much the Cubans hated the Russians for having let them down, and his account also informed Hungarian readers for the first time of the true cause of the crisis, namely, the stationing of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. The appearance of Csoori's "diary" brought forth a vehement reaction from party critics, who charged the author with flaunting the banner of "non-conformism." [14] The attacks made it abundantly clear that "non-conformism" is a dirty word to Communist ears, but some Hungarians seem to take the view that it represents the only honest way of writing.

Hungary's Solzhenitsyn

No less significant is the fact that in Hungary, as in Khrushchev's Russia, it has become permissible within the last two years to write on the subject of concentration camps and police terror. The lifting of this tabu has produced some interesting contributions to contemporary Hungarian literature, and it is the main purpose of the present article to examine these in some detail.

In Jozsef Lengyel Hungary now boasts its own counterpart of Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, author of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," with whom he shares a common experience of life in Stalin's concentration camps. One of the founders of the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918 and the editor of some party newspapers during the subsequent brief interlude of Communist dictatorship, Lengyel emigrated to Austria after the collapse of the "Hungarian Soviet Republic," moved on to Berlin in 1927, and to the Soviet Union in 1930. There, in 1937, he was caught up in the maelstrom of the great *chistka* (purge) and sent to a concentration camp. He remained a prisoner until the end of World War II, after which he was released from camp but assigned to a compulsory place of residence. He finally was allowed to return to Hungary in 1955, after an absence of thirty-six years.

Since February 1962, Lengyel has managed to publish several short stories based on his life in Soviet forced labor camps.[15] One of the most revealing, entitled "From Beginning to End," appeared early last year [16] and was written in the form of a personal diary kept by a certain fictitious Gyoergy Nekeresdi (George Don't-Look-For). The diary falls roughly into two parts, the first describing some of George's experiences following his arrest and during his years as a labor-camp prisoner, and the second dealing with his life after his release from camp.

The diary opens with a scene in the prison where George had already spent two weeks prior to interrogation. There is no explanation of why, when, or how he was arrested. The prison is described as a place "where the bread, still fresh in the morning, was covered by noon with mold produced by human perspiration, hot radiators, and the hermetic sealing of the cells." For 275 prisoners there were only 25 iron beds, which the prisoners spontaneously reserved for the use of their cell mates when

[12] William Juhasz, "The Literature of Solitude," *East Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 12, Dec. 1963, p. 19.
[13] *Uj Iras*, Nov. 1963, pp. 1287-99.
[14] For reactions to Csoori's essay, see *Elet es Irodalom*, Jan. 4, 1964, pp. 3-4; *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 8. See also Jozsef Darvas, "For More Productive Cooperation," *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1963, p. 9; and Lajos Racz, "On Principles and Conformism," *Csongrad Megyei Hirlap*, Dec. 31, 1963.

[15] *The Charmer*, a volume of short stories published in February 1962, contains a short story describing the fate of a law-abiding, simple-minded individual who, imprisoned along with professional criminals, tries to adapt himself to the savage and depraved ways of his fellow prisoners. "Yellow Poppies," published in *Elet es Irodalom* (March 1962), paints a dramatic picture of the Soviet forced labor camp "Norilsk 2." "A Short and Angry Man," published in *Uj Iras* (June 1962), deals with the arrest and imprisonment of a non-party scientist. Besides revealing the inhuman methods of interrogation, the novel also depicts the bestial conditions in the prisons and the crude language of the prisoners.
[16] *Uj Iras*, January 1963.

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they returned half-dead from their interrogations.

From the prison George was transferred to a forced labor camp where he was to serve his sentence. The daily food ration in the camp consisted of small amounts of bread and salted fish, with only two hundred grams of water. During the war, of which the prisoners were somehow aware without being told, the food became even worse and more scarce. The numbers of sick and disabled multiplied, and the camps for the infirm became the most crowded, while the brigades of woodcutters and gravediggers became the largest work crews.

George himself was assigned for a time to work as a gravedigger. His "diary" paints this stark picture of the daily activities of his crew:

It is as dark as night when we get up, and it is much too cold to wash. In wintertime we are led out of camp by daybreak. Tall, hard-faced Letts, broad-backed Russians, narrow-shouldered Chinese, bandy-legged Bokharans with large heads, Armenians and Jews—all kinds of people, and all are marching. Stamping down the snow under our feet, we trudge along to the nearby woods. The soles and counters of our shoes are made of used automobile tires; the uppers are patched together from remnants of quilted cloth. In these shoes one can only shuffle along. They are heavy and cold and always feel damp.

In the woods we rake up branches, crumbling tree trunks, and abandoned beams from beneath the snow. We drag them to the path we have just made. The smaller branches are carried by the men on their backs, the larger pieces are picked up by two men, and the heaviest beams are attached to a rope and pulled by many of us to the cemetery. We chop the wood, make a big bonfire, and sit around it . . . smoking our pipes and trying to keep warm until the frozen ground starts thawing under the bonfire. Then we quickly clear away the embers and begin digging in the spot where the fire had been. To a depth of one or two spadefuls, the soil is soft. We go on deepening the hole with picks and handspikes until the frozen soil does not give way any further, and then we light another fire in the hole and warm ourselves again. . . .

Two full days were needed to dig a large grave. On the second day we reached the soft, unfrozen earth. We scooped out big hollows beneath the frozen layer in order to earn more bread and make more room for those arriving on their last journey. This was the only way to fulfill the norms and thus obtain a bread ration of seventy decagrams per day. . . . We tried to avoid death by digging hollows to earn our daily bread. But all the time men continued to disappear into the graves, and death hovered over the gravediggers ever more menacingly . . .

Later George, too, falls ill, and instead of seventy decagrams of bread a day, he receives only the sick ration of forty decagrams of poor, wet bread. However, his life is saved by the cook, who assigns him to the crew of potato peelers. Ivan Osipovich, the cook, is an important and powerful person. He is protected by special guards, and while he is sleeping in the barracks, the others may only talk in whispers. To the prisoners, he is the symbol of the bread rations, potato peels, and other scraps of nourishment that they need to stay alive.

Under the circumstances, the prisoners' minds became obsessed with just one thing—how to obtain more food. Much of George's dairy is devoted to portraying this obsession and relating the desperate acts some prisoners resorted to in order to satisfy their gnawing hunger. The most dangerous was stealing, but it was practiced nevertheless.

One gruesome passage in the diary describes what happened to a thief unlucky enough to be caught stealing bread. The enraged prisoners pull the man off his bunk and drag him by the feet to the middle of the floor.

He stays on his stomach, an anemic, beardless boy. Four fingers on his right hand are missing. I recognize him—he is a self-mutilator. The maimed and the intact hand still hang on to the stolen bread, and while the body is being beaten and kicked, the mouth is still chewing. A gnome-like, hunchbacked carpenter steps with one heavy shoe on the thief's head . . . the boy does not defend himself, nor does he utter a sound. He continues to eat. He chews and swallows the bread, mixed with blood and phlegm, until the last pieces are kicked out of his hand and mouth. . . .

At that stage of camp life, the unwritten law of retribution was that a bread thief had to be beaten to death. If someone's last shirt or only pair of shoes was stolen, he was not supposed to complain; he was to blame for not looking after his things. But bread was a different matter; it was life itself. A bread thief had to pay for the crime with his life. Not even the higher authorities could interfere . . .

Because of this unwritten law, only the toughest prisoners dared attempt food-stealing. Most

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stuck to less dangerous, but also potentially less profitable, ways of obtaining extra nourishment. Potato peels and discarded cabbage leaves were salvaged from the camp garbage pit, boiled in water, and devoured. With the coming of spring, the camp inmates would also start eating grass, so that around the camp the grass never got taller than half a centimeter.

The second part of the story starts from December 13, 1946, when George is released from camp 26 months after the actual expiration of his term. At the railway station he confronts the "outside" world for the first time since his imprisonment and finds conditions appalling. The waiting room is crowded with people who have spent days—some even weeks—waiting to get a train. Each day the travelers line up in front of the ticket office, which learns the number of seats available on any train only half an hour before its departure. Sometimes the number is two, or three, sometimes zero. After waiting for two weeks, George finally gets on a train filled with prisoners returning home and with whole families moving back with their belongings from the places to which they had been evacuated during the war. Also among the passengers are speculators engaged in transporting Siberian flour and butter, and things "obtained by plundering the Japanese," [17] to western Soviet cities to be exchanged for apples from the Caucasus, ladies' chemises, pocket watches and radio sets (these latter very likely plundered from Eastern Europe).

After three adventurous weeks George arrives at Alexandrov, a small town where a fellow Hungarian happens to live. Dirty and covered with lice, he falls ill but has to get up after three days to look for work, though still weak. He manages to obtain only a temporary position, making him ineligible for bread-ration coupons, and consequently has to buy his bread on the market from the wives and mothers of policemen, who make sure that all competition is eliminated. He thus has to pay one hundred rubles for a loaf of bread which could be purchased with coupons for two rubles.

George spends almost two years in Alexandrov, and then one night the police come for him. His case is investigated for four months, after which he is assigned to a place of residence which he must not leave, on pain of being reimprisoned for twenty years. The place to which he is ordered is a kolkhoz, or collective farm, where he works first at making charcoal, then as a field guard.

Conditions in the kolkhoz, George finds, are not much different from those he had experienced in labor camp. Stealing is the rule, and an "unarmed and disabled old man," as George now is, cannot do much to stop the thieves. The reason for such stealing is quite simple:

Fifteen percent of the bread grains harvested by the kolkhoz is distributed among the members, a sufficient quantity is kept for seed, and the rest is handed over to the state. Only one-third of the cereals given to the members is suitable for baking; most of it is frozen, moldy, or full of black wild oats.

For the following six years George is a forest guard. Growing old and feeble, he fears that he may have to spend the rest of his life as a beggar, but his fortunes finally change for the better. He could be content and at peace now, but instead he is tormented by sleeplessness. Memories of all that he has been through keep flooding through his mind, and he is constantly haunted by the questions: *"Why and how could it happen?"* The diary of George Don't-Look-For does not try, however, to answer these questions: it merely presents facts.

Lengyel's story also offers interesting characterizations of some of George's fellow prisoners. Of particular interest are the portrayals of Ivan Timofeievich and Kondrat Ivanovich: the former an old-time Communist who had once been imprisoned and exiled to Siberia by the Tsarist regime; the latter an elderly factory worker from Leningrad and a deeply religious man who belongs to the "Old Believers" sect. These two men are the only positive characters in the story. They neither curse nor behave like animals; they maintain human dignity even under the most humiliating circumstances; they share everything with each other, take care of each other, and in every respect set an example for their fellow prisoners. The one big difference between them is their opposing faiths: Ivan Timofeievich believes in communism, Kondrat Ivanovich in his religion. The two are continually engaged in a peaceful ideological battle for the soul of one of the younger prisoners. In this struggle, waged inside a Communist concentration camp, Ivan Timofeievich is understandably handicapped in trying to answer the searching questions put to him by the

[17] The "plundering" done by the Red Army in occupied territories has never before been mentioned in any Soviet or East European publication.

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young man, as for instance when the latter wants to know how the old man can still remain a Communist (see box).

The publication of Lengyel's story evoked both comment and controversy in Hungarian literary circles. A professor of literature from Debrecen compared the somewhat analogous works of Lengyel and Solzhenitsyn and went on to interpret the Stalinist terror in the Soviet Union as a remnant of capitalism which the young socialist society had not yet overcome.[18] This, however, was not the main point at issue in the controversy that followed. The debate, carried out between the "conservative" and "liberal" camps of Hungarian Communist writers, revolved rather around the questions: Is there, or is there not, a need for books revealing the evils and terror of the Stalin era? How should such writings be regarded, and what is the proper task of literature in this sphere?

The debate was touched off by an article in *Magyar Nemzet*,[19] daily organ of the "Patriotic Front," which asserted that only the Soviet Union could provide a "psychologically and historically authentic analysis of the Soviet concentration camps." Tamas Zala, the author of the article, accused Lengyel of writing only of "bestial persons whirling about in a frigid, cold, moon area," and protested the fact that Lengyel's hero, after his release from concentration camp, had also found "a camp outside."

Zala's negative criticism drew a prompt reaction from the "liberal" camp. Six days after the *Magyar Nemzet* article, the literary monthly *Elet es Irodalom* published a defense of Lengyel written by the prominent Hungarian prose writer and journalist, Sandor Tatay, following this up in its next (March 1963) issue with another vigorous counterattack on Zala by no less important a person than Gyula Hevesi, a member of the party Central Committee and Vice-President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Hevesi flatly rejected Zala's central thesis that only the Soviet Union was entitled to present the historical truth about the Stalinist terror: anyone who had personally experienced its manifestations, he maintained, could write about them as long as he showed "political good will"—in other words, provided he upheld the correctness of the Communist Party and the Soviet system and blamed only Stalin for the "errors." Since Lengyel had shown such good will, said Hevesi, Zala had no reason to attack him. With this authorative opinion from a Central Committee member, the debate ended.

CONCENTRATION CAMP DIALOGUE

"Are you still a Communist, Ivan Timofeievich?" the boy wanted to know.

"What else could I be?"

"But they say that you are an 'enemy of the people' and that they are the true and loyal men."

"Yes, they are loyal to their desks. But I am loyal to the party and the people. Didn't you know that?"

"I know, but . . ."

"What does that 'but' mean? Do you think that you are super-clever and everyone else is stupid?"

"People believe them. They say nice things and. . . ."

"It is not enough to say nice things; they also have to be done. Way back, during the underground period, there was a traitor in the party. He sent many people to the gallows. Lenin once said of him: 'He performed the work of a henchman, but in order to be able to do this he had to recruit hundreds of people for the party.'"

"Does this apply to the present?"

"Nothing repeats itself in the same way. Thus, the last sentence does not apply to the present. But there is one thing that still holds true: when they attack us, they have to refer to communism and to the people."

"I do not understand this."

"You will understand later on."

"I do not understand how you can remain a Communist!"

"What do you mean? Should I cease to be a Communist because of these men?" With his thick, crooked thumb, he pointed behind his back.

"This is difficult, very difficult."

"Well, it isn't easy. But you, my lad, will live to understand it. . . ."

—From Jozsef Lengyel's "From Beginning to End," Uj Iras (Budapest) January 1963.

While the controversy generated by Lengyel's story was still in progress, Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" made its appearance in Hungarian translation [20] to be-

[18] Professor Pal Kardos, "One Subject—Two Methods," *Alföld*, April 1963.

[19] Feb. 17, 1963.

[20] In the February 1963 issue of the literary magazine *Nagyvilag*, as well as in book form put out by the Europa Publishing House. Several dailies also serialized it. For a report on Hungarian public reactions, see: Lajos Galambos, "I protest," *Kortars*, March 1963.

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come part of the debate on the admissibility of writings depicting the evils of Stalinist society. Perhaps the most important effect of the debate was that the official attitude of tolerance displayed in the discussions seemed to create a propitious atmosphere for the treatment of similar phenomena closer to home. If it was permissible to write about the Stalinist terror in the Soviet Union, why should it not also be proper to deal with its equivalent in Rakosist Hungary? The ice appeared to have been broken, and in the latter part of February 1963 the magazine *Kortars* took the next step by publishing Gyula Oszko's "The Seventeenth Sunday," a short story focussing the spotlight on the Hungary of Rakosi's terror and the 1949 "show trial" of Laszlo Rajk.

Spotlight on Rakosist Hungary

Like Lengyel's, Oszko's story is fictional in form but presumably based on the personal experiences of the author, who was among those arrested by the AVH (Rakosi's secret police), forced into signing false confessions implicating Rajk in "treason," and subsequently kept in prison until (in the case of the more fortunate) their eventual release and rehabilitation after Stalin's death. Oszko's hero spends five long years in prison, but it is the seventeenth Sunday following his arrest that remains most sharply etched in his memory—it is the day when he finally breaks under police torture and signs the fabricated confession required of him. Hence the title of the story.

Oszko's work has less literary merit than those of Solzhenitsyn and Lengyel and also suffers from being too obviously tendentious. The story is made up largely of incoherent reminiscences, devoting much space to the mental anguish of the hero as he asks himself how it could happen that he, a longtime, dedicated Communist loyally serving the "workers' and peasants' state," has been arrested by the police, interrogated, and tortured into signing a statement that is not only completely false but also, he believes, contrary to the true interests of the party. Yet, despite his suffering and soul-searching, the hero clings to his faith in communism, believing that the terror had to be only a temporary "error" which would be overcome in time.

The central figure in Oszko's story is a chemical engineer, 38 years old when arrested in June 1949, with a record of party activity going back to the pre-war Communist underground in Hungary and including service in the Spanish civil war (where he was a comrade-in-arms of Rajk's) as well as imprisonment by the Germans. These background data are significant because they identify the hero with the present group of "homebred" Hungarian Communist leaders, as opposed to the formerly dominant group of Stalinist "Moscow-émigré" leaders like Rakosi and Geroe. It is clearly the author's purpose to render "historical justice" to this new generation of leaders, to justify its present reign, and to create a mystique by making a sort of national hero of the martyred Rajk.

After his arrest, the hero of the story finds himself accused of espionage on behalf of "US imperialism" and of taking part in a conspiracy, allegedly led by Rajk, to overthrow the Communist regime. The charges are so fantastic that at first he is almost inclined to regard them as a practical joke. Looking back on his own close associations with Rajk over many years, he finds it totally impossible to believe him capable of plotting against the regime:

He had always been very fond of Rajk, had even idolized him in his youth. Many common experiences linked him to Rajk: the youth movement of the 1930's; "underground" hikes together; secret seminars on political economy; the years of the Spanish civil war; the barracks shared in internment camp. . . .

Could the same Rajk be a police informer, a spy, and an imperialist agent? No! He felt and knew that this could not have been the case. He had always regarded Rajk as one of the greatest promises of the Hungarian workers' movement. . . .

He had to stand up for Rajk; he had to stand up for the others, too.

This, however, was not easy. The AVH, the "sword and shield" of the party, had ways of "breaking" the resistance of even the toughest of former underground fighters. The first step in this process was to deprive the prisoner of any opportunity to sleep during the initial ten days of interrogation. But this was just the beginning. Beatings and torture later became almost routine, supplemented by ingenious forms of trickery. For example, the story relates how the hero on one occasion was shown what appeared to be an actual newspaper clipping—even showing the masthead and date of the paper—reporting that he (the prisoner) had been shot and killed by a border guard while attempting to escape across the Yugoslav frontier, and that important confidential

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documents had been found on his body. After showing the prisoner the clipping, the interrogator tells him, "Get this clear, you idiot, we do with you what we like!"

Humiliation and prolonged semi-starvation were also among the devices used to accomplish the gradual breakdown of the prisoner's resistance. But what finally clinches the surrender of Oszko's hero is an appeal to his sense of loyalty to the party. On the eve of the "seventeenth Sunday" he is once again led before the "head of the investigation." To his great surprise, however, instead of another brutal interrogation, a seemingly friendly conversation takes place. The two men sit down in comfortable armchairs, smoke, sip coffee, and talk over the case in an "almost comradely" manner:

"This [the trial] is only needed to confuse the apparat," *said the head of the investigation.*

"Try to understand," he continued, "that it is not your person that is at stake."

Then he asked seductively: "On whom can the party rely under difficult circumstances, if not on men like you?"

. . . the ever-returning and final explanation was always: "the interest of the party."

Having signed his "confession," Oszko's hero was at last left in peace. Some time later another prisoner, also arrested in connection with the Rajk case, was brought in to share the same cell and told the hero about the outcome of the trial. Rajk and two or three others had been sentenced to death, the rest of the accused to life imprisonment. The newcomer, a witness at the trial, admitted that the testimony he had given against Rajk was a complete fabrication. "They brought me in," he said, "and told me what they wanted. They gave me a fairly clear explanation and informed me that I was to be a witness. I have performed that function, and now I am here." According to the newcomer's story, he had agreed to testify as the police required after they told him that his wife was also under arrest (he subsequently thought he recognized her voice calling out the names of their children from the neighboring cell), but that she would be released if he behaved "reasonably."

Anxious to learn how Rajk had conducted himself at the trial, Oszko's hero questions his new cell mate and is told that the accused Communist leader had "confessed and admitted everything, like all the others." His reaction to this is one of protest mingled with doubt and confusion:

He remained motionless, yet seemed on the verge of jumping up, hammering on the door, or shouting out loud. He mumbled to himself, or perhaps said in a loud voice: "Rajk is innocent, Rajk is honest, Rajk is a man and a Communist!" Thoughts flooded through his mind in feverish succession. He felt as if he had to make a quick decision in a very important matter:

Had he been misled? Rajk was a clever man.—Had Rajk been overcome by means of unknown tortures and horrors? But he was a courageous man; he did not fear death!—Was all this done in the interest of some goal greater than that of the party? But there could be no higher goal!—He searched for some analogy in the past: Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev? No, their cases were different, had to be different! Tukhachevsky? He had been a Tsarist officer! He failed to find any analogy; there was no example, no comparison . . .

The hero in Oszko's story is finally released from prison in the spring of 1954, one year after the death of Stalin. Despite everything, he still remains a Communist. "Somewhere deep in his soul" he continues to believe that "the truth, the true cause, cannot be served by false means"—or, to put it in terms more in keeping with the current political line in Hungary, that the true cause sooner or later finds its true means.

Time of Torment

The prisoner felt as if he were in an inexplicably strange, floating world of unreality. In his consciousness everything became blurred; the dirty walls of the cell and the constantly damp concrete floor took on a waving motion that washed away the sequence of days. . . . He tried to determine the day of the week from the schedule of interrogations, the frequency with which the cell doors were banged, the meals, words dropped by the interrogators, or from anything else. Yet all his efforts remained fruitless. He sought in vain for a point of departure, but he could not find a stable zero point anywhere. He was overcome by a distinct sense of a kind of death or the beginning of disintegration.

—From Gyula Oszko's "The Seventeenth Sunday," Kortars (Budapest) February 1963.

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Four months after publishing Oszko's piece, *Kortars* came out in its June 1963 issue with another short story that dealt with the same general subject, but in a quite different fashion and raising different questions. Entitled "Reckoning in the Bakony" (the mountainous region of western Hungary), the story was written by Janos Feoldeak, a 53-year-old writer known as an ardent supporter of the Kadar political line.

This time the story is set in the present and is woven around a chance encounter between a former victim of the AVH terror of 1949, now a deputy minister in the post-1956 regime, and the man who, as a young AVH first lieutenant, had been his chief inquisitor at the time of his arrest, but who is now the council chairman of a small village in the Bakony. The confrontation occurs when the minister's car, taking him and his secretary back to Budapest after an official trip, breaks down near the village, obliging them to go to the local council office in order to telephone Budapest for another vehicle.

While the secretary makes the call, the deputy minister (Comrade Gonda) and the council chairman meet face to face and immediately recognize each other. There follows a tense and dramatic dialogue in which Gonda, struggling to control his inner turmoil and bitterness, prods the agitated council chairman into recalling the painful details of their earlier encounter. He does not seek revenge, however, and speaks of these past happenings as if they had involved two other persons, to whom he refers only as "the elderly comrade" and "the young first lieutenant." Consequently, no one else who witnesses the conversation is aware that the two men are speaking of themselves.

What had taken place between them years before emerges partly from the spoken dialogue and partly from the unspoken memories that flood to Gonda's mind as he faces his old persecutor. The "elderly comrade," we learn, had been an important government official in 1949 when the police had suddenly arrested him and sought to use him in fabricating a case of treason against Rajk. The "young first lieutenant," put in charge of the "investigation," had tried to force him to write a statement confessing that he had been in the pay of Western embassies, but Gonda had stubbornly refused to perjure himself and as a consequence had been subjected to threats and physical brutality. Now, as the two men talk, Gonda (the first-person narrator of the whole story) asks the council chairman if he remembers a certain meeting:

"No . . . no, I cannot remember," he hedged.

"Think hard!" I prodded him.

"No, I cannot remember . . ."

"But I do!" I shouted at him angrily. "He [the young lieutenant] bawled: 'You say this protocol is a lie? You old ass, you dirty dog of a fascist traitor!' . . . Now, do you remember?"

"Yes, I . . . I do," he answered, appalled.

"Didn't I quote him correctly, word for word?" The chairman nodded, his apprehension mounting.

"And what happened then . . . after the shouting?" I went on. But I did not wait for his answer; I did not have the patience . . . "And then he slapped the face of the elderly comrade! Do you get it? . . . He slapped his face!" I shouted passionately, putting my hand to my face as if it had been slapped again. "He was an old man, he could have been the lieutenant's father, and the lieutenant slapped him . . . !"

The dialogue goes on in this fashion, with Gonda relentlessly forcing the troubled council chairman to recall the happenings of the past. Then, the conversation turns to the crucial question of the first lieutenant's personal responsibility for his actions in 1949. The chairman asserts that the officer undoubtedly "did not feel himself guilty" of any wrongdoing because he had only "obeyed an order" from his superiors—thus, ironically, falling back on the same defense so often heard in Nazi war crimes trials. Only Gonda's secretary, representing the post-1956 generation of young, dedicated party officials, takes exception to the chairman's argument:

"That is an easy kind of defense, I must say. It is easy and comfortable to decline responsibility in that way . . ."

"Nevertheless, it is the truth . . . it can be proven . . ." muttered the chairman timidly.

Gonda himself remains silent, knowing very well that the chairman is right. The latter's answer, in fact, broaches the question of the guilt of the whole regime, but that is a question which the author evidently felt could not be pursued further.

A car arrives shortly from Budapest, and the visitors depart as unceremoniously as they had arrived, even neglecting in their haste to shake hands with the chairman. But that is not the end of the story. Two days later, a delegation from the village appears at Deputy Minister Gonda's office in Budapest. Shortly

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after the minister's departure, they report, the council chairman had been in a motorcycle accident. He had evidently driven too fast, skidded on the wet road, and hit a milestone; and in the hospital his dying wish had been that "Comrade Gonda should deliver his funeral address."

The Enduring Limits

The important question that remains to be answered regarding the writings examined above is just how much of a "liberalization" their publication really signifies. To be sure, the fact that it is now possible for Hungarian authors to write of the police rule, the concentration camps, and the inhumanities of the Stalinist past marks a certain relaxation of former taboos. But it cannot be overemphasized that this is a relaxation within rather narrow, carefully calculated limits.

A common characteristic of the writings discussed in the preceding pages is the fact that all of them voice a final note of optimism, of undiminished faith in communism. The sympathy of Lengyel's hero, George, clearly lies on the side of the faithful old Communist, Ivan Timofeyevich. The hero of Oszko's "The Seventeenth Sunday" steadfastly clings to his belief that the true cause will ultimately find its true means. The very fact that Feoldeak's Comrade Gonda is a deputy minister testifies to his abiding fidelity to the Communist faith.

A certain optimism on the part of authors who themselves experienced the horrors of Stalinist or Rakosist terror but have lived to see their correction is indeed understandable. But the fact that *only* writings that sound such a note of optimism have been published does suggest a conscious effort on the part of the present Hungarian regime to put across a political message useful to itself: namely, that the Communist system as it exists in Hungary today has nothing whatsoever in common with the Communist terror of the past; that it was the "real Communists" who were the primary target of that terror; that now, with these true and tested Communists restored to their rightful position of leadership, the evils of the past are dead and buried, and all is well. In Hungary, where Kadar's own imprisonment and torture under the Rakosi regime are fairly common knowledge, the message has particular point.

There is something else that underscores the limited nature of the recent writings about concentration camps and terror. They deal only with the sufferings inflicted on faithful Communists, not with the sufferings of *all* the victims of Communist terror. To use a speculative comparison, they reveal as much truth about the real scope of the Stalinist terror as might have been revealed about Nazi concentration camps and police terror had Germany won the last war and Hitler's dictatorship been succeeded by a more moderate Nazi regime. Writings which would tell of the sufferings of the faithful and unfaithful alike, which would not simply describe but also analyze, and which would draw no conclusions of politically-inspired optimism—such writings are still beyond the realm of possibility for present-day Hungarian literature.

Finally, all achievements of the liberal writers notwithstanding, there remains one principle which they may not possibly challenge, and that is the right of the party to sit in judgment on literary products. Indeed, they may not question either the hallowed ideological tenets or the basic practices of communism. That Kadar's regime is not willing to deviate one inch from these tabus was illustrated recently by the criticism meted out to two literary journals, *Alföld* (Lowland, from the topography of the region of Debrecen, where it is published) and *Jelenkor* (Contemporary), published in Pecs. Lashing out against the editorial policies of the two journals, the party's central newspaper, *Nepszabadsag*, declared:

> . . . *When reading this year's issues of* Alföld *and* Jelenkor, [*one is struck*] *by the fact that the overall picture is not too favorable and is replete with unhealthy phenomena. Both periodicals contain articles revealing incorrect, petty-bourgeois, and sometimes hostile and harmful views. Some of the articles and reviews present statements and ideas sharply contradicting Marxism-Leninism, the results of Marxist esthetics, as well as the policy and theoretical position of our party.*[21]

The anonymous author of the *Nepszabadsag* article went on to criticize an essay which "proclaimed the right to irrationalism and maintained that it was not possible to rely on reason alone;" an article by Laszlo Nemeth which accused "almost all the progressive and Marxist theoreticians of snobbish boasting;" a trend—"apparent in both periodicals"—toward "attacks on socialist literature"; an "un-Marxist"

[21] December 8, 1963.

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opposition to "ideological and political criticism"; and the appearance of literary products which "repudiate every kind of government, political system and political activity."

Perhaps as a bow to the new spirit of liberalism, the party permitted a discussion of the issues raised by *Nepszabadsag*. The result of it, however, could easily have been foretold: both journals went through the ritual of self-criticism and promised to mend their ways. *Jelenkor's mea culpa,* which appeared in its January 1964 issue under the title "After the Criticism," abjectly stated:

The editorial board is of the opinion that the acknowledgment and acceptance of the criticism are of great importance if we wish to improve our work in the future. We wish to give proof of this attitude in the forthcoming issues of our journal . . . We have to select articles more carefully. We shall work for socialist literature and for the victory of Marxist ideology.

Jelenkor's statement was followed a month later by an editorial in *Alföld,* entitled "Taking Stock, Conclusions, Tasks," which was similarly penitent:

Without making a detailed analysis of each mistake that has been committed by our periodical, as outlined in the Nepszabadsag *article, we can state that we agree with the article's train of thoughts and critical remarks, and that we shall heed them in the course of our efforts to improve our editorial work. There can be no room in our periodical for the anti-Marxist notion of a predestined conflict between the "people" and the "government," and for the distorted offshoots of the third-road theory.*

To be sure, no "administrative measures" were taken following the appearance of these two editorials—as *Nepszabadsag* hastened to point out.[22] Still, one is permitted to doubt the veracity of the report that the resignation of Gabor Mocsar, editor-in-chief of *Alföld,* was indeed as "voluntary" as was reported, or whether the stringent criticism and self-criticism will remain without effect.

Nevertheless, an overall assessment of the literary situation in Hungary must take into account the fact that, just as there has been a relaxation and an increased confusion in the international cold war, so has there been a similar process in the internal cold war waged between the Communist rulers and their subjects. Thus, where the taboos and "accepted rules" formerly were clearly defined, they are now vague and frequently contradictory. An interesting example of the current confusion in the party's literary policy is provided by a recent interview with Pal Ilku, Minister of Culture, published in the February 2, 1964, issue of *Nepszabadsag*. The Minister expressed himself against the proposition that the party ought to be the "arbiter" in "stylistic" or purely "professional" artistic questions. Yet he also warned that "the commanding positions where the publication of works is decided" must be filled with "Marxist cultural politicians possessing correct esthetic as well as political judgment." He rejected a return to "administrative methods," yet he advocated a stronger "preliminary criticism"—*i.e.*, censorship. He deplored the lack of consistency in the application of the party's literary policies (which have often resulted, as in the case of *Jelenkor,* in the acceptance of manuscripts originally rejected by Budapest censors), yet he was notably reluctant to suggest the formation of a centralized and tightly controlled apparatus of censorship, such as had existed until a few years ago.

The explanation of this ambivalence is fairly simple. The party would like to avoid being identified with the policies and "mistakes" of the pre-1956 regime. It cannot, therefore, utilize the old methods of political and cultural control. At the same time, it has no wish whatever to step down from its "commanding position," and to let matters take their natural course. Under such circumstances, a freer literature may indeed flourish. But the uncertainties as to the limits of the possible, and the fear lest at some point the party assert its right to suppress, to dictate, and to demand an act of public contrition, remain as real and pervasive as before.

[22] February 2, 1964.

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After the Reappraisals

By Edwin P. Jones

In early 1964 Peking displays a paradoxical air of confidence and crisis, motion and stagnation. It claims substantial economic recovery; yet, apart from vague generalities, it has revealed no concrete plans of economic development nor any expectation of sustained rapid growth. It calls for Marxist organization and discipline as prerequisites for national growth, yet recognizes the practical need to restrain indoctrination and limit regimentation in certain areas. It asserts a moral imperative to defy and defame the two main world powers—one of them its own erstwhile ally—and to support subversive revolutionary forces everywhere, while blandly cultivating relations with some capitalist powers and national governments on the basis of a professed willingness to coexist peacefully.

This somewhat inconsistent posture seems, on the one hand, to reflect the existence of serious economic difficulties, popular apathy, a certain disarray in the Chinese internal revolution, and national weakness. Yet, on the other, it proclaims the regime's confidence that it has found, in the policies enunciated at the Tenth Central Committee Plenum (September 1962), the formulas for vigorous and successful action to resolve its problems. An assessment of the regime's current posture requires an understanding of these policies and problems.

An American economist and student of Chinese affairs, Mr. Jones last appeared in these pages with "Peking's Economy: Upwards or Downwards?" (January-February 1963).

The Background

The Eighth and Ninth Plenums of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, in August 1959 and January 1961, were held in situations of serious internal crisis. The Eighth Plenum ratified continued adherence to the "Great Leap" economic program in the face of increasing domestic strains and Soviet threats to withdraw aid. The policies of the leadership had generated strong opposition within the party because of their implications for military and economic growth, and to silence this opposition the Plenum called for unity against the "rightists" and instituted purges that extended to the politburo itself.

By the Ninth Plenum, the fears of the "rightists" had been confirmed. The irrational policies of the "Great Leap" had collapsed of their own weight, and the Soviet threat to suspend aid had been carried into execution. The regime faced disastrous food shortages which would cost perhaps 60 million lives, a divided and disillusioned party, and a disgruntled and deteriorating military establishment. The Ninth Plenum, then, was clearly concerned with survival.

In order to halt the drain of resources into a bankrupt program, the Plenum reversed economic policy, calling for retrenchment in industry and primary emphasis on agriculture. At the same time, in the customary quest for scapegoats, the Central Committee found that nearly 10 percent of the cadres were either "bad elements" or well-meaning "left deviationists" who would have to be purged or re-educated in order to restore good relations between the party and the masses. Regional party organizations were restaffed, with orders to carry out a housecleaning of the provincial administrations and to ensure that central policies were properly implemented at the local level, particularly with respect to the surrender of local food surpluses needed to ward off national starvation.

The Plenum further noted that 10 percent of the population at large had either become "bad

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elements" or fallen under their influence, requiring tighter supervision and indoctrination. Its decision to strengthen controls may have had the limited objective of putting a stop to outbreaks of rioting and banditry occurring in disaster areas, or it may simply have proven unworkable in view of the already low state of public morale. At any rate, the regime found it politic to call a virtual halt to indoctrination efforts and to curtail greatly the detailed official supervision of the daily life and thoughts of the population.

Subsequent developments made clear that the Plenum had approved sweeping institutional changes designed to increase agricultural productivity and reduce the costs of supporting urban industrial areas. The stultifying regimentation of the commune was to be eliminated by transferring production and accounting authority down to the smaller, lower-level operating units, whose members, being neighbors, would hopefully be more willing to work in the collective interest. At the same time, scope was to be provided for individual initiative by allocating private plots to the peasants and permitting them to sell the surpluses in "free markets." In urban areas, uneconomic enterprises were to be closed down, and redundant labor was to be discharged and sent back to the rural areas.

Actually, strong public pressures forced the regime to go farther than it had intended in dismantling controls, and at the same time to refrain from fully carrying out various onerous measures. It had first planned to shift primary production authority in the communes to the brigades (each consisting of 150-200 households, comparable to the collectives of 1955-58) but eventually had to retreat still farther to vest this authority in the commune production teams (comprising only 30 households, comparable to the pre-1955 cooperatives). It had initially proposed to set aside only five percent of farmland for cultivation as private plots, but in practice the proportion appears to have risen somewhat higher. The regime also seems to have allowed considerable autonomy to local urban enterprises in adjusting to the new austerity, while it failed by a wide margin to carry out its intended goals for the transfer of surplus urban labor back to the rural areas.

The Tenth Plenum

At the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, the regime revealed its concern that caution and permissiveness in national policy were inviting foreign aggression and sapping the revolutionary spirit of the people, and it manifested its belief that, with a fair 1962 harvest assured and the worst of urban retrenchment over, it could again afford to act decisively. Prior to the meeting, during the spring and summer of 1962, Peking had professed to see serious external threats to Communist China from various quarters—from Chinese Nationalist preparations for an assault on the mainland with alleged US complicity, from menacing Indian troop movements on the Tibetan border, and from Soviet moves to encourage the flight of numerous Uighurs and Kazakhs from Sinkiang province across the Soviet frontier, possibly to organize and train them for underground separatist activities. Meanwhile, internally, the continued demoralization and alienation of the cadres, the growing foothold of private economic activities, and the spread of non-Marxist views and attitudes among the people were viewed as jeopardizing the social revolution. The regime believed that the times called for bolder leadership, and that the risks involved in a more positive course were less than those deriving from continued inaction.

The Tenth Plenum reaffirmed the emphasis on agriculture and economic self-reliance, thus implicitly accepting a prolonged period of slow economic growth. Despite the prospect of national weakness over this period, however, Peking proposed to take a strong "principled" stand towards both the United States and the USSR. Internally, this stand would serve to create the tensions necessary to enable the regime to mobilize patriotic support and impose the desired discipline and austerity, while externally it would prevent an unfavorable hardening of the *status quo* either in Asia or in the Communist world. The risks were considered small since China's space and manpower precluded her cheap conquest and since the loosening bonds of both the Communist and Western alliances could be exploited to thwart attempts

Personality Cult: Peking Version

Chairman Mao:

Points to a mountain, trees grow tall;
Points to a river, the water runs clear;
Draws a line on a map on the wall,
And roads and railways will appear.

—From a poem published in *Peoples' Literature* (Peking), No. 8, 1958, p. 53.

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at China's economic and political isolation. Peking apparently was confident that the slow but steady buildup of economic strength at home and a positive policy of alignment with revolutionary forces abroad would enable it, by the latter 1960's, to project itself more forcefully on the world scene, challenging the USSR for paramount leadership of the Communist world and undermining US positions of influence in Asia and the underdeveloped areas.

Policies Since the Tenth Plenum

In the eighteen months since the Tenth Plenum, an air of purposeful action has pervaded Peking, creating an impression of gathering momentum. To some degree this impression is grounded in reality, for Communist China has scored undeniable foreign policy successes as well as a measure of economic recovery and political improvement at home. Yet the regime still has far to go before an acceptable level of national strength will have been regained, and its ultimate success depends critically on whether or not the present momentum can be sustained. The economy does not yet provide a tolerable living standard for the mounting population, let alone the margin necessary for sustained growth. Moreover, while the decay of the social revolution has been arrested and a degree of support regained by skillfully blending ideology with nationalism, the two critical groups who must underwrite the program of agricultural growth and modernization—the peasants and intellectuals—still show little respect for the Communist Party or faith in party doctrine.

As for Communist China's external gains, these have derived less from national strength than from fortuitous developments abroad. In October 1962, the Chinese seized the opportunity to score a quick, cheap victory over exposed Indian forces in the disputed frontier region, tremendously boosting Chinese morale and reestablishing the image of a strong military power that could not be ignored. The subsequent unreasoned rumors and fears of further Chinese attack that gained currency in India not only enhanced this image but also facilitated a Chinese pose of reasonable restraint and willingness to negotiate, which was further bolstered by China's signature of a border agreement with Pakistan.

At the same time, Peking initiated strong overtures for improved commercial relations with Japan and Western Europe—an approach made credible by signs of Chinese preparations for a renewed economic development effort as well as by China's evident need to find new suppliers to replace the Soviet Union. A five-year quasi-official trade agreement was signed with Japan in November 1962, and a high-level Chinese trade mission prepared to visit Europe (although its trip was delayed until the spring of 1963 owing to the Sino-Indian crisis). These initiatives succeeded in drumming up considerable interest abroad in trade with China, and in early 1964 the Peking regime scored heavily in obtaining French diplomatic recognition, greatly enhancing its prospects of breaking out of diplomatic isolation and gaining entry into the United Nations.

Within the bloc, the Chinese also have more than held their own in their ideological battle against the CPSU leadership. In spite of Peking's increasingly bold defiance, Moscow still has not been able to secure agreement by a decisive majority of the world's Communist parties to excommunicate the Chinese, for the parties are aware that such action would not only force a fratricidal struggle over the interpretation of Communist doctrine, but would also do irreparable damage to the image of world communism and possibly recreate an onerous new discipline centered in Moscow. Peking probably estimates that unilateral Soviet action against the Chinese party, unless carried to dangerous and unlikely extremes, would prove ineffectual and thus would only emphasize the collapse of Soviet leadership of world communism.

In addition, Peking has reaped certain gains through its policy of supporting nationalist and revolutionary forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, even though it has negligible material means of influencing developments except in adjacent Asian countries. The unstable governments in some of the underdeveloped or emergent nations frequently find themselves in the dilemma of attempting to forge political unity on the basis of "anti-imperialist" nationalism while trying at the same time to construct their economies through trade and aid ties with the Western capitalist countries. There seems to be a growing feeling among them that some recognition of, and closer alignment with, Peking might serve domestically to demonstrate their neutrality and independence from imperialist domination, while creating externally a *bête noire* that might induce the West to be freer with economic aid and more tolerant of affronts. This feeling that Peking can be useful to them is, of course, useful to Peking, helping to foster an image of expanding Chinese Communist influence and prestige.

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Meanwhile, at home, the regime has sought to restore revolutionary dynamism by combining a renewed emphasis on Marxist principles with an appeal to the nationalist sentiments aroused by its foreign policy initiatives. It has significantly strengthened its institutional controls over society, but it has done so subtly and cautiously, in step with improving living conditions and avoiding any major wrench to the social fabric.

In the rural areas, the regime, while reiterating its commitment to private plots and the primary authority of the communal production team, has moved to cut back excessive private cultivation and placed renewed emphasis on the collective role in farm production. In the winter and spring of 1962-63, state-run "high-price" markets appeared to supplant the "free" markets, although carrying out the same function, and private peddlers and handicraftsmen were subjected to such onerous supervision as to drive them substantially out of business. Towards the end of 1963, the regime reestablished an Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives, not only as central instruments for regulating rural money and credit, but reputedly with broad powers to coordinate and guide state and commune investments. In the urban areas, stricter emphasis on accounting and technical controls appeared, along with a stronger insistence on retrenchment reforms and reorientation of industrial production along specified lines.

In both rural and urban areas, indoctrination efforts were stepped up, using general themes of appeal. Besides the usual ranting against "US imperialism and its lackeys," there was a new stress on Soviet "perfidies" and an attempt to picture these as responsible for China's recent economic hardships. As a proud nation, the Chinese were asked to shoulder their difficulties unflinchingly and to renew their dedication to Marxist-Leninist principles, in contrast to the backsliding Soviet "revisionists." Party propaganda also recalled the self-sacrifice of the pre-1949 revolutionaries and exalted a life of dedicated service to collective goals without concern for material rewards. These themes probably had some effect toward refurbishing the image of the regime as one genuinely devoted to restoring the glory and influence of China.

Nevertheless, the indoctrination campaign appeared to make little headway towards eradicating the entrenched notion that the interests of the party and state are basically opposed to those of the individual citizen. In the rural areas, the heads of the communal production teams, which were too small to have their own party units or cells, were generally inclined to champion the interests of the team against those of the brigade and the commune, and to search for ways of complying with directives from higher authority at minimum cost in material sacrifice and effort. In urban areas, workers reportedly resorted to slowdowns in order to "spread the work" and prevent their reassignment to rural areas. The regime also showed concern over the continued tendency among technicians and intellectuals to confine their advice to vague generalities and refrain from making specific proposals in order to avoid the risk of being held responsible for errors or contravention of doctrine. It proposed to remedy this situation by assigning party cadres to production activities with a view to gaining a better understanding of popular aspirations and restoring the party's ties with the people, but it has had to contend with the cadres' reluctance to give up their privileged status.

In short, though the Mao regime appears to have had some success in repairing its credentials to rule China, it does not seem to have succeeded thus far in restoring revolutionary *élan* to Chinese society, nor is it likely to do so in the absence of marked success in reviving economic growth. The problems examined below strongly militate against any conspicuous degree of success in this direction.

The Problem of Population

It is only now becoming fully clear from recent Chinese data what a trying period the Chinese people experienced as a consequence of the "Great Leap" debacle. By Chinese estimates, the population increased between mid-1953 and mid-1958 by 12 percent to 654 million,[1] a growth consistent with a life expectancy of 50 years and a general fertility rate of 200 annual births per 1,000 women aged 15-44. In the absence of hardships, a growth of 13 percent to 739 million by mid-1963 could have been expected with unchanged fertility and a higher life expectancy of 55 years. Recent Chinese data, however, suggest an actual increase of no more than 4 percent to 680 million as of mid-1963, showing a deficit of about 60 million below estimated normal growth.[2]

[1] Based on Chinese estimates as of the end of 1957, projected to mid-1958 to provide a convenient five-year span from the mid-1953 census.

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This reduced growth would be consistent with a 5 to 10 percent decline in fertility and a life expectancy of 30 to 35 years. However, averages are misleading. Population growth was presumably near normal in the first and last years of the period from mid-1958 to mid-1963, suggesting that there probably was negative growth in 1960/61 and 1961/62, at the height of the food shortages.[3] With a majority of the population afflicted with edema and infectious hepatitis and unable to get the rest and nourishment necessary to combat them, mortality probably rose to more than double the normal level in this critical period. Infant mortality in particular climbed as a result of widespread failures of maternal lactation. At the same time, fertility probably declined in the wake of epidemic gynecologic disorders (notably, prolapsed uterus and amenorrhea) stemming apparently from the assignment of women to unusually long hours of heavy labor in 1959-60.

As a consequence of this traumatic experience, the regime has shown new determination to check population growth through fertility control. Birth-control publicity appeared in some cities early in 1962, but in 1963 the drive took on added vigor and dimensions, with the authorities displaying readiness to exert strong social pressures to secure conformance. The official approach is multi-faceted, combining encouragement of late marriages (after age 30 for men and age 25 for women) and contraceptive practices, abortion, and sterilization, with measures discriminating against the noncompliant in rations, job and housing assignments, education, and wages. The drive is now one of the major tasks of the party's indoctrinational apparatus, which seeks to propagate the notion of a two-child family as a comfortable ideal, a three-child family as the maximum, and a four-child family as an irresponsible excess justifying extreme pressures upon the parents to submit to sterilization. Though still sensitive on the question of whether its policy is compatible with Marxist doctrine, the regime has made clear that the birth-control program is supported at the highest levels. Indeed, Chou En-lai's familiarity and identification with it suggest that the program may well be administered directly under the Premier's office rather than under the Ministry of Health.

While current reports indicate that the program has had marked initial success in urban areas, it is apparent that the indoctrination and

[2] Grain output in 1962 was 6 to 8 percent below the 1957 level. Allowing for changes in imports and nonfood uses, the supply available for food was at least 1 percent lower. Yet per capita grain consumption could hardly have been more than 5 percent below 1957-58 levels in 1962-63 in view of the confirmed improvement in the diet and the limited scope for non-grain foods in the diet. Chinese grain estimates are thus imcompatible with estimates of a five-year population growth significantly exceeding 4 percent.

[3] In 1958-59 and 1962-63, food shortages were not severe. In interviews with Felix Greene (December 5, 1963) and Edgar Snow (January 23, 1964), Chou En-lai stated that the current annual population growth was 2 percent and 2.5 percent respectively. These rates presumably refer to 1962-63 and are obviously rounded, suggesting a real rate of perhaps 2.2 percent.

From Dizziness to Sobriety

During the "Great Leap":

What it took these countries [*i.e.*, Great Britain, United States and West Germany] several years, even more than ten years to attain [in steel production], or what has taken them several years and they still have not attained, China will do in a single year.

—Jen-min Jih-pao *(Peking), March 31, 1960.*

. . . We will certainly catch up and outstrip Great Britain in the output of major industrial products in less than ten years, fulfill and overfulfill the original demands set in the Program for Agricultural Development in less than 12 years, and on this basis continue to strive to bring about an even greater advance in our countryside.

—*From a speech by Tan Chen-Lin, member of the Secretariat of the CC of the CPC, April 6, 1960.*

Three Years Later:

China's economic situation has become better with each passing year, and the entire national economy has begun to take a turn for the better in a general way.

—*From* Hung Ch'i *(Red Flag), Oct. 1, 1963.*

The country, as a whole, has gathered a relatively good harvest, with a new increase in output of food grains compared with last year and a fairly big growth in major industrial crops. . . . Our national economy has achieved tremendous successes in the work of readjustment, consolidation and raising standards in recent years. . . . Our national economy has begun an all-around turn for the better.

—*From the press communiqué of the fourth session of the Second National Peoples' Congress, NCNA, Dec. 3, 1963.*

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newly-instituted social pressures have not yet effectively reached the predominant rural population. In recognition of the enormity of the task, the regime has set as its relatively modest goal for 1970 a reduction of the current annual growth rate of 2.2 percent (which would raise the population to 800 million by the end of that year) to a little under 2 percent, with a further lowering of the rate to the current Japanese level of 1 percent regarded as a distant hope.[4] The regime clearly does not anticipate much relief from population pressures in the next ten years, and its current efforts are aimed rather at insuring survival in the decades following thereafter.

The Situation in Agriculture

The Chinese are also beginning to confirm the extent of the disruption in agriculture caused by the "Great Leap." Farm output, after rising possibly 10 percent in 1958 with good weather and reasonably moderate official policies, plummeted in 1959 and 1960 under the impact of irrational commune organization, and it remained depressed in 1961 and 1962 owing to the debilitating food shortages. Adverse crop weather in 1960 and 1961 accentuated the decline and delayed the recovery. The restoration by 1963 of a more adequate diet through grain imports and private-plot cultivation sparked Chinese hopes for a major recovery in farm output that year, but these hopes appear to have been only partially fulfilled.

Recent Chinese statements confirm that by 1960 grain output—accounting for about half the value of total farm production—had fallen 19 percent below the 1957 level.[5] By 1963 it had recovered to the 1957 level, as had the production of livestock and vegetables (left largely to private peasant initiative); but the output of soybeans, oilseeds, and industrial crops, owing to the continued shift of important acreages from these crops to grain, still remained markedly below 1957 levels. Overall farm output in 1963 was clearly more than 5 percent below the 1957 level, and in per capita terms more than 10 percent below. A tolerable diet had been restored, but production was still insufficient to permit dispensing with grain imports amounting to 3 percent of domestic grain output, much less to provide a margin for restoring former levels of agricultural exports and raw materials output.

The ability to attain such a margin is of course crucial to the magnitude of the development effort that can be mounted, and the scale and timing of agricultural recovery will critically influence the character of China's development. The Chinese desperately hope that cheap organizational improvements will suffice to assure a substantial measure of recovery, for new expansion of agricultural productive capacity is likely to be costly, complex, and slow to come by. But the Chinese are again under the pressure of rapid population growth, and they cannot afford to temporize. If the damage to agriculture resulting from the "Great Leap" proves deepseated and permanent, or if the disgruntled peasantry fails to respond to new production arrangements, the Chinese regime will have no choice but to allow living standards to fall, and to resort to more oppressive political controls, while it seeks to extricate itself from its predicament.

The present state of production inputs in Chinese agriculture is imperfectly known. There are some indications of reduced yields resulting, notably, from seed deterioration, but the smaller overall farm output compared to 1957 seems to stem primarily from a decline in sown acreage. This decline, in turn, is partly due to some loss of cultivated acreage to roads, reservoirs, and other construction, but also certainly to a reduced intensity of double-cropping, which may reflect a net decline in motive power. The number of draft animals dropped sharply—possibly by one-quarter—between 1957 and 1963, and the drop was only partly offset by a 5-percent increase in the farm labor force and an expansion of tractor power from 25,000 to 110,000 15-horsepower standard units.

On the other hand, there has been an impressive advance in rural electrification in the last several years. This advance has particularly emphasized pumping stations for irrigation and

[4] Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai, *Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 1964.

[5] Mao told Viscount Montgomery in September 1961 that grain output in 1960 had been 150 million tons and would be 160 million tons in 1961. At the time, this estimate seemed far too low and was not widely credited. Chou En-lai has now confirmed it in statements that the increase in grain output in 1962 had exceeded that in 1961 and for both years had exceeded 20 million tons (interview with Pakistani newsmen, quoted in *Dawn*, April 11, 1963), and that the increases in 1962 and in 1963 had each exceeded 10 million tons, with 1963 output still below 190 million tons (interview with Edgar Snow, cited above, January 1964). Chou implied that the 1963 target—upset by natural calamities—had called for an increase of over 10 percent to more than 190 million tons. These statements suggest a grain output series as follows (in million tons): 1957—185; 1960—150; 1961—160; 1962—172; 1963 target—193; 1963 actual—184.

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drainage and appears based on surplus power and machine plant capacity. As yet, however, it has affected only about 7 percent of total farmland. Although chemical fertilizer supplies have increased rapidly from 2.5 million tons in 1961 to 4.5 million tons in 1963 through production and imports, they still represent only a minor addition to the available supply of plant nutrients and seem likely to expand much more slowly in future years.

Agricultural development to date has been rather haphazard and spur-of-the-moment. Apart from a commendable attention to fertilizer output, the approach has been to utilize whatever idle production facilities and domestic materials could be found to make agricultural producers' goods and then to devise farm programs to utilize these goods. Of course, the current exigencies and uncertainties make long-term planning difficult, and an authoritative review of agricultural planning proposals published in Peking last December makes clear that even the basic premises of Communist China's long-term agricultural development have not been decided.[6]

This aricle reveals confusion over whether the farm program should concern itself exclusively with raising production or should aim at larger objectives, such as releasing labor to industry and constructing an ideal socialist organization in the countryside. The specific proposals discussed also reflect a wide divergence of views as to the scale of available developmental resources. The optimists apparently have been advocating large-scale mechanization, reclamation, and water conservancy projects, while the more cautious have shunned such proposals on economy grounds and instead proposed varying emphases on electrification, selective mechanization, fertilizer production, small-scale water conservancy projects, research, and extension work.

Developments in Industry

Although Communist China's industrial output approximately doubled during 1958-60, it declined sharply in 1961 and again in 1962. Judging from the lower consumer goods output caused by raw material shortages (*e.g.*, in textiles) and the sharp cutbacks in production of investment goods, overall industrial output in 1962 could hardly have exceeded the 1957 level, or half the 1960 peak. Though still a year of retrenchment, 1963 probably saw a stabilization of industrial output, with increased outputs in certain sectors. The 1964 New Year's day editorial in the central party organ *Jen-min Jih-pao* implied some increase in 1963 industrial output, but the amount of growth evidently was not large enough to be worth specifying and probably did not exceed a few percentage points.

Recent Chinese statements about industrial production have instead emphasized successes in reducing costs, improving quality, expanding variety, and achieving self-sufficiency, albeit at a low level of output. The Chinese are proud that they were able to halt the industrial decline despite being handicapped by a sharply reduced level of industrial imports and by the absence of foreign technical assistance. They are also aware, however, that without such imports and assistance, investment efficiency is necessarily low and will not support rapid industrial growth. When the pro-Communist American writer Anna Louise Strong asked Vice-Premier Po I-po early this year why the Peking regime was merely talking enthusiastically about "readjustment" instead of launching a new "great leap forward," the Chinese official, while noting the importance of producing domestic substitutes for imports, related the prospects for China's industrial recovery to repayment of the Soviet debt (by 1965) and the freeing of foreign exchange to pay for industrial imports.[7]

During the period 1958-60, China's average annual imports amounted to nearly $2 billion, of which nearly half was allocated to machinery and another 40 percent to industrial fuels and raw materials. These industrial imports were cut by roughly two-thirds during 1961-63 as a result of reduced exports, increased food imports, accelerated debt repayment, and the necessity of living within China's available foreign exchange means. The drop in farm output, by reducing edible agricultural exports and necessitating purchases of food from abroad, accounted for about $1 billion of the reduction in industrial imports.

China's prospects for relieving this situation quickly do not seem bright. The long-term agreement concluded with Canada for purchasing grain suggests that the regime does not foresee an early recovery in farm output on anything like the scale necessary to finance marked increases in industrial imports. Any further agricultural recovery that may occur in the near future is likely to be limited, and the gains probably will be devoted first to improv-

[6] *Ching-chi Yen-chiu* (Economic Research), No. 12, Dec. 17, 1963.

[7] Interview, Hong Kong *Ta Kung Pao*, January 15, 1964.

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ing the diet and clothing standards of the Chinese people. Moreover, although China will complete her debt payments to the USSR in 1965 (these payments were reflected in Chinese trade surpluses with the Soviet Union in excess of $200 million annually during 1961-63), over 80 percent of Chinese exports to the USSR are textiles, minerals, and consumer manufactures which will be difficult to market elsewhere, making it far from certain that retirement of the Soviet debt will actually release exchange resources. In the meantime, since one-third of Chinese exports still go to the USSR, China's trade position could suffer a further serious setback if the deepening Sino-Soviet crisis were to lead to a suspension of trade relations. Despite the evident willingness of Japan and West European countries to trade with China, it is highly unlikely that they will take in exchange the cheap textiles and low-quality consumer goods that supported the growth in Sino-Soviet trade in the past decade.

The Problem of Technology

China, of course, hopes in the long run to reduce her dependence on imports by developing her own technological capabilities. In the past fourteen years the regime has greatly expanded the educational system, with particular emphasis on engineering and science, but industrial advance depended critically upon the provision of technical experts by the USSR, which withdrew them in 1960 as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In order to create a literate work force, the regime effected a great expansion—looking eventually to universal education—at the primary and junior-high school level. Enrollment at the senior-high level was also expanded greatly, but with the more limited objective of providing candidates for college and a body of workers with specific technical skills. College education at the undergraduate level likewise showed a marked increase, but postgraduate education was limited and conducted mainly in the USSR. Soviet technical assistance provided an essential complement to the large and growing force of young Chinese graduates.

The withdrawal of this assistance and the setback suffered by Chinese hopes of rapid industrial growth have greatly affected educational plans. College and senior-high enrollments have been greatly curtailed to conform to lower projected requirements, and instead the regime is concentrating on improving the quality of training. New emphasis has been placed on expanding postgraduate training, although progress appears to be very slow, presumably because China's top technical talent has been drafted to reorient production and halt the industrial decline. Only 800 students were admitted to postgraduate training in 1962, and although the official plans called for a doubling of this number in 1963, admissions seem to have continued at the same level. Thus, current exigencies are evidently holding back the adaptation of China's educational system to her new requirements, with the result that the system is unlikely to produce a major increase in highly trained personnel for a considerable period.

The number of college graduates in the population, judging from current enrollments, may be expected to increase from 1.3 million in 1963 to 2.9 million in 1973. Even at the latter level, however, it will still amount to little more than 0.3 percent of the population. Graduates trained in engineering and science are expected to account for about 40 percent of the total number. While this is an impressive figure, very few will have had sufficient postgraduate training to qualify for advanced work and research, and because of the limited industrial establishment, a large proportion will probably be diverted to middle-school teaching assignments. These considerations suggest that, despite substantial improvements in education, China is unlikely to accomplish a dramatic elevation of its own technological capabilities in the next decade, and will be well advised to import, copy, and adapt what foreign technology it can obtain.

The Outlook

The Chinese Communist regime seems to be facing its domestic problems with somber realism. Confronted by continuing agricultural difficulties, population pressure, and the severance of its ties with the Soviet industrial economy, it no longer hopes for rapid economic growth, but rather seeks to achieve stability while trying gradually to create the conditions necessary for renewed expansion and modernization. In its external outlook, it is more optimistic: it believes that opportunistic policies, in conjunction with the current process of rapid change and shifting alignments in international politics, will enable it, with little risk, to undermine the position of the United States in Asia, to challenge the Soviet Union for the leadership of world communism, to increase its influence

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among the new nations, and to find at least a partial replacement for past Soviet economic assistance in expanded trade ties with Japan and Western Europe.

While conceding a need for caution and flexibility, the regime sees the key to success, in both its domestic and foreign policies, in a vigorous rededication to Marxist ideology. In lieu of unobtainable material incentives, it seeks to instill a revolutionary self-discipline at home that will motivate the people to greater effort. Abroad, it emphasizes that it can provide a relevant ideology and example to developing nations; and, by taking a rigid, "principled" stand, it hopes to prevent—particularly in Asia—an unfavorable coalescence of the status quo that might block its goals.

Yet one suspects that there are incompatible ingredients in Peking's posture which lessen the prospects of success. In foreign policy, opportunistic policies could eventually discredit "principled" positions, while an uncompromising attitude could involve unacceptable risks or costs. In domestic affairs, the attempt to pursue a cautious, pragmatic policy with doctrinal conviction may prove an unworkable contradiction. It will also be difficult to evoke a heroic response from a stagnant society still disillusioned and embittered from the "Great Leap" disaster, and the attempt to do so may inhibit the flexible, experimental approach necessary for fashioning new and appropriate adjustment policies.

These problems are further complicated by the uncertainties and distractions of the inevitably approaching succession. The present Chinese Communist leaders—the "men who made the revolution"—are aware that the time is drawing near when they will be consigned to history. Curiously, they have deliberately drawn public attention to this fact by citing it as the reason for the urgency they attach to an indoctrination program that will pass on their revolutionary wisdom and ensure the worthiness of their heirs.[8] It is also logical to surmise that the prospect of an early succession is causing political ferment in the top echelon of the party, stimulating personal and factional rivalries. This seems particularly probable in the face of the coming Ninth Party Congress—not yet scheduled but overdue since 1961—which will formalize power shifts since the Eighth Congress of 1956 and importantly influence the leadership structure entering into the succession period.

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[8] Anna Louise Strong, in her *Letters From China*, Peking, World Press, (undated), Letter No. 10, July 26, 1963, states: "If I ask Chinese friends today what is the chief problem, the chances are that they will not say 'agriculture' or 'industrialization' but 'Socialist Education.' How to keep the revolutionary spirit alive when the men who made the revolution pass?" Also, Takashi Oka, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor* (Feb. 26, 1964), recounts the experience of a frequent and sympathetic foreign visitor to Peking who was told by a junior Chinese official in the summer of 1963: "We need a change of leadership. And if you think that by 'change' we merely mean a shift from Mao Tse-tung to Chou En-lai or Chen Yi, you are much mistaken. There must be a change of generations."

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Politics and The Military

EDITORS' NOTE: Recent events, particularly the so-called Cuban crisis of October 1962, have again brought into focus the question of the role and importance of the military in the shaping of Soviet internal and especially foreign policy. Can the leaders of the armed forces be considered a well-defined and organized pressure group in Soviet society? To what extent is the political leadership influenced by the professional interests of the military—and, vice versa, *to what extent must the military subordinate themselves to the party? Have the latest events introduced any changes in the relationship between the two groups? These are some of the questions examined by Mr. Wolfe in the first of the two articles below. In the second, Mr. Gallagher addresses himself to one specific point at issue between the military and the Kremlin—namely, what should be the size of the Soviet ground forces? By tracing the half-muted yet nevertheless very real dispute between Ministry of Defense spokesmen on the one hand and Khrushchev on the other, Mr. Gallagher sheds light not only on the nature of relations between the military and the party establishments, but also on the intriguing problem of Khrushchev's personal freedom of action.*

Political-military relations in the Soviet Union have been characterized by a number of built-in tensions and controversies since the beginning of the Soviet regime.* Basically, these tensions have grown out of the process by which the party has sought to integrate the armed forces into the totalitarian structure of the state and to prevent them from developing a separate identity of their own. The fact that the military establishment possesses a potential power of coercion far beyond that of any other element of the Soviet bureaucracy naturally has sharpened the concern of the party to keep it an acquiescent instrument of political authority.

The Soviet military command, on the other hand, while not disposed to challenge the basic policy-making powers of the party, has tended to seek a greater measure of autonomy in matters within its professional competence and to look upon excessive party-political intrusion into military affairs as a threat to military effectiveness. In a sense, therefore, the history of Soviet political-military relations can be described as the search for a formula to reconcile political control with professional military efficiency, played out against the background issue of what the proper extent of military influence should be upon the formulation of Soviet policy and strategy.[1]

Developments of the past year or so, especially since the Cuban crisis of October 1962, have furnished revealing testimony to the continuing vitality of many of the old problems of political-military relations, as well as suggesting the emergence of new difficulties arising out of the politics and technology of the nuclear-missile age. While it is important to bear in mind that an essential consensus still binds the

* Views expressed in this paper should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

[1] The literature on the history of Soviet political-military relations is too extensive to cite at length here, but the following are worth particular mention: D. Fedotoff-White, *The Growth of the Red Army*, Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 76-175; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 411-18, 500; John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1962, pp. 113-78, 187-91, *passim*; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in The Nuclear Age*, New York, Praeger, 1958, pp. 18-40.

Author of the forthcoming Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, *Mr. Wolfe has long specialized in problems of Soviet military doctrine and history. He is a Senior Staff Member of the RAND Corporation (Washington, D.C.).*

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Political Primacy *vs.* Professional Elan

By Thomas W. Wolfe

various elements of the Soviet leadership together, the present signs of stress in Soviet political-military relations are not without interest as evidence that no stable solution has yet been worked out in this area of Soviet bureaucratic life.

The Reaffirmation of Party Primacy

One of the symptoms of underlying tension in the area of Soviet political-military relations in the last year-and-a-half has been the conspicuous reassertion of political primacy in military affairs. While the need to re-emphasize this time-honored assumption of Soviet political life may spring from deeper sources of ferment in Soviet society, the manifest questions involved here have centered mainly on the relative weight of the military and political leadership in the development of military doctrine and strategy, and on the tendency of some elements of the military elite to emphasize military professionalism at the expense of ideological values.

A noticeable trend toward reassertion of political primacy became evident in the fall of 1962 on the heels of the Cuban missile crisis, at a time when critical second thoughts about the handling of the crisis presumably were circulating among the Soviet hierarchy.[2] Among the first signs of a new campaign to reassert political primacy in unmistakable terms was an article in early November by Marshal Chuikov, Commander of the Soviet ground forces. The Chuikov article, which took the form of an interview in *Red Star*, repeatedly stressed the dominant role of the party in military affairs and used the rather transparent device of citing a hitherto unpublished exchange of messages between Stalin and Lenin in 1920 to refute the notion that "our diplomacy sometimes very effectively spoils the results achieved by our military victories."[3] Chuikov criticized unnamed fellow officers for failing "to maintain proper attitudes and opinions," and seemed to be reminding the military leadership that it would be unwise to question decisions of the political leadership, which is in a better position to see the larger policy picture.

The delivery of this "message" by a high-ranking military leader avoided the embarrassment of any open confrontation between the party and the professional military.[4] Indeed, one of the interesting features of the Soviet

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[2] For a detailed discussion of signs of post-Cuban dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, see Roman Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-1963*, RAND Research Memorandum RM-3760-PR, the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, August 1963, pp. 16-35.

[3] Marshal V. I. Chuikov, "The Basic Fundamentals of Military Development, *Red Star*, Nov. 17, 1962.

[4] One should be careful in discussions of this sort not to regard the "party" and the "professional military" as two altogether antipodal groups in frequent opposition to each other. Without exception, all responsible military figures in the high command of the Soviet armed forces are also party members subject to party discipline. At the same time, there are institutionalized interests on both sides which may collide, and which find expression in various forms of bureaucratic infighting. It is in this contained arena of conflict that tensions in political-military relations arise.

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campaign to reassert political primacy in military affairs and to stress the importance of Marxist-Leninist attitudes among military personnel has been the fact that top-ranking military leaders have for the most part taken on the task of setting their own colleagues straight. Thus, while impetus for the campaign may have come from political authorities, there is also a possibility that the military leadership may have embarked to some extent upon a process of self-catharsis in order to ward off stronger measures of the sort that Khrushchev felt obliged to administer in the Zhukov case of 1957.

Another important military leader to lend his prestige to the party primacy campaign was Marshal Malinovski, the Soviet Minister of Defense. A pamphlet over Malinovski's name was sent to the press in late November 1962.[5] One of the conspicuous features of this document was its assertion of the complete dominance of the party generally and of Nikita Khrushchev personally in military affairs and in the formulation of military doctrine. Stressing explicitly that "military doctrine is developed and determined by the political leadership of the state," the pamphlet underscored Khrushchev's personal role in this process. It stated that his January 1960 speech represented "the first developed exposition" of modern Soviet military doctrine "from both a political and a technical standpoint." [6] This tribute was the more conspicuous because no specific mention was made of Malinovski's own major formulation of the new military doctrine at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. While Malinovski may have written the November pamphlet on his own initiative to deflect party criticism of the military, the character of the document suggests that more than one author may have been involved. It is not implausible that the party and Khrushchev may have had in hand a pamphlet in search of an author, and that their choice fell upon Malinovski.[7]

The trend toward stressing political preeminence in the military field gathered momentum in 1963. In February, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense and presumably the party's principal voice in the armed forces, published an article which emphasized the leadership of the party in developing military doctrine and policy and strengthening the Soviet military posture.[8]

An important issue in this accelerating campaign—and indeed one of the factors that may have precipitated it—was a study entitled *Voennaia strategiia* (Military Strategy) that had appeared in the late summer of 1962.[9] Written by a group of fifteen military experts headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, the study was not an "official" document but offered authoritative treatment of a wide range of issues bearing on Soviet military doctrine and strategy in the nuclear-missile age. The authors furnished some evidence of differing views between the "modernist" and "traditionalist" schools of military thought as well as between the political and military leadership. They also tended to give the military a good share of credit for developing recent Soviet military doctrine, by implication staking out a claim for greater military influence on state policy.[10]

At the time of its publication this study was hailed in the Soviet press as the first comprehensive work on military strategy to appear in the USSR since 1926. But by early 1963 press reviews—seemingly influenced by the new reaffirmation of party supremacy—became increasingly critical. A review published in January attacked the work for its failure to follow Lenin's injunction to "subordinate the military point of view to the political" and charged that the book had broadened the scope of military doctrine and strategy at the "expense of politics," whether the authors "meant it or not." [11] Another review suggested that the Sokolovski authors had overstated the military leadership's role in the determination of

[5] Marshal R. Ya. Malinovski, *Bditelno stoiat na strazhe mira* (Vigilantly Stand Guard over the Peace), Moscow, Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1962.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

[7] In this connection, Khrushchev has admitted a precedent by mentioning to former US Vice-President Nixon that he himself had written a widely-publicized article on Soviet military policy which had been attributed to Air Marshal Vershinin in *Pravda*, Sept. 8, 1957. See article by Earl Mazo on the Nixon trip to the Soviet Union in 1959, *New York Herald Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1960, p. 8.

[8] A. A. Yepishev, "The Growing Role of the CPSU in the Leadership of the Armed Forces," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Problems of the History of the CPSU), No. 2, February 1963, pp. 3 ff. The Main Political Administration headed by Yepishev has been traditionally an extension of the party Central Committee's professional staff within the armed forces. Before donning a uniform to take up his present post, Yepishev had been ambassador to Yugoslavia and still earlier a secret police official in the MGB.

[9] Translated and published in the US as *Soviet Military Strategy*, with Analytical Introduction and Annotations by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Gouré, and T. W. Wolfe (all of the RAND Corporation), Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 33 ff.

[11] Colonels V. Zemskov and A. Yakimovski, "Military Strategy," *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 1, January 1963, p. 124.

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strategy, overlooking Frunze's words that "strategy is not the prerogative solely of the military command." It should be borne in mind, the review went on, that the government leadership "determines the final and interim goals of warfare . . . and the means of attaining them," while the job of the military command "comes down mainly to carrying out concrete operations to attain these goals." [12]

Just as these reviews took the Sokolovski book to task for staking out too large a claim for military prerogatives in the area of strategy, so in other Soviet military writings in 1963 the issue of party supremacy centered frequently on the question of where competence lay for the formulation of military doctrine. There was little doubt that the new guidelines on this question had been laid out. While an undercurrent of resistance persisted, many military writers found it expedient to fall in line with the new trend. Thus, a conference on Soviet military doctrine which was held in Moscow in May 1963 (though not reported until October) came up with the uncontested finding, among other matters, that: "Military doctrine is developed and determined by the political leadership of the state." [13] The same point was underscored in a brochure entitled *Soviet Military Doctrine*, by Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, published in May 1963, approximately a year after an earlier article by the same author had appeared in a Soviet military journal. In the earlier article, Lomov had advanced a claim for significant military influence on policy formulation in the following words:

The formation of our military world-view has taken place in a creative atmosphere . . . and is the result of the common effort of military theorists and practical military people. Thanks to this, we have developed a body of unified, theoretical views, on the basis of which a broad state program has been carried out to prepare the country and the armed forces for the defense of the Fatherland.[14]

This passage was conspicuously missing in the Lomov brochure on the same subject published a year later. A new formula now appeared:

. . . the foundations of military doctrine are determined by the country's political leadership, for it alone has the competence and the jurisdiction to solve the problems of developing the armed forces. . . .[15]

The journal *Communist of the Armed Forces*, which is the organ of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense, was especially diligent in reminding its audience that the party is both the creator and the leader of the armed forces. An exposition along this line was offered in an article by Colonels S. Baranov and E. Nikitin in April 1963, which underscored the point, quoted from Lenin, that:

The policy of the military establishment, like that of all other establishments and institutions, is conducted on the exact basis of general directives issued by the party Central Committee, and under its control.[16]

In the fall of 1963, the political-military issue took on new interest when Soviet commentary began to display marked sensitivity to foreign interpretations of the original Sokolovski edition as a document reflecting a conflict of views and interests between the Soviet political and military leadership. An article in the November issue of *International Affairs* noted that Western writers had sought to use the Sokolovski work as evidence of "glaring" contradictions between Soviet foreign policy and military thinking.[17] Four of the Sokolovski authors themselves, in a highly unusual *Red Star* article dealing with foreign commentary on their book, conceded that the work had been a forum for "theoretical discussion" of varying viewpoints, but vehemently denied that this betokened any conflict of views over military doctrine, strategy or defense appropriations. Controversy over such matters is rife within imperialist countries, they charged, but not in the Soviet Union, where:

All these questions are decided by the Central

[12] A. Golubev, "Some Problems of Military History in the Book *Military Strategy*," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 5, May 1963, p. 90.

[13] Reported in an article by Colonel L. Belousov, "Conference on Soviet Military Doctrine," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 10, October 1963, p. 122.

[14] Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 10, May 1962, p. 12.

[15] Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, *Sovetskaia voennaia doktrina* (Soviet Military Doctrine), Moscow, All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, May 1963, p. 5.

[16] Colonels S. Baranov and E. Nikitin, "CPSU Leadership—The Fundamental Basis of Soviet Military Development," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 8, April 1963, p. 17.

[17] L. Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense Might and Peaceful Coexistence," *International Affairs*, No. 11, November 1963, p. 27. Colonel Larionov was one of the authors of the Sokolovski work.

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Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government on a scientific basis . . . with full support from the people, the army and the navy.[18]

Concurrently with this riposte in *Red Star*, a second revised edition of the Sokolovski work appeared in Moscow bookstores—a scant fifteen months after its predecessor.[19] While many of the changes in the revised edition bore on questions which lie outside the scope of this article, it is not unreasonable to assume that the political-military issue may have had something to do with republication of this substantial work at such an early date. Interestingly enough, however, although some effort obviously was made to bring the book into line with the prevailing trend on party primacy, the Sokolovski authors gave ground rather grudgingly. Most of the changes they introduced in this area were relatively minor. For example, in one place the authors dropped a sentence which Western commentators had speculated might be aimed indirectly at Khrushchev, in light of his frequent personal sallies into the enunciation of new military doctrine. The sentence read:

Military doctrine is not thought out or compiled by a single person or a group of persons.[20]

In its place, the authors substituted the currently favored formula:

The basic positions of military doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the state.[21]

In another passage, where the discussion concerned the relationships of strategic considerations to policy, the first edition, after citing Engels to the effect that policy must not violate the laws of military strategy in wartime, went on to say:

In wartime, therefore, strategic considerations often determine policy.[22]

The new edition addressed itself to the same question by first inserting the caveat that Engels did not intend to emphasize "the independence of strategy from politics." It then substituted a new sentence, stating:

In wartime, strategic considerations often reflect and in turn influence policy.[23]

Here the Sokolovski authors appeared to be making some concession to criticism that they had failed to "subordinate the military point of view to the political." However, they stopped short of a full amendment of their original text, by retaining in the new edition a sentence stating unequivocally:

Cases even arise when the military factor not only predominates, but even acquires decisive significance.[24]

Professionalism vs. *Political Indoctrination*

The party traditionally has held the view that the armed forces should be not only an institution to provide an effective military capability, but also a "school for communism." [25] A good deal of friction in political-military relations has been generated by failure to reconcile fully these two objectives. One of the transgressions laid at Marshal Zhukov's door was that he had "underestimated" and tried to "liquidate" the indoctrinational and other activities of political workers in the armed forces.[26] Concurrently with the revival of the party supremacy campaign, this issue also took on new currency. Some Soviet commentators found it expedient to cite the unhappy fate of Zhukov, recalling that he had "followed a line of ignoring and doing away with party-government leadership and control of the armed forces," [27] and that he had sought "to tear the army away from the party and the people." [28]

As if to steer clear of his predecessor's mistakes, Marshal Malinovski, at a military conference in Moscow in October 1963, sounded a warning to military cadres to avoid thinking too

[18] Major-Generals I. Zavialov, V. Kolechitski, M. Cherednichenko and Colonel V. Larionov, "Against Slanders and Falsifications: Concerning the US Editions of the Book *Military Strategy*," *Red Star*, Nov. 2, 1963.
[19] Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, *et al.*, *Voennaia strategiia* (Military Strategy), second edition, Moscow, Voenizdat Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1963. Hereafter cited as *Voennaia strategiia*, 2nd ed. Besides numerous textual revisions, the second edition was about 50 pages longer than the first.
[20] *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 130.
[21] *Voennaia strategiia*, 2nd ed., p. 54.
[22] *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 104.
[23] *Voennaia strategiia*, 2nd ed., p. 30.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] See N. M. Kiriaev, "The 22nd Congress of the CPSU on Strengthening of the Armed Forces and Defense Capability of the Soviet Union," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 1, January 1962, p. 74.
[26] *Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1957; *Red Star*, Nov. 5, 1957.
[27] Moscow broadcast to North America, Nov. 10, 1963.
[28] Baranov and Nikitin, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

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THE PARTY AND THE ARMY

A Page from the Recent Past

The plenary session of the party Central Committee resolutely condemned the underestimation of the importance of party political work in the armed forces and outlined an extensive program for radically improving it in the spirit of the historic decisions of the 20th party Congress, in the spirit of the inviolable Leninist traditions. V. I. Lenin taught that "where . . . political work among the troops is carried out with great care . . . there is no lack of discipline in the army, its organization and spirit are better, and there are more victories."

Intensification of political work in the army and navy is the common task of all Communists, commanders and political workers. Their task is firmly and consistently to carry out in the armed forces the policy of the Communist Party, to be the bearers of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

—From a Pravda editorial of Nov. 3, 1957, following the ouster of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense.

exclusively in professional military terms and "to develop their skill in analyzing phenomena and facts from a Marxist-Leninist position." [29] His admonition came in the wake of a running dialogue during the previous year in which one side argued against spending too much time on propaganda and political orientation in the armed forces when the increasing complexity of new military technology demanded more time for intensive training,[30] while the other side bore down on the tendency of high-ranking officers to give superficial attention to ideological and party matters, and thus to set a poor example.[31] The party's concern to channel this dialogue in the right direction was made evident by a flurry of meetings in late 1962 and early 1963, designed to look into the state of ideological health among the officers corps and to devise ways to improve the work of political organs within the military establishment. At one of these meetings, Yepishev, the party watchdog in the Ministry of Defense, urged political organs to "inquire deeply into the activities of generals, admirals and officers and to evaluate their professional and political-morale qualities on the basis of their activities." [32]

This warning apparently was not fully effective, for complaints from some high-ranking military figures about excessive political interference in military affairs and in the private lives of officers continued to find their way into print. For example, Colonel-General Tolubko, deputy commander of the strategic missile forces, took occasion in January 1963 to criticize political organs for "burdening officers" with political requirements which interfered with their military duties, and there was other military back-talk in the same vein.[33] Thus Malinovski's admonition in October 1963 that military professionalism should not be overstressed at the expense of political indoctrination merely underlines an old and apparently unresolved dilemma.

Military Influence on Policy

The obverse side of the political primacy issue is the question of what the proper limits of military influence should be in the area of strategy and national security policy. Notwithstanding the cooperative role which the Soviet military hierarchy has found it expedient to

[29] Report of All-Army Conference of Ideological Workers, *Red Star*, Nov. 1, 1963. Articles in a similar vein turned up around this time in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil:* see, *e.g.*, Colonel A. Yuvlev, "Requirements of the 22nd Party Congress and the Program of the CPSU with Regard to Military Cadres," No. 15, August 1963, pp. 14-45; editorial "To Strengthen Military Cadres Ideologically," No. 19, October 1963, p. 6.

[30] *E.g.*, General I. Pliev, "The New Technology and Problems of Strengthening Discipline," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 19, October 1962, pp. 21-28.

[31] See *Red Star*, Nov. 18, Dec. 8, 1962, Feb. 20, 1963; Major-General D. Reshetov, "The Highest Level of Marxist-Leninist Training of Officers," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 20, October 1962, pp. 21-23.

[32] A. A. Yepishev, "Raising Combat Readiness of Troops—The Main Task of Party Work," *Red Star*, Dec. 1, 1962.

[33] Colonel-General V. Tolubko, "Know Strategic Weapons Perfectly," *Red Star*, Jan. 8, 1963; see also, *Red Star*, March 20, 29, 1963. One facet of the issue between party work and military professionalism relates to the rise of a new generation of "military specialists" associated with advanced technology in the missile forces and other branches of the Soviet military establishment. Party workers' complaints have singled out the obstructionism of the "military technologists" along with that of "staff officials." See Colonel D. Levchenko, "The Commander and the New Technology," *Red Star*, Dec. 10, 1960; Pliev, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

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assume in the party supremacy campaign, it also is evident that an effort has been quietly underway to resist the narrowing of the military's sphere of influence. Before turning to some examples of this effort, it may be useful to distinguish more precisely the areas in which military influence on Soviet policy come into play, at least potentially. Three such areas can be discerned: (1) the high-level sphere of party-state policy formulation; (2) the lesser level of military-technical considerations relating to the development and management of the military establishment itself; (3) the area of internal Soviet politics.[34]

What seems to have been happening can best be described as an effort by the Soviet military to extend its influence in a gray area lying between the military-technical level and the party-state level of policy concern. This has not been a frontal challenge to political primacy, but a process of indirect encroachment. The principal avenues of military encroachment upon terrain traditionally reserved to the political leadership have been twofold.

The first of these, so far as the visible evidence enables one to judge, has been a military bid for greater influence in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy, both of which impinge upon the area of state policy to a greater or lesser extent, depending on how they are defined. According to the presently prevailing Soviet definition, military doctrine is the more fundamental conception, representing "the officially accepted expressions of state views . . . on questions of war and the country's defense," whereas the content of military strategy is in a sense provisional until approved by the political leadership.[35]

Generally speaking, the broader the accepted scope of military doctrine and strategy, and the greater the acknowledged share of the military in their formulation, the more room there is for the military leadership to exert influence on policy—whether to advance the national interest as the military may perceive it, or to serve more parochial military interests in the day-to-day interplay of Soviet bureaucratic life. This helps to explain why the party supremacy issue has tended to center so frequently on the question of "jurisdiction" over military doctrine and strategy. Unless the party has sensed an implicit challenge from this direction, it is difficult to account for the concerted efforts to reestablish a point that has generally been taken for granted anyway—namely, that primacy in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy belongs to the political leadership.

The second avenue of indirect military encroachment upon the traditional prerogatives of the political leadership has been through a more or less subtle assertion that the military-technological revolution of the nuclear age has put a higher premium than ever before upon professional military expertise, and thus has enhanced the contribution that the professional officer corps is fitted to make to the complex and many-sided task of assuring the country's defense. Essentially, this is another aspect of the old question of military professionalism in modern dress.

This line of military argument has been somewhat diluted by the modernist-traditionalist debate within the Soviet military establishment itself, which has tended to place the advocates of modernism in the position of looking toward Khrushchev and the party to take the initiative in combatting military conservatism and outworn concepts still dear, evidently, to a substantial number of military leaders. Another factor undermining the line of argument that avows the special qualities of the military leadership as a whole has been the emergence of the so-called "Stalingrad group" of military leaders, whose careers have been closely linked with Khrushchev's and who occupy many of the top positions in the military hierarchy, at the expense of officers whose earlier service did not bring them into close contact with Khrushchev.[36] By and large, Khrushchev has rewarded the Stalingrad group well, but in return has expected its cooperation in supporting policies which have been more or less unpalatable to large sectors of military opinion. Nevertheless, despite the cross-currents of internal military factions and debate, there has been a perceptible tendency for the military to seek leverage upon policy by advancing the notion that the professional military elite performs unique functions which the political leadership itself cannot discharge.

[34] For a more complete discussion of each of these three levels of potential military influence, see this author's *Role of the Soviet Military in Decision-Making and Soviet Politics*, RAND Paper, P-2767, July 1963, especially pp. 1-6, 18-19.

[35] *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 10, October 1963, pp. 121-23; Lomov article in *Red Star*, Jan. 10, 1964 and same author's *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 5, 18; *Voennaia strategiia*, 2nd ed., p. 54.

[36] Among prominent members of the Stalingrad group are Marshals Malinovski, Chuikov, Biriuzov, Krylov, Yeremenko and Grechko. For a detailed discussion of the role of the Stalingrad group, see Kolkowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-45.

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"Rear-Guard" Maneuvers

In the course of the current reassertion of political primacy in military affairs, the Soviet military professionals appear to have conducted a number of rear-guard actions, as it were, in order to keep alive the question of what the proper limits of military influence should be in the area of defense policy. On the issue of military doctrine and strategy, as the previous discussion has indicated, the military case suffered a perceptible setback. Even so, while giving way on some points, ground was held on others. An interesting example of this was provided by the revised Sokolovski edition.

In the preface to the revised edition, the authors bowed to criticism that they had failed to accord enough weight to the role of the political leadership in the formulation of strategy. They did so by an interesting device. First, they stated that some Soviet critics had found fault with them for defining strategy on a class-oriented basis "in contradiction with its objective character as a science." This, they said, was an "objectivist position" with which they could not agree, for the "dependence of strategy on politics" and its "party character" were incontrovertible.[37] After thus clearing themselves of any leaning toward a nonpolitical or purely professional view of strategy, the authors went on to indicate that they were not prepared to "exclude" from the scope of military strategy the "study of problems of leadership in preparing the country for war," as certain other critics had suggested. This suggestion, they said, was founded on the notion that military strategy "should deal with questions of leadership concerning the armed forces alone," while preparation of the country itself in a military respect was "a political matter." The authors then asked:

Is it possible to separate so mechanically the two interrelated aspects of the indivisible process of leadership?

Answering this question in the negative, they asserted that the defense capability of the country was inextricably bound up with the combat readiness of the armed forces themselves, and therefore:

. . . in addition to questions of leadership of the armed forces, the task of Soviet military strategy must also include study of the problems of leadership involved in preparing the country itself to repulse aggression.[38]

Thus, as concerns the Soviet military's claim for a larger share of influence upon policies governing national defense preparations, the Sokolovski authors in this passage appeared to be taking back with one hand what they had conceded with the other.

Attempts to shore up the military side of the political-military balance by emphasis on the unique contributions of the professional officer corps have periodically found expression even during the campaign to reassert party supremacy. A typical example was furnished in the brochure *Soviet Military Doctrine* by Colonel-General Lomov, published in mid-1963. Noting that almost 90 percent of the officer corps consists of party and Komsomol members, which in itself was a way of inferring that the political health of Soviet officers need not be questioned, Lomov stressed that the regular officer corps has a special role to play in the era of a revolution in military technology. "Preparation of the officer corps," he wrote, has an especially important significance ". . . for they are the backbone of the armed forces, the creator and the bearer of the military art and the teacher of soldiers in the ranks."[39] He then went on to emphasize the high level of technical competence required of the officer corps in a modern establishment.[40] These passages, which did not appear in his earlier May 1962 article on military doctrine, came close to being a reminder that the professional officer corps serves a function for which the party by itself is no substitute. Lomov made much the same point in another (January 1964) series of articles in *Red Star*, where he also introduced the theme that even the best technology is not good enough in war without well-trained commanders and troops to employ it. This theme, developed concurrently in other Soviet military writing,[41] has overtones broader than the issue of Soviet military-political relations alone, for it has been introduced into Sino-Soviet polemics by the Chinese, who for reasons of their own have

[37] *Voennaia strategiia*, 2nd ed., p. 4.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[39] Lomov, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, p. 19.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 20. See also Colonel V. Konoplev, "On Scientific Foresight in Military Affairs," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 24, December 1963, p. 34.

[41] See Colonels V. Siniak and V. Vare, "Role of Man and Technology in the Command and Control of Troops," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 18, September 1963, p. 50.

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charged Khrushchev with "nuclear fetishism" and one-sided emphasis on technology over man.[42]

Khrushchev's Minister of Defense—Marshal Malinovski—has played a somewhat enigmatic role with regard to the touchy problems of political-military relations. In a figurative sense, at least, he has seemed to suffer a split personality, being at once the titular guardian of military interests within the Soviet bureaucracy and the chief executor of Khrushchev's policies within the armed forces. While himself a member of the "Stalingrad group," he has not always identified himself with it as a claimant of Khrushchev's favor, as in the case of his 1963 anniversary article on the Battle of Stalingrad.[43] His gruff presence at Khrushchev's elbow during the abortive 1960 Summit meeting in Paris was widely noted, but whether he wielded real influence there or was merely brought along as a bemedaled symbol of Soviet military might has never become clear. Further, though Malinovski often spoke out against military conservatism, outmoded thinking and ideological backsliding among Soviet military people, at times he has nevertheless seemed to defend essentially conservative positions, and his views on the qualities of Soviet military leaders have served as a rallying point for those emphasizing the unique professional contributions of the military.

An example of the latter occurred in a review in December 1963 of a two-volume work, *A History of Military Art,* edited by Marshal Rotmistrov. In acclaiming the work as a worthy testimonial to the creative qualities of Soviet military leaders, the reviewer referred to Malinovski's description of military art as the application of military science and theory in actual warfare, and then quoted him to the effect that:

The creative mind of military leaders and commanders and the initiative of military personnel exert tremendous influence on the practical application of military-theoretical knowledge. This is not a mere craftsman's trade—it is an art.[44]

While it would seem unwarranted to suppose that the conflicting views and interests of military and political leaders in the Soviet Union are anywhere near the point of getting out of hand, the evidence generally available does seem to support the proposition that no stable solution to the problem of Soviet political-military relations has yet been worked out. The old issue of balancing military professionalism and efficiency against political interference remains alive. New problems have arisen as the military-technological revolution of the nuclear age has tended to put a higher premium on professional military competence and thus to increase the potential weight of the military leadership vis-à-vis the political elite. At the same time, judging from the trends examined here, it also seems true that the Soviet military as an elite group is still far from being in a position to exercise dominating influence on Soviet policy-making as a whole.

[42] Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's military theories was most pungently expressed in one of a series of joint *Peoples' Daily—Red Flag* articles on Sino-Soviet relations which appeared Nov. 18, 1963. While Chinese stress on the importance of "man over technology" was undoubtedly related to Peking's lack of an advanced military technology, including nuclear weapons, there is also a likelihood that the charges against Khrushchev were calculated to exacerbate political-military relations within the Soviet Union.

[43] In this article, which is to be taken up in the study by Matthew Gallagher, Malinovski went out of his way to slight Khrushchev's role at Stalingrad and to make favorable public reference to Zhukov, whose name has become synonymous with professional military flouting of party supremacy. *Red Star,* Feb. 2, 1963.

[44] Major-General E. Boltin, "Art Triumphs," *Izvestia,* Dec. 26, 1963.

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Military Manpower: A Case Study

By Matthew P. Gallagher

The signs of tension between Soviet military and political interests described by Mr. Wolfe in the preceding article reflect the institutional effects of a functional change that has been taking place in the military's role in Soviet policy. At a time when few major governmental decisions can be made without regard for military advice or without consideration of military interests, the Soviet officer is no longer acting as a mere executant of policies formulated by others. Whether as an invited advisor on national policy, or as an uninvited advocate of military interests, he is mixing to a greater extent than ever before in areas of the political process heretofore regarded as the preserve of political authority.

Conflicts of judgment and jurisdictional frictions seem inevitable in this situation. The interests of the Ministry of Defense are not identical with the interests of the Kremlin. The military officer cannot be expected to weigh the risks and advantages of alternative policies from the same standpoint as the political leader. And no special interest group enjoying the leverage available to the Soviet military can be expected to acquiesce docilely in policies inimical to its interests.

The terms of the Soviet military-political relationship are thus shifting in ways which reduce the relevance of the army's subordination to party control. The reality of that control —and its legitimacy—is not in question in the Soviet Union. But the important issues affecting the military-political relationship lie today not in the area of institutional control but in the shadowy realm of policy formulation where military and political interests overlap. The evidence afforded by the Soviet press over the past three years suggests that the military has not been constrained by institutional formalities from airing its views and defending its interests.

This article seeks to illustrate the scope and character of military-political interactions in the policy sphere by tracing the course of a single issue, that of military manpower. While not the sole nor even the major issue on which the impact of military assertiveness has been apparent, it is one whose implications and ramifications extend into all the areas Mr. Wolfe distinguishes as susceptible to military influence. Its course may thus be regarded in some sense as a gauge of the military's role in policy and a mirror of the recent history of Soviet military-political relations.

The Conflict over Ground Forces

The principal line of stress in Soviet military-political relations over the past three years has occurred along what might be called the missiles-*vs.*-ground forces split in Soviet strategic thinking. Running through the complex disputes over strategy and force structure which

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have attended this split, and which have divided military theorists against each other, a persistent tug-of-war has been waged between Khrushchev and the Ministry of Defense over a seemingly subsidiary point—the size of the ground forces.

This tug-of-war should not be thought of as a purely institutional conflict: many military leaders have spoken out on behalf of Khrushchev's policies; on the other hand, some of Khrushchev's colleagues in the political leadership may be assumed to have supported contrary views advocated by the Ministry of Defense. Neither should it be thought of as a purely personal conflict—an aberrant phenomenon entirely tied to Khrushchev's idiosyncracies. Any Soviet leader occupying the post of party first secretary might have provoked a similar conflict: as the initiator of national policy he would have had to face the same choices that Khrushchev has had to face; as the spokesman for the general, as opposed to the special, interests of Soviet society, he could hardly have avoided conflicts with such a powerful special interest group as the military establishment. Thus, the conflict between Khrushchev and the Ministry of Defense over the manpower issue may be regarded as a natural product of the Soviet political system and, in particular, of the relationship between the political and the military interests within that system.

The manpower issue concerns more than just officers' jobs. Tangible economic stakes are involved: repeatedly throughout the past three years Khrushchev has indicated that his programs for consumer welfare have been dependent upon diverting resources from defense commitments; and while manpower may not be the largest item in the military budget, it is the most vulnerable. In addition, a conflict of strategic concepts is involved. The significance of the strategic issue fluctuates more or less sharply depending upon the scale and character of any troop-cut contemplated. It would be relatively less important, for example, should force reductions be aimed, as well they may be, primarily at low-efficiency cadre divisions in the interior of the country. Yet the fate of even these divisions might largely decide such vitally significant questions as whether the country could carry out a large-scale mobilization quickly, or whether the military could establish semiautonomous centers of civil control in the event of attack. If large force reductions were involved, the specter of 1941 would be evoked—for no lesson of that traumatic experience has left a deeper impression on Soviet military minds than the importance of large and ready reserves.[1] Even though all military men might not agree in their assessments of the course and character of a future war, they would be likely to rally together on such a point of policy conflict, recognizing that military interests as a whole stood to gain or lose by the outcome.

In sum, the manpower issue is a touchstone which has served over the past three years to distinguish two quite different approaches to the problem of national defense: the one, sanguine about the possibilities of peace, confident that short-cuts to national security can be found; and the other, preoccupied with the possibilities of war, insistent that all the means that might possibly be needed to fight and win a war should be retained.

The issue was first posed by Khrushchev in a speech of January 14, 1960, to the Supreme Soviet.[2] In it, he not only announced that a troop-cut of 1.2 million men had, in fact, been decided on, but he presented a rationalization of the measure which seemed calculated to cut the ground from under any known or potential opposition. He argued that conventional armaments, including surface ships and aircraft, as well as large standing armies, had become or were rapidly becoming obsolete—and hence could be dispensed with in the Soviet Union's defense establishment. The strength of a state today, he added, is measured not by the number of men that it maintains in "army greatcoats" but by the amount of "firepower" at its disposal. Finally, in an allusion that must have sent shivers of apprehension up military spines, he recalled with approval the territorial-militia system that had preceded the regular professional army in Soviet history, suggesting that a reconstitution of the system might be appropriate after disarmament had been achieved.

The echoes of his speech had scarcely died away before intimations of the military opposition it would evoke were heard. Speaking in the same hall, on the same day, Marshal Malinovski reiterated—in the midst of an otherwise

[1] A curious but by no means untypical illustration of the pervasive effects of this lesson is afforded by several retrospective analyses of the war of 1812 published in the Soviet press during the sesquicentennial year 1962. An article by Malinovski, which appeared in *Pravda*, Sept. 7, 1962, laid such stress on the importance of numbers in the shifting fortunes of the two armies as virtually to ascribe to this factor the decisive significance in the outcome of the war. Another article, in *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1962, co-authored by the military historian P. Zhilin, pointed out that among Kutuzov's virtues as a commander was his profound understanding of the importance of the "numerical size of armies."

[2] *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1962.

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dutiful gloss on Khrushchev's speech—the classic military formula that victory in war depends upon the combined action of all arms and services.[3] The contrast with the tone and implication of Khrushchev's words on this point was sharp. Where Khrushchev had told the Supreme Soviet that the USSR could completely annihilate any enemy with existing strategic firepower, Malinovski countered with the declaration that "it is not possible to solve all the tasks of war by one branch of the armed forces." And where Khrushchev had avoided any mention of the need to develop the conventional branches of the armed forces, and had even called for the replacement of the surface fleet and most of the air force by rocket forces, Malinovski asserted that "the successful carrying out of military actions in a modern war is possible only on the basis of a unified use of all types of armed forces. . . ."

In the weeks and months that followed, military spokesmen lined up to profess loyalty to Khrushchev's strategic wisdom—but a surprising number of them managed at the same time to register professional demurrals to key aspects of his program. Reservations were most apparent regarding Khrushchev's evident intention to relegate conventional arms and the standing army to the limbo of military antiquities. The cachet of these reservations was the "combined arms" formula. A Colonel F. Sverdlov, writing in *Red Star* on January 21, 1960, argued that it was necessary to develop all branches of service in order to provide the "greatest harmony and unity in the armed forces as a whole." A Colonel Grudinin, writing in the same paper on February 16, stated:

. . . our military science assumes that strategic rocket troops alone, as the main type of our armed forces, cannot fulfill all the tasks of war. The successful conduct of military operations in a rocket-nuclear war is possible only on the basis of the coordinated use of all means of armed combat, and on the unity of effort of all types of armed forces. This implies that all types of armed forces are and will be preserved in given proportions.

Not surprisingly, top officers of the branches of service most threatened by Khrushchev's reorganization plans found ways of stressing the continued importance of the forces under their command while professing overall agreement with Khrushchev's principles. Admiral Gorshkov, writing in *Soviet Fleet* on Armed Forces Day, acknowledged that rocket forces had become the "main type" of forces.[4] But he went on to argue that "it does not at all follow that the need for other types of armed forces has passed." Marshal Vershinin, speaking to an officers' *aktiv* meeting on January 19, 1960, achieved a somewhat similar effect by pointing out that, despite decreases in the size of the air forces, "new, more perfect" aircraft were being introduced as standard equipment.[5] Some officers indicated disapproval by faint praise or silence. Marshal Konev, commander of the Warsaw Treaty forces, was conspicuously restrained in his comment on the troop-cut, treating the measure as though its major significance lay in the field of disarmament negotiations rather than in the field of military strategy;[6] Marshal Sokolovski, Chief of the general staff, disdained comment entirely. Both of these officers were retired from active duty within a few months after Khrushchev's speech—almost certainly because of their opposition on this issue.

Interval of Truce

International events intervened at this point to modify for a time the terms of the conflict. The U-2 incident and the collapse of the Paris summit meeting undermined the philosophical underpinnings of Khrushchev's program and led to corresponding modifications in his defense prospectus. The last occasion on which Khrushchev publicly disparaged the effectiveness of military aircraft was on July 12, 1960[7]—and a week later, in a speech to the Soviet intelligentsia, he referred approvingly, if indirectly, to the "combined arms" concept.[8] Military spokesmen, in the meantime, were pushing ahead to find additional doctrinal supports for their concept of the ground forces' role in a future war. In November, *Red Star* introduced a new formula to the armory of arguments appropriate to this purpose—the assertion that "mass, multi-million" man armies would be required.[9] And some months later, a military author was arguing—in flagrant, if unacknowl-

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Sovetski flot*, Feb. 23, 1960.
[5] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Jan. 20, 1960.
[6] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Feb. 23, 1960.
[7] *Pravda*, July 13, 1960.
[8] Khrushchev's speech to the intelligentsia on July 17 was withheld from publication for ten months, appearing finally in abbreviated form in the May 1961 issue of *Kommunist*, No. 7.
[9] Lieutenant General Krasilnikov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, Nov. 18, 1960.

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edged, opposition to Khrushchev—that "the might and variety of equipment technology does not entail a sharp reduction of troops." [10]

The gap between Khrushchev and the military was narrowed further by the events of the spring and summer of 1961. As a result of the new crisis that built up over Berlin, the troop-cut policy was officially suspended, appropriations for defense were increased by one-third, the regular release of servicemen into the reserves was deferred, and the resumption of nuclear testing was announced. This confluence of policy with military views on the practical level was accompanied by moves by Khrushchev on the psychological level evidently calculated to conciliate military opinion. Appearing in a Lieutenant General's uniform for the first time in three years, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Nazi invasion (June 22, 1961), Khrushchev announced a formal concession to the military on the missiles-*vs.*-ground forces issue. Addressing the armed forces directly, he said:

The strengthening of the defense of the Soviet Union depends on the perfection of all services of our armed forces—infantry and artillery, engineering corps and signal corps, armored tank divisions and the navy, the air force, and the missile forces.[11]

But to interpret these policy shifts and political moves as signifying a basic change of views would be to accept the credibility of a complete about-face by Khrushchev in the space of a year and a half on a matter of vital national significance—a matter in which, moreover, he had heavily invested his personal prestige. To do so would be to ascribe to him a softness of character and inconstancy of purpose which seem out of line not only with the office he holds but with the record of persistence he has demonstrated in the pursuit of his basic goals. Khrushchev's own statements at the time suggest that he regarded the steps being taken as a temporary turn rather than as a decisive reversal of his policies. In a speech to military graduates on July 8, 1961, he carefully explained that the measures were "temporary" only and purely responsive in nature.[12] He seemed concerned to stress the notion that the measures would be rescinded as soon as evidence of a corresponding willingness to relax tensions was offered by the United States. And in a radio-television speech of August 7, he was even more explicit in defining the political purpose behind the regime's action:

Why does the Soviet government consider such measures? These are measures in the nature of a reply. . . . The experience of history teaches: When an aggressor sees that no rebuff is given to him he grows more brazen, and, conversely, when he is given a rebuff he calms down. It is this historic experience that should guide us in our actions.[13]

Since the summer of 1961 there have been recurrent signs of controversy centering around the ground forces issue, indicating at the least that, however far Khrushchev may have retreated for a time from his original conceptions, he did not abandon his goal of seeking manpower economies—and that the military did not cease to resist.

Impact of the Agricultural Crisis

Indications of renewed pressures against the military budget—including by definition the manpower item—reappeared in the military press in the spring of 1962. It was hardly coincidence that these indications dated approximately from the period of the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which dealt primarily with the critical condition of Soviet agriculture. The contrast between the optimism of Khrushchev's opening speech to the plenum and the pessimism of his concluding remarks, as well as the administrative nature of the measures proposed to relieve the agricultural crisis, highlighted the tightness of available resources. The stage was thus set for an intensified competition for funds throughout the Soviet government.

The plenum resolution authorizing the Presidium and Council of Ministers "to find additional investment capital" for certain specified industries supporting agriculture in effect served notice that a hard scrutiny of existing and planned claims on the national budget would be undertaken.[14] As the largest institutional claimant on national resources, whose interests were affected not only by the size of its departmental appropriations but by the pace

[10] Colonel S. Kozlov, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 11, 1961.
[11] *Pravda*, June 22, 1961.
[12] *Ibid.*, July 9, 1961.
[13] *Izvestia*, Aug. 9, 1961.
[14] *Plenum Tsentralnovo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza, stenograficheski otchet*, Moscow, 1962.

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and direction of the economy as a whole, the military department would naturally be sensitive to the implications of such a scrutiny.

The most striking indication of this sensitivity was Marshal Malinovski's article in the May issue of *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1962. Stressing the danger of aggression from the West and the need for continuing development of Soviet military capabilities, Malinovski vigorously defended the cost of Soviet defense programs. Arguing that Soviet defense expenditures should not be compared with the policy of "militarization" pursued by the Western powers, Malinovski asserted that while the latter consumed the budget, enriched the monopolists, and impoverished the workers, Soviet expenditures were dictated by legitimate state needs. The situation in the world was such, he said, that expenditures for defense were "absolutely necessary," and the Soviet people welcomed them. He then stated:

To this one must add that, with us, military expenditures are strictly regulated. In the Soviet government there is not and cannot be an exaggeration of military expenditures; our government carries out all measures for strengthening defense might within the limits called forth by the actual requirements for defense of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries from capitalist aggression.

This excursis on the rationale of Soviet military spending had no known precedent in Soviet public utterances. That it was argumentative seemed evident from the content. The notion that defense expenditures might be "exaggerated" would hardly be raised—even if only to deny it—unless there was a compelling reason to do so. A good guess as to what this reason was could be deduced from Malinovski's stress elsewhere in his article on the need for maintaining a large standing army.

In discussing current Soviet military doctrine, Malinovski placed unusual emphasis on the notion that a future war will require mass armies. The notion had been expressed in virtually the same terms in his 22d party congress speech, but there he had placed it in the context of a balanced presentation of other elements of the doctrine. By contrast, in the *Kommunist* article, it was the only element of the doctrine that he emphasized. Moreover, the substance of the argument was reiterated in another passage where Malinovski asserted that in constructing the armed forces

. . . the party is forced . . . to adhere to the principle of maintaining a cadre regular army which by virtue of its composition, numerical scale, and degree of preparation would be able from the beginning of a war to repulse an attack and destroy the aggressor.

That the ground forces issue was a matter of concern to the military at this time was further evident from a great increase of references in the military press to the Eighth CPSU Congress. No event in Soviet military history was more directly relevant to the question of the role of the professional soldier in the Soviet system than the Eighth Congress. Reduced to essentials, the military issue at the congress had involved a controversy between Trotsky, who favored the establishment of a highly disciplined, professional army, and the "military opposition," which favored a "partisan-type" army based on the territorial-militia system. The congress, following Lenin's lead, resolved the controversy by a compromise. The territorial-militia system was acknowledged to be the best "theoretically," but a "standing" "regular" army was adjudged to be required by practical necessity. "To preach partisan methods as a military program," said the resolution of the congress, "is the same as recommending a reversion from large industry to cottage handicraft." [15]

The military press' sudden focus on the congress in the spring of 1962 could not be explained away by anniversary protocol, since anniversaries of such occasions are normally observed by the Soviet press on decennial years, and the Eighth Congress had taken place in 1919. The historical symbolism of the congress seems a more likely explanation for the press attention. The symbolic significance of the congress was particularly apt in that it drew subtle attention to the anachronistic character of Khrushchev's suggestion in his January 1960 speech that the Soviet Union might go over to the "territorial-militia" system. In its repeated references to the Eighth Congress during this period, the military press stressed the notion that the regular standing army was inspired by Lenin and that its maintenance was required by contemporary conditions.[16] The impression was hard to avoid that the territorial-militia suggestion had left a rankling bitterness among the military.

[15] *KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskovo Soiuza: sbornik documentov, 1917-1958*, Moscow, 1958, p. 53.

[16] See, for example: *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 2, 1962, p. 47; *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 12, 1962, pp. 13-20; *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 18, 1962.

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A further indication that the question of military manpower had become an issue in the regime's efforts to relieve the agricultural crisis—and that effective resistance to any cut was being offered—was provided by major regime decisions made public in June. On June 1, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers announced an increase in the prices of a list of agricultural products, explaining that this was the only way of raising necessary funds for agricultural investment without detriment to defense commitments. On the same day, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the lowering of the draft registration age from 18 to 17, thus providing for the maintenance of force levels in a period of tightening manpower availability.[17]

The Post-Cuban Policy Conflict

Evidence of tensions over the missiles-vs.-ground forces issue appeared again in the wake of the Cuban crisis. The first sign that some move was underway to revive the issue was the appearance of a pamphlet attributed to Malinovski, entitled *Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace.*[18] Whether Malinovski was in fact the author of this work is subject to some doubt, as Mr. Wolfe has discussed in the preceding article.[19] In any event, though published late in November 1962, the pamphlet was given to the printers before the Cuban crisis so that its contents cannot easily be interpreted as a mere reflection of the lessons derived from that confrontation. It seems more likely that the pamphlet represented the military aspect of a broad policy initiative that Khrushchev was evidently preparing for the November plenum in anticipation of the successful outcome of his Cuban

(*Continued on page 60*)

[17] The first decree was published in *Pravda*, June 1, 1962; the second in *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 23, June 8, 1962.

[18] *Bditelno stoiat na strazhe mira*, Moscow, 1962.

[19] The writer shares Mr. Wolfe's view that this pamphlet is not typical of Malinovski. Whether or not he was the author, the pamphlet should not be taken as indicative of Malinovski's personal position on the question at issue or in the policy debate which evidently followed. It is quite conceivable that Malinovski could have accepted the broad outlines of a Khrushchev reform proposal without conceding all points of his previous reservations and without relinquishing his option to renew opposition when the opportunity presented itself. Malinovski's ability to oppose Khrushchev was presumably much weaker in the period before Cuba than in the period after it. Special advocacy in the Soviet Union must adjust to the opportunities presented by the shifting fortunes of the political leader.

The Military . . .

Early in February 1964, the Soviet Defense Minister, Rodion Malinovski, delivered a major address in which he accused liberal Soviet writers, film producers, composers, actors, sculptors, and journalists of pursuing pacifist and humanistic themes in their works; instead, he said, they should glorify the heroic aspects of past wars, thus contributing to the patriotic education of Soviet servicemen and youth in general. In the battle between the liberals and the dogmatists in literature and art Malinovski has sided with the latter, apparently for the reason that military training and political indoctrination do not provide sufficient psychological preparation of the armed forces for a future war. In a third world war, Soviet military strategists maintain:

. . . Soviet soldiers must be able to overcome fear of nuclear weapons, perform gigantic dashes forward, fight lonely battles, control themselves in any situation. . . . The enormous killing power of modern weapons does not diminish the role of man and his morale in war but rather increases this role a hundredfold.[1]

To meet these requirements Malinovski urged Soviet men of art to make "correct" use of their "mighty weapon—the weapon of the artistic image, which possesses the enormous force of emotional influence on the people's souls and hearts." Using military expressions, Malinovski declared that this weapon "should always be in order and correctly aimed," since only then "would it be reliable and not miss the mark."[2] He went on to complain:

. . . one cannot overlook the fact that recent tendencies have appeared in the portrayal of the last war. Certain literary works and paintings, as well as certain films, have reflected motifs of pacifism and the abstract rejection of war. Is it correct to depict the war waged by our people as a mere accumulation of horrors and deprivations, and to bring onto the stage irresolute and petty people described in naturalistic detail? We reject this one-sided approach to an important subject.

Malinovski also protested against writers who adopt a "position of abstract humanism and objectivism" in describing wartime hardships, and against critics who call for a rejection of "enthusiastic words and the heroic aspects" of other (presumably "positive") works about the war.

[1] *Marksizm-leninizm o voinie i armii*, Moscow, 1962, p. 311.

[2] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Feb. 9, 1964.

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The Soviet military have good reason to be perturbed. Almost two decades have passed since the last salvos of World War II were fired. Those of the participants who became writers, poets and artists have passed the half point in their lives. War and hatred, they now feel, must give way to peace and love. As a Soviet poet recently expressed it:

If love is gone, the world will perish;
The fires of war will crush
What man has built in torments.

But life and reason have not died.
The world of youth has gotten wiser,
And over hatred love prevails
And over madness reason reigns.[3]

The essence of the liberals' attitude on Soviet war literature has been well described by the Soviet writer Vasil Bykov: "We should not neglect the truth in human behavior when man is faced with death." In an article published in 1962, "The Survivors in Remembrance of the Fallen," this writer (who was not yet eighteen when he volunteered for the army) bitterly attacked the "happily-heroic clichés" in war novels which describe

. . . heroes who come to their senses exactly at the moment when a tank approaches (not later!), neatly aim at it (and how could it be otherwise?), strike with enviable bravery and destroy the tank; inconceivably calm fliers who, instead of bailing out, guide their incapacitated burning planes down to hit a large supply (not less than that) of the enemy's military equipment; commissars who appear at the most critical moment, and not a minute later, at the right places to raise the morale of the soldiers. . . .[4]

Bykov's own war stories have been praised for their "mature modern interpretation of humanism" by the critic L. Lazarev, who summarizes the plot of the story "Damnation" as an illustration. A Soviet and German soldier were fighting man-to-man in a basement of a destroyed building, when a wall crumbled. Faced with a common threat, both began working together to remove the fallen rubble. The German was wounded. The Soviet soldier (Ivan) could not kill a defenseless man; he even offered him his field dressing. When a piece of concrete hit Ivan, the German (Fritz) helped him in turn. Somehow they started conversing and found out that both had been carpenters. Yet while they were digging themselves out, they had the same question on their minds: who was above them, who commanded the street? It became clear that the Germans were in control, and when Fritz heard the voices of his comrades, he tried to join them. Ivan then killed him "in order not to let an enemy loose." Afterward, "overwhelmed by grief and emotionally tormented, Ivan walked slowly down the middle of a war-devastated street and, clenching his big trembling fists in despair, repeated over and over again: "Vile creatures! Murderers! Dirty scum! Be damned forever, barbarians!" [5]

* * *

Malinovski's attack on "abstract humanism" and "pacifism" is understandable. Pacifism is as compatible with Soviet military doctrine as oil with water. The Soviet political dictionary defines pacifism as a means of "deceiving the masses, used by the imperialists to disguise their preparation for war and to divert the masses from their active struggle against imperialist wars" [6]: to this the military professionals would no doubt say amen.

Nevertheless, this weapon of "deceit" is readily employed by the Communists when it is useful to their own ends. In fact, the CPSU Program adopted in 1961, which sets forth the basic guidelines of current Soviet party policy, specifically states:

All organizations and parties that strive to avert war, neutralist and pacifist movements and bourgeois circles that advocate peace . . . will meet with understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union.[7]

In implementing this point of the program, the Communists have praised and publicized non-Communists who expound pacifist ideas: an American millionaire, a high-ranking scientist, an anti-Marxist philosopher, or a Christian preacher is not only welcome in Moscow but can even become eligible for a Lenin Peace prize for helping to promote pacifism —outside the borders of the Communist camp. Not, however, inside. There pacifism remains, as in Lenin's days, a grave ideological sin. Clearly, Trojan horses are needed in Athens, not in Troy.

—Lazar M. Pistrak

[3] Gleb Pagirev in *Neva*, January 1964, p. 77.
[4] *Druzhba narodov*, No. 12, 1962, pp. 260-61.
[5] *Novyi mir*, No. 6, 1963, p. 257.
[6] *Politicheski slovar* (Political Dictionary), Moscow, 1958, p. 419.
[7] *The Road to Communism:* documents of the 22nd CPSU Congress, Moscow, 1962, p. 507.

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gamble. The pamphlet's confident claims of Soviet missile superiority, and its merely perfunctory bow to the "mass, multi-million-man" armies thesis, seem compatible with this hypothesis. Moreover, its stress on "qualitative" criteria, in speaking of the Soviet Union's commitment to maintain missile superiority, seemed to reflect a respect for the economic realities of defense which would be harmonious with Khrushchev's known objectives in the welfare aspects of his program.

A notable sign that the ground forces issue was centrally involved in post-Cuban policy debates was the publication in *Red Star*, on January 11, 1963, of a full page of articles defending the role of the ground forces in contemporary war. The demonstrative nature of this action was unmistakable. Other articles in the military press, both before and after this action, gave more evidence that a squabble around the missiles-*vs.*-ground forces issue was in progress.[20]

An interim resolution of the conflict was registered in Khrushchev's February 27 speech to the Supreme Soviet. In it he announced, in strikingly defensive terms, that the realization of the welfare goals that he had raised would be deferred due to the implacable demands posed by defense requirements. Khrushchev's capitulation proved to be temporary, but the fact that it occurred at all seemed due, in large part, to the strength of the internal political forces arrayed against him.[21]

That some military leaders were included among these forces was indicated by an event which occurred in the midst of the conflict. This was the Stalingrad anniversary celebration, on February 2, 1963, which featured a public debate among the marshals over the allocation of credits for the wartime victory. The historical symbols in which the debate was conducted made it appear that impersonal entities were mainly involved—the Stalingrad Front command, on the one hand, and General Headquarters, on the other hand. But the meanings of the symbols, and the implications of the debate for Khrushchev's reputation, could not be lost on readers of Soviet military history.

For several years a subtle effort to build up the public image of Khrushchev's role in the Stalingrad battle—where he had served as the political opposite number of Marshal Yeremenko in the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front—had been discernible in the party press and historical literature. The buildup was linked with a seemingly academic issue: whether the wartime General Headquarters, represented by Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevki, or the Stalingrad Front command, represented by Yeremenko and Khrushchev, had been chiefly responsible for working out the plans which led to the victory. Before his fall, Zhukov had claimed the credit for Vasilevski and himself in an interview with William Randolph Hearst, Jr. in 1955.[22] And at the time of his fall, one of the charges leveled against him, in Marshal Konev's vindictive attack, was that he had falsely claimed the credit for "evolving the plan and practical preparation of the Stalingrad offensive." Khrushchev's claims for a share of the credit had been made before Zhukov's fall, but they acquired new force after this event, partly as a by-product of the prestige accorded military councils generally in the post-Zhukov military-party settlement, and partly as a result of special propaganda efforts.

A principal architect of Khrushchev's reputation as a hero of the Stalingrad operation was Marshal Yeremenko. In his memoir-history of the Stalingrad battle, published in 1961, he gave the credit for the planning of the Stalingrad operation to his own Front command and implied that Khrushchev had fully participated in this command activity.[23] The tenor of the book on this point was reflected in a *Pravda* review published on June 24, 1961:

A. I. Yeremenko shows great warmth in much of his book in describing N. S. Khrushchev's work at the front. . . . He [Khrushchev] took an active part in working out specific forms for operations and in deciding the directions the main army thrusts would take.

Despite this burgeoning of the Khrushchev legend, however, the champions of the General Headquarters' role in this event still held their ground. A review of Yeremenko's book published in the January 1962 issue of *Military-Historical Journal*—an organ of the Ministry of Defense, clearly representative of conservative professional opinion—sharply criticized Yeremenko for "exaggerating" the role of the

[20] For examples of the reformist side of the argument, see editorial in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 24, 1962, and Colonel General S. Shtemenko, *ibid.*, No. 3, 1963. For the conservative side, see Marshal P. Rotmistrov, *ibid.*, No. 2, 1963, and Colonel Skidro, *ibid.*, No. 5, 1963.

[21] Evidence of such opposition is presented in Mr. Carl Linden's article, "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1963.

[22] *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1955.

[23] A. I. Yeremenko, *Stalingrad*, Moscow, 1961. See particularly Chapter 13.

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Stalingrad Front and "minimizing" the role of General Headquarters.[24]

By the time of the anniversary celebration of 1963, the question of the relative roles of the Stalingrad Front and General Headquarters had thus become heavily loaded with implications bearing on Khrushchev's historical reputation. In the articles and speeches by the marshals on this occasion, two factions were discernible—one pro-Khrushchev, led by Yeremenko, and the other anti-Khrushchev, led by Malinovski.[25] The polemical cast and overtones of Malinovski's article were unmistakable. Not only did he subordinate the role of the Stalingrad Front to General Headquarters in the planning of the Stalingrad operation, but he specifically circumscribed Khrushchev's responsibilities within the political, rather than the military, sphere. Moreover, along among the marshals, he recalled the name of Zhukov. The flaunting of this sensitive symbol could be nothing less than a direct challenge to Khrushchev. It was Khrushchev who had brought about Zhukov's downfall; it was Khrushchev who had reversed the trend toward military independence which Zhukov had promoted; and it was Khrushchev who stood to profit by Zhukov's continued oblivion.

The Stalingrad anniversary demonstration marked the high-point of military assertiveness in the course of the military-political conflict waged since 1960. In effect, military spokesmen went beyond the mere advocacy of a policy position to direct participation in the high-level politics of the regime. Malinovski's article was, if nothing else, a blow to Khrushchev's prestige. This, in a society where prestige symbols reflect political power, was a political act of startling boldness. The enduring mystery of the Stalingrad anniversary episode is not that it could have occurred—for this could be understood in the light of the dramatic failure of leadership demonstrated by the Cuban policy disaster—but that it should have remained unpunished after Khrushchev's authority was restored in the months that followed.

New Troop-Cut Proposal

Whatever Khrushchev's reaction may have been to the affront over Stalingrad, several months intervened before there was a significant new confrontation over the manpower issue. That came last December when Khrushchev, in his concluding speech to a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, announced that the regime was "contemplating" a new troop-cut. The indefinite character of the announcement, the ambiguity of subsequent regime references to the proposal, and the conspicuously inhospitable reception accorded the announcement by the military press indicated that a new phase of policy conflict was developing along traditional lines.

The first indication of military resistance to the proposed measure appeared in an article by Marshal Chuikov, published in the December 22 issue of *Izvestia*. Chuikov reiterated the doctrinal thesis regarding the role of ground forces in a future war with a forcefulness that had not been seen in the Soviet press in some time. He declared:

Soviet military science considers that victory in a future nuclear war . . . can be achieved only by means of the joint action of all types of armed forces.

And one sentence later:

Therefore, in modern conditions the ground forces continue to be not only a mandatory but also a most important integral part of the armed forces.

In between these two propositions in Chuikov's text was a sentence which appears to have been inserted arbitrarily, since it destroys the logical and grammatical sequence of the paragraph. The sentence reads: "There is no doubt that a decisive part in achieving the main aims of war will be played by the strategic rocket troops." The suggestion of tampering conveyed by this sentence adds to the impression that Chuikov's article represented a move in intra-regime politics.

Military resistance to the notion of a troop-cut seemed to be registered also in a major two-part article on doctrine by military theorist Colonel General N. Lomov which was published in *Red Star* on January 7 and 10, 1964. The article added up to a comprehensive restatement of Soviet military requirements and seemed contrived to emphasize the undiminished scope and priority of the defense establishment's claim on national resources. On the issue of ground forces, the article restated the traditional "combined arms" postulate with a bluntness that betrayed a fine disregard for the political proprieties of the moment:

[24] *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 1, 1962, pp. 99-105.
[25] See Yeremenko's article, *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1963; and Malinovski's article, *ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1963.

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Winning the victory in a clash with a strong adversary requires the efforts of a multi-million-man modern army. This determines the contents of one of the most important principled theses of Soviet military doctrine, which is that to win a final victory over the aggressor the combined efforts of all types of armed forces, which rely on the decisive role of rocket nuclear weapons, will be needed.

Since the turn of the year negative evidence of the military's attitude has been even more impressive. It seems clear that the military has been staging a demonstration of resistance which rivals in boldness the "feats of silence" performed by other professional groups, on other occasions, when government policy clashed with professional interests. At the time of this writing—some three months after Khrushchev's announcement of the proposal for a further troop-cut—not a single Soviet marshal has yet mentioned the subject in any article in the Soviet domestic press.[26] And not a single reference to the subject has been made by *Red Star* since its one and only mention of Khrushchev's proposal on December 25, 1963. Whatever the outcome of the most recent troop-cut issue, this campaign of silence again demonstrates the Soviet military's readiness to protest decisions in the policy area in defense of its institutional interests.

The evidence described above—together with the evidence presented in Mr. Wolfe's article—falls into a pattern which may de described as a cycle in the Soviet military-political relationship. The cycle began with the military on the defensive against a powerful Khrushchev policy initiative in 1960, and it now seems to be ending with the military in much the same position. One is tempted to write an epitaph to this episode—to conclude that however vigorous the resistance raised, however tortuous the detours forced upon him, Khrushchev always prevails in the end.

Yet, in the author's view, the appropriate emphasis for the concluding remarks of this survey is rather that the resistance continues. The military demonstrations go on. One is at a loss to understand the rationale of these demonstrations unless one assumes that they are aimed at exerting some real effect on policy. The precise mechanics of this process are not clear. Perhaps by placing its views on the public record regarding this or that aspect of doctrine, the military counts on inhibiting Khrushchev's freedom of maneuver—creating situations in which Khrushchev may flout military opinion only at the cost of a public display of differences. Those who read the Soviet press most closely, the Chinese and the Albanians, have noted such differences in the past and have exploited them—a fact which may add leverage to the military's bargaining position. Thus, while the military's influence on policy is no doubt limited, the extent to which Khrushchev—and with him the entire political leadership—can ignore military opinion also seems to have its limits.

[26] Two references have appeared in statements addressed to foreign audiences. One was in an article by Marshal Yeremenko, published in the English language *Moscow News*, Jan. 8, 1964. The other was in an article signed by Marshal Malinovski, published in *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw), Feb. 22, 1964, and *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Feb. 23. Both references were noncommittal, expressing neither approval nor disapproval. Malinovski's was, however, contradictory to Khrushchev's most recent, February 14 statement on the subject, since the Marshal referred to the measure as merely "contemplated," whereas Khrushchev had implied that it was much closer to implementation.

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BOOKS

The Revolutionary

On the Persistence of Myths and Mystiques

By Ronald Hingley

"REVOLUTION" AND "revolutionary" are enshrined among the most sacred cult words in Communist vocabulary and have been specially impregnated with enthusiasm, high-mindedness and moral uplift. If they have now begun to smell and turn up at the edges through overuse in grubby hands, there is no sign that Communist sopkesmen have noticed the fact. Soviet citizens, for example, are still urged to show the revolutionary spirit or revolutionary vigilance nearly fifty years since Russia's most recent revolution.

To the Communist all revolutions, past and future, are sacred. The prospect of an anti-Communist revolution does not deter him, for he has ensured by a simple linguistic device that no such event can ever occur. The term "revolution" may mean any "complete overthrow of the established government . . . by those . . . previously subject to it" to the compilers of the "bourgeois" Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. But to the Soviet lexicographer a revolution does not count unless it leads to the replacement of an "obsolete social system" (*i.e.*, one not approved by Communists) by a "new progressive social system" (*i.e.*, one which has the blessing of the current party line). (See, for example, *"revoliutsiia"* as defined in the Soviet *Academy Dictionary of Contemporary Russian.*) Not being "progressive," non-approved uprisings—such as that in Hungary in 1956—simply are not reckoned as revolutions at all.

We cannot expect things to be quite so clear-cut in the future, for already rival Communist oracles in Moscow, Peking, Tirana, Havana and elsewhere are in disagreement about what constitutes a true revolutionary movement. But however much they may disagree about how the symbol should be applied, the symbol remains a sacred one.

Spokesmen of Communist governments may have good reason for praising revolutionaries and trying to claim all revolutionaries as their own. But what of ordinary citizens in non-Communist societies? Have these any motive for idealizing the revolutionary—their would-be destroyer—in this way? Hardly. Yet it is arguable that even in non-Communist societies the calling of revolutionary is often too much honored. There remains a tendency to regard any revolutionary as a glamorous, romantic figure, whether he is thought of as throwing bombs at Russian Tsars in the 1870's or as crawling, bearded and festooned with hand-grenades, out of the Cuban sierras 80 years later. As these examples show, the revolution-

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ary may be thought of as slightly comic, but his heart, it is believed, is usually in the right place.

In the Western world, for example, one may easily hear a person who is no sort of Communist, and who may well be what Communists call a "bourgeois," blithely referring to Cuban-trained revolutionaries as "happily throwing bombs somewhere in South America." The speaker has never so much as seen a bomb, still less thrown one. He would admit if pressed that bombs are liable to litter the landscape with odd pieces of random bystanders and that he would not like himself or his children to be among them. But for him the purely scenic aspect of revolution has eclipsed all others.

IT IS NOT THE PURPOSE of this essay to denounce all revolutionaries without reference to their cause or achievements, or to deny that noble and good deeds have been done by brave men in the cause of overthrowing oppression—which is how the word revolution got its built-in plus sign in the first place. But surely it is time that revolutionaries were stripped of the picturesque gloss which has been imparted to them. Is it unreasonable to suggest that they and their revolutions should be treated neutrally, on their own merits—to be judged by their methods and practical achievements, not unthinkingly overpraised? Does the revolutionary automatically deserve the kind of prestige awarded, rightly or wrongly, to explorers, mountaineers, astronauts and international footballers? And even if he sometimes does deserve such acclaim, is it suitable that he should automatically receive it from his enemy and victim, the "bourgeois"?

The concept "bourgeois" is every bit as fraudulent as that of "revolutionary" and differs from the latter in carrying a whiff of disapproval. No one of course regards *himself* as a bourgeois, any more than anyone who visits a seaside resort regards himself as a "tripper." The word is for other people. Still, we are aware that countries such as Britain and France are called "bourgeois" in Soviet propaganda and that articles such as the present one are said to be written by bourgeois intellectuals. All these terms are stale and repulsive. But however small the residue of meaning retained by the term of abuse "bourgeois" and the term of praise "revolutionary," these two contrasted types are natural enemies by any standards. Still, the revolutionary has taught the bourgeois to admire him—a strictly one way process, for the revolutionary emphatically does not admire the bourgeois.

The idealization of the revolutionary in the Western world is certainly not confined to writers and spokesmen who can be considered bourgeois. Among the more vociferous admirers of such well-known revolutionary figures as Trotsky and Stalin was, for example, George Bernard Shaw, who incidentally much admired Fascist leaders such as Mussolini as well. (Brutality, perhaps, was the passport to his affections.) Anyway, Shaw does not illustrate the point very well, since he was merely an inverted bourgeois and thus of little permanent interest, except possibly to his contemporary bourgeois whom he was so concerned to shock. As a more serious example of an admirer of revolutionaries we may take a modern historian, the biographer of Stalin and Trotsky—Isaac Deutscher. This is perhaps a timely moment to consider Mr. Deutscher since the third and final volume of his great trilogy on Trotsky has just been published.[1]

WHEN THE FIRST VOLUME of this trilogy appeared, a reviewer claimed that it was written "with that sympathy and understanding for his subject without which no biography should be attempted."[2] Well, perhaps. But even sympathy and understanding can be overdone, as in passages such as the following from the new volume:

The passions of his [Trotsky's] intellect and heart, always uncommonly large and intense, now swelled into a tragic energy as mighty and high as that which animates the prophets and the lawgivers of Michelangelo's vision (p. 12).

He [Trotsky] stood where he stood like truth itself, unkempt and unadorned, unarmored and unshielded yet magnificent and invincible (p. 382).

It cannot be, it would be contrary to all historical sense, that so high an intellectual energy, so prodigious an activity, and so noble a martyrdom [as Trotsky's] should not have their full impact eventually (p. 512).

After this it comes as no surprise to find Trotsky described as "the greatest master of Russian prose of his generation" (p. 252), and as an "historian of genius" (p. 221). What remains a surprise, even with all this, is the status

[1] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.
[2] From *The Listener* (London), as quoted on the dust jacket of Deutscher, *op. cit.*

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given to Trotsky as a prophet who, Deutscher wrote in his second volume, "ran so far ahead of his time that more than thirty years later much of his prediction still remains unconfirmed by events."[3]

This claim constitutes a monument of absurdity by any standards, but in general Mr. Deutscher's cult of Trotsky's personality can be viewed with some tolerance. Trotsky was, after all, a great man. He was not merely a brilliant orator and theoretician, he was also highly successful in the practical side of conspiracy, organization and administration. But reading this biography, one becomes aware of the fact that to Mr. Deutscher revolutionaries in general—the rank and file as well as the leaders—bestride the narrow world. They may come in different sizes, but all are colossi. Indeed, of all authors on the subject he seems more prone than any to the kind of dated romanticism about revolutionaries which I am attempting to discredit. To treat Trotsky as a heroic figure may be excusable. But to treat the smaller fry as "uncommon intellects steeped in Marxism" is going altogether too far, as is the implication that a revolution—any revolution—is inevitably a grand and noble spectacle. Nor is it reasonable to suggest that the most pathetic, hysterical and ineffectual revolutionary crackpot is to an ordinary mortal as a giant to a pygmy.

AMONG THE REVOLUTIONARY small fry to whom Mr. Deutscher alludes from time to time in his Trotsky trilogy is Victor Serge. Of Russian origin, Serge was brought up in the West, but spent most of the years 1919-36 in the USSR and is an important witness of Soviet events in those years. It happens that a volume of his memoirs appeared in English at about the same time as the final volume of Mr. Deutscher's trilogy.[4] It also happens that Serge's account contrasts in various ways with the over-heroic picture of the revolutionary painted by Mr. Deutscher.

Not that it is Serge's intention to deflate the revolutionary. Far from it. To Serge himself revolutionary activity seems to have come as naturally as writing music came to Mozart. He was apparently driven by none of the more normal revolutionary urges, ranging from a desire to found a new and better society to mere power-seeking or a grudge against the existing order. To Serge revolution was a self-justifying activity. Why was he a revolutionary? As well ask him why he breathed.

One might almost apply to him what Professor E. H. Carr has said of the notorious 19th-century revolutionary Nechaiev—the model for Peter Verkhovenski in Dostoyevsky's great anti-revolutionary study, *The Devils:*

He believed in revolution as a tenet valid and sufficient in itself; and he believed in nothing else.[5]

Serge's work has impressed some "bourgeois" critics as noble and eloquent. Indeed it is quite possible to see him—as so many other revolutionaries of the period—as a sort of Marxist saint, careless of his own welfare, defying death and imprisonment in "capitalist" Europe and in Stalinist Russia alike. However, I cannot myself take this view, for it seems to me that Serge has, to borrow a phrase, "unmasked himself" in his writings. They are, for example, unusually revelatory of the indifference and hostility of a certain type of revolutionary, not merely to his enemy the bourgeois, but also to the "ordinary people" and "workers." These are in theory the ultimate beneficiaries of his political activity, but one would hardly think so from the tone in which Serge writes about them.

Even as an adolescent Serge saw himself as a man apart, someone different from his young contemporaries who, as he tells us, "talked about bicycles or girls in a most loathsome way." He continues in a style which throws further light on revolutionary psychology:

We were chaste, expecting better things both from ourselves and from fortune. Without benefit of theory, adolescence opened up for us a new aspect of the problem. In a sordid alley, at the end of a dark passage hung with gaudy washing, there lived a family we knew: the mother gross and suspicious, nursing the vestiges of her beauty; a lecherous daughter with bad teeth; and a stunning younger girl, of pure Spanish beauty, her eyes all charm, innocence, and softness, her lips like blossom. It was all she could do, when she passed us chaperoned by her dam, to manage a smiling "Hello" to us. "It's obvious," said Raymond, "they're sending her to dancing lessons and keeping her for some rich old bastard." We discussed problems like this. Bebel's Woman and Socialism *was on our reading-list* (p. 11).

[3] Deutscher, *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 217.

[4] Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.

[5] E. H. Carr, *The Romantic Exiles*, London, Stokes, 1933, 1949, p. 335.

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This passage from the first chapter of Serge's memoirs may be taken as a text for much of what follows and as an indication of certain trends in revolutionary psychology in general. One is struck, above all, by the puritanical attitude. Serge apparently saw himself as a novice in some peculiarly censorious order of monkhood, and his contempt for money is closely intertwined with what might be considered almost a rejection of sex ("We were chaste, expecting *better* things both from ourselves and from fortune").

Indeed, after considering the careers of certain revolutionaries one might be inclined to ask whether revolutionary politics are some powerful form of anaphrodisiac, or possible sex-substitute. "Women," we are told, "had never appeared at any period of his life to interest or attract Bakunin; and all the evidence goes to show that this giant of superhuman energy was sexually impotent." [6] The previously-mentioned Nechaiev, too, is known to have shied away from any contacts with women, and the most famous revolutionary of them all, Lenin, was known as much for his rather puritanical views on sex as for his personal avoidance of romantic entanglements—the recent disclosure of his peculiar relationship with Inessa Armand notwithstanding.[7]

Yet it is possible to pursue this line of thought too far, of course, for there have certainly been revolutionaries who have not shared Serge's attitude on sex. Perhaps what Lenin's solitary *affaire du coeur* suggests is the tendency, among many revolutionaries, of one central passion—for revolution—to drive out others.

THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE brings us on to another of the less glamorous features in the revolutionary's make-up—that is, his obsession with money, or rather his obsession with his idea that other people are obsessed with money. In the case of Serge this takes somewhat extreme forms—in fact it led him to a detestation, not merely of money, but even of the elementary comforts of existence.

It is characteristic of Serge that he should have resented Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920's not (as many Communists felt) because it meant abandoning Communist principles, but because it saw the disappearance of the extreme hardships of the Civil War period. For these hardships Serge retained a sentimental attachment that bordered on aberration.

It is to the NEP period, when "the sordid taint of money is visible on everything again," that the most extraordinary passage in Serge's memoirs is devoted. This carries the life-denying side of revolutionary psychology to a fantastic point:

I knew fair-haired Lisa I— in the days when, emaciated and crazy-eyed, she saw her first child die of starvation. Now they have another child, who is far better fed than the children of our unemployed workers. Lisa is now a plump blonde who wears a necklace of heavy gems from the Urals. There is still a slight hint of madness in her eyes, which makes me long to come out with some sharp questions: "It was great when we were up against it, wasn't it? Do you remember Mazin's body under the fir trees? And the corpse of that little sculptor Bloch who got shot, we never knew why? And his wife's corpse, so childlike she was? Tell me, do you remember?" But I say nothing of the sort; it would not be nice, the world has changed (p. 197).

Nowhere does Serge express the revolutionary's death wish quite so outspokenly as here, but he comes near to it in his comments on A.A. Yoffe's suicide note. Here we find the death wish combined with a mystical idea of communion with humankind:

The man who wrote these lines, prepared to seal them with his own blood, here touched on heights of faith where neither reason nor unreason counts any longer; there has been no better expression of the revolutionary's communion with all mankind in all ages (p. 229).

Incidentally, "communion with mankind" was seen by Serge, as by other revolutionaries, as a one-way process—the kind of communion that may be said to exist between a chess player and his row of pawns. Mankind exists to adopt certain predetermined postures chosen for it by the revolutionary.

This manipulatory attitude is richly revealed in Serge's reflections on working-class affluence which he observed in Belgium in 1936 (after spending many years in the Soviet Union) and contrasted with the miserable condition of the Russian worker:

These riches were within reach, within reach of an unemployed man in a working-class area, without benefit of socialism or a Plan! It was disconcerting. I had known of all this before-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 345.
[7] See Bertram D. Wolfe, "Lenin and Inessa Armand," *Encounter* (London), February 1964.

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hand, but the reality of it shocked me as if I had been ignorant. It was enough to make one weep in humiliation and grief for our Russia of revolutions.

On May Day we saw these provincial streets full of workers out in their Sunday best with their families; young girls with red-ribboned hair, men with red badges in their buttonholes, all of them with well-fed faces, the women fat at thirty and the men fleshy at forty or so. They were off to a Socialist demonstration, and looked just like the bourgeois as pictured by the popular imagination in Russia under the influence of the cinema. Peacable, content with their lot. I gathered that these workers of the West had no desire whatsoever to fight for socialism or for anything else for that matter (p. 324).

It may seem unkind to dwell so long on Serge, who in many ways was a pathetic figure with his pursuit of lost causes. Perhaps he even broke with Stalinism because he could not bear to be on the winning side—and not because of the "massacres in so great number as to inspire a certain dizziness," for, to a mind like Serge's, those were all in the day's work: they "were the only roads possible for us."

Serge's writings are mainly of value as a primary source on the history of his period. Yet as I have tried to suggest, they also have a certain usefulness in showing the revolutionary as a humdrum and curiously perverse figure—providing a needed corrective to such glossy, larger-than-life portraits of heroic figures steeped in Marxism as Mr. Deutscher paints.

LET US NOW CONSIDER a few further aspects of the revolutionary, taking evidence from some whose attitude to revolution in the Soviet sense has been ambivalent or hostile.

The first figure to be considered is the young —not so much in years as in the imagery that word projects—poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko. Yevtushenko leaped to fame in 1956 at the age of 23 with the publication of a controversial poem, *Zima Railway Station.* This was followed by his expulsion from the Komsomol—an important event in the career of any young Soviet poet at the time, and an important step to recognition by the younger generation. Since then Yevtushenko has been labeled a "rebel" against Soviet society and has become regarded as a sort of professional *enfant terrible.*

But Yevtushenko has not been a rebel pure and simple. In order to be published at all he naturally has had to make concessions to official viewpoints, and in recent years the element of concession in his public postures has tended to win ground over the element of defiance. There have been times when it has seemed doubtful whether he is a rebel at all, though his personal courage has not been questioned and he remains to some extent an enigma.

One important act of defiance for which he has been censured in the Soviet Union is the publication abroad of his autobiography, known in English as *A Precocious Autobiography,* in effect another "smuggled" Soviet work like Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* and so many more.[8]

One is tempted to call this a retarded rather than a precocious autobiography, for here the gifted and at times brilliant young poet appears to poor advantage—especially when he tries to handle ideas, an activity in which he is clearly not very much at home.

However, the very commonplace nature of Yevtushenko's ideas makes his book a useful quarry for the student of revolutionary romanticism, since certain characteristic aspects of the subject are here expressed in clichés of impeccable triteness. The book is above all the repository of the "things-were-better-under-Lenin" school of thought. According to this thesis there is a certain "pure" revolutionary idea, sometimes called "pristine," embodied by Marx and Lenin. (The fact that Lenin departed from Marx's teaching in many respects is often conveniently forgotten by promoters of the thesis.)

"I love my fellow-countrymen as a Russian," Yevtushenko writes, "but I also love them as a revolutionary. They are the dearer to me because they never became cynics, never lost their faith in the initial purity of the revolutionary idea, by whatever filth it has been desecrated" (p. 38). To Yevtushenko "Lenin's teaching is dearer than anything in the world" (p. 81). Stalin distorted Lenin, "the whole meaning of whose work was that communism was for man, whereas all the implications of Stalin's practices were that man existed for communism" (p. 76).

Similarly, Mr. Deutscher repeatedly puts forward his Trotsky as the custodian of the tradition of Marx and Lenin in its "pristine purity."

It is a sad comment on the plight of revolutionaries at the moment that their utopistic longings, once focussed exclusively on the future, have been turning increasingly towards the past. Little as either Lenin himself or the country over which he ruled might seem to justify any nostalgic glow, Russia of the 1920's has become a romantic theme in post-Stalin Soviet literature—something exciting to com-

[8] Yevgeny Yevtushenko, *A Precocious Autobiography,* New York, Dutton, 1963.

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pare with the gray present. Moreover, the "things-were-better-under-Lenin" school seems to have won ground among those "bourgeois" enemies of the revolutionary who were described above as being so easily inclined towards unthinking admiration of the revolutionary. Even among opponents of communism in the West not many pause to consider that Lenin has been the supreme architect—with Trotsky, Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini as active and able junior partners—of 20th-century totalitarianism, one of the greatest misfortunes ever to afflict humanity.

One understands of course that Yevtushenko, and other invokers of the name of Lenin in the Soviet Union, are not necessarily as naive as I have suggested. They can hardly be blamed in their peculiar position for using whatever weapons are at hand against the forces of entrenched Soviet illiberalism. And Lenin's name still remains a formidable polemical weapon that has been wielded skillfully by the "liberal" side in Soviet polemics. Thus Lenin is now being used to mitigate the totalitarianism which he himself set up. One suspects that Castro has been used as a similar ambivalent symbol by Yevtushenko, some of whose "Cuban poems" have perhaps implied that in Cuba is to be found the true, "pure" revolutionary spirit which has not been seen in bureaucratic Russia for many a year.

The use of champions of totalitarianism to further a "liberal" cause is regrettable (if we are right in assuming that this is what is going on), but the contest between "liberals" and "illiberals" in the Soviet Union has its own special rules and it is not really for onlookers to be too censorious about the contestants' choice of weapons. If we had to play that tiresome game ourselves we might not show up very well either. It is probably legitimate tactics to use Castro's Cuba and Lenin's Russia as a stick to beat Khrushchev's Russia, and the Western citizen can only be grateful that he neither has to live in nor choose between any of these societies.

REVOLUTIONARY UTOPIANISM about past and future is often combined with a certain bland callousness toward the sufferings inflicted by revolution on previous generations—surely one of the least attractive items in the catalog of revolutionary attitudes. This callousness is present in Yevtushenko's parade of clichés, and it does not gain from being combined with a characteristic complacency about the Russian national character:

You may object that, side by side with its achievements, the Revolution brought new tears and new sorrows to the Russian people.

But here our Russian character must be kept in mind. Suffering is a habit with us. What seems nearly unendurable to others we endure more easily.

Besides, we have paid for our ideal with so much blood that the cost itself has made it all the dearer and more precious to us, as a child born in torment is the dearer and more precious to its mother (pp. 39-40).

There is something monstrous about the way in which a Yevtushenko or a Trotsky, using what Mr. Deutscher calls the "grand historical scale," is prepared to write off the sufferings of generations. "When it is a question of the profoundest changes in economic and cultural systems, twenty-five years weigh less in history than an hour does in a man's life": thus Trotsky as reported by Mr. Deutscher.[9] And again:

Against those who, dwelling on retrograde developments in the Soviet Union (and on his own fate), denied the raison d'être *of the October Revolution, he [Trotsky] pointed out that "in criticism as in creative activity perspective is needed." The fifteen years since October were only "a minute on the clock of history."*[10]

Few indeed are the revolutionary clichés which Yevtushenko leaves unturned in his autobiography, for to those mentioned above we must also add such old favorites as "money is the root of all evil" and the praise given to the concept of "seeking truth"—a mysterious process, never further defined, in which all men of good will are by axiom deemed to be permanently engaged. But he does not pay much attention to one concept which plays a key part in revolutionary romanticism and Marxist platitude-building—that of the "worker."

IT IS THE ROMANTIC image of the worker in Marxist revolutionary thinking that we must now consider, though this concept is so wrapped in mystery that one is hard put to do it justice. The visitor to a Communist country who asks why the workers have no right to strike is usually told it is because their factories and places of work are "their own" and they obviously cannot strike against themselves. Similarly Communist countries are "workers' states," but it is impossible for the non-Marxist

[9] Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940*, p. 512.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

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to see that this is so or to discover any way in which the worker's ownership of his "own" factories or of his "own" state is expressed in practice. The non-Marxist visitor begins to realize that "worker," when used in this way, is a purely mystical or metaphysical conception, having nothing whatever to do with anyone who has ever swung an axe or handled a lathe.

This may lead the non-Marxist to question the thesis whereby the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 is termed a "workers' revolution." He will certainly notice that many prominent leaders of the Bolshevik coup—Lenin and Trotsky for example—were proletarians neither by birth nor by adoption (in the sense of working with their hands for a living). Later Soviet leaders such as Khrushchev have not been backward in claiming worker's status for themselves, in many cases with more reason than Lenin and Trotsky. But however proletarian Khrushchev's origins and early life may have been, it is hard to see him or other Soviet leaders as manual workers in any meaningful sense of the term. They are in fact professional politicians of a rather special kind. The case could not be otherwise: it may be true, as Lenin is supposed to have said, that any cook can learn to run the affairs of state, but if so the first thing he must do is stop being a cook—there really isn't time for everything.

Nevertheless the romantic image of the worker—that honest, horny-handed son of toil, somehow more noble, deserving and "real" than the non-worker—has been successfully adopted by the Soviet state and to some extent, like other romantic revolutionary symbols, "sold" to the gullible bourgeois abroad. This concept has tended to replace what is surely a more objective and reasonable view of the workers (or proletariat)—as people who make their living in a certain way and who therefore have certain broad features in common distinguishing them from others, but who are not thereby made better or worse or more or less fitted to exploit (or be exploited by) their fellow men than anyone else.

IF THERE IS ONE name in Russian literature more associated with revolutionary romanticism than any other it is that of Maxim Gorky, author of the celebrated *Song of the Stormy Petrel*, of the revolutionary novel *The Mother*, and many other evocative works. It is often forgotten, however, that Gorky's attitude to the revolution was by no means so simple-minded and clear-cut as it is made to seem by Soviet literary historians. Gorky had the awkward habit of using his brain from time to time and he did not always come up with the correct official stereotype.

It is in a little-known passage from *My Universities*, the third volume of Gorky's autobiography, published in 1923, that we find a politically unorthodox confrontation of the intellectual (Gorky himself) and the worker (an anonymous friend who had become a political "tycoon" since the revolution). The passage deserves to be put to Gorky's credit when his sins as an official hagiographer come to be reckoned up, if only because Gorky here makes no serious attempt to dissociate himself from the heretical philosophy of his worker friend.

"I don't want any of these things, my dear Aleksei Maksimovich," the worker tells Gorky. "What do we need with academies, sciences and aeroplanes? All I need is a quiet corner and a woman to kiss when I want to, one that responds honestly, body and soul, see? You argue as an intellectual, you're not on our side any longer. You're poisoned. You put ideas above people. . . . Intellectuals like worrying, they've tagged on to rebellions from time immemorial. . . . The worker rises for the sake of revolution, he has to secure a just distribution of the means of production and the product of labor. But do you think he wants to take control of the state once he's got power? Not a bit of it. They'll all go their different ways and . . . get themselves a quiet life. . . . Why should I build a town when I only want a little cottage?"

(A few pages earlier Gorky had recorded the great impression made on him thirty years before by a like-minded "worker" who remarked, among other things: "Factories and machines to make more and more machines—that's stupid. . . .") Gorky continues:

After this conversation, I couldn't help wondering whether millions of Russians really only put up with the hardships of revolution because they cherished the idea of escaping from work. A minimum of work and a maximum of enjoyment—a very attractive idea.[11]

HOWEVER, IT IS HARDLY to Gorky that one looks for a champion of ordinary mortals against revolutionary oppression. If there is one Russian author of our times to whom that honor belongs above all others, it is Boris Pasternak

[11] M. Gorky, *Izbrannyie sochineniia*, Moscow, 1946, pp. 498-500 (my translation—R.F.H.).

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for his *Doctor Zhivago*.[12] The novel is very much more than a mere anti-Soviet or anti-revolutionary polemic, and Western readers who approached it in this spirit, after it had been dramatically smuggled out of Russia, found themselves disappointed. However, on closer examination, it did turn out to have a deep anti-revolutionary message implanted in almost every line. This is especially evident in the loving care with which Pasternak describes ordinary family life—the sort of thing which Serge, Trotsky and their like so often dismissed as beneath contempt. "What do wives matter to them at a time like this?," Pasternak's heroine Lara asks with reference to her husband, a famous revolutionary leader. "The workers of the world, the remaking of the universe, that's something. But what's a wife? Just an individual biped, of no more importance than a flea or a louse!" (p. 273). This indifference to personal ties is sharply contrasted with the hero's outlook, reflected for example in his thoughts while traveling home from the front during the war: "What is there in the whole world worth more than a peaceful family life and work? The rest isn't in our hands" (p. 156).

Pasternak's defense of ordinary people against revolution is part of the texture of his novel, and not the least eloquent element in his indictment of revolution is what he leaves unsaid about it. Of the specific claims of Soviet official propaganda he has very little indeed to say: it is clear both from the novel itself and from what Pasternak has said elsewhere that he did not think these sufficiently serious to be worth discussing. However, his novel does contain several eloquent passages in which he comes to grips with revolutionary psychology in general terms. The following is probably the most important of such passages:

But . . . those who inspired the revolution aren't at home in anything except change and turmoil: that's their native element; they aren't happy with anything that's less than on a world scale. For them transitional periods, worlds in the making, are an end in themselves. They aren't trained for anything else, they don't know about anything except that. And do you know why there is this incessant whirl of never-ending preparations? It's because they haven't any real capacities, they are ungifted. Man is born to live, not to prepare for life. Life itself —the gift of life—is such a breathtakingly serious thing! Why substitute this childish harlequinade of adolescent fantasies, these schoolboy escapades? (p. 269).

As this passage suggests, in the conflict between Victor Serge and his young contemporaries who "talked about bicycles and girls," Pasternak was all for the bicycles and girls.

Pasternak seems to have seen revolutionary thinking as a sort of impertinent pomposity with no relevance to anything of real importance in man's spiritual life. It is significant that he finds himself opposed not merely to the Lenins and Stalins of this world, but also to such a fierce anti-revolutionary as Dostoyevsky. To Pasternak these apparent opposites were more similar than they seemed. Both had a kind of shrill high-mindedness—a cumbrous phrase, but one which seems to express what he deplored. Thus the following assessment of Russian authors, put into Dr. Zhivago's mouth, is of the greatest importance as an indication of Pasternak's thought:

What I have come to like best in the whole of Russian literature is the childlike Russian quality of Pushkin and Chekhov, their shy unconcern with such high-sounding matters as the ultimate purpose of mankind or their own salvation. . . . While Gogol, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky worried and looked for the meaning of life and prepared for death and drew up balance sheets, these two were distracted, right up to the end of their lives, by current, individual tasks imposed on them by their vocation as writers, and in the course of fulfilling these tasks they lived their lives, quietly, treating both their lives and their work as private, individual matters, of no concern to anyone else (p. 259).

"Private, individual matters of no concern to anyone else"—the Marxist revolutionary recognizes no such things. Perhaps if he did his record of failure would not be so complete as it is. For so far he has been mainly successful in stimulating sudden, dramatic changes of government involving the substitution of one form of tyranny for another. He has helped acquire power which has usually been no sooner acquired than it has been seized from him by calculating, *soi-disant* revolutionaries, as callous as himself, but of most unrevolutionary temperament.

The image of this modern knight in shining armor is gradually becoming more tarnished. It may lose its glitter entirely if mankind should ever move on from political adolescence.

[12] Boris Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago*, tr. Max Hayward and Manya Harari, London, 1958.

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The Many Faces of the Cold War

Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, *by Marshall D. Shulman. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.*

The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change, *by Robert C. Tucker. New York & London, Praeger, 1963.*

Soviet Foreign Propaganda, *by Frederick C. Barghoorn. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.*

The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives, *by Alexander Dallin. New York, Praeger, 1962.*

Africa and the Communist World, *edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963.*

Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963, *edited by Alexander Dallin, with Jonathan Harris and Grey Hodnett. New York & London, Columbia University Press, 1963.*

Reviewed by Richard Davies

"WE ARE evidently at the beginning of the third major effort since 1945 to establish whether or not it is possible for the Soviet Union and the West to live together on this planet under conditions of tolerable stability and low tensions," wrote Walt W. Rostow in the October 1963 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (p. 1). The beginning of this "third round" is a good time to look back and consider the characteristics and origins of the past stages of the cold war and draw a few conclusions from such a retrospect.

In his book, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised,* Marshall Shulman has taken a hard, fresh look at the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership from 1949 until the dictator's death in 1953. In the early 1950's, Professor Shulman argues, the Soviet leadership began to realize that its aggressive policy of the immediate postwar period had evoked a vigilance and cohesion in the West that were producing a significant remobilization of Western military forces. Under these circumstances, which were clearly illustrated by the strong American reaction to Communist aggression in Korea, Stalin began preparing a shift towards a more tolerant foreign policy and a posture calculated to be less alarming to the outside world. Shulman finds the first signs of the new policy in the relative easing of the Soviet outward thrust in 1951-52 (*e.g.*, the Korean truce talks begun in July 1951), in developments in the "peace" movement and the tactics of the French Communist

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Party, and in the 19th CPSU Congress which Stalin closed by exhorting Communists in the West to pick up the banners of "bourgeois democratic freedoms," of "national independence and national sovereignty."

Mr. Shulman concludes that the impression gained in the West that Soviet militancy in the immediate postwar period "constituted the renewal of a world revolutionary drive . . . was probably mistaken, for the key to the action now appears to have been the consolidation of Soviet control over territories gained since 1939 and an essentially reactive response to ward off an anticipated effort by the West to recover these territories" (p. 258). He is insistent upon "the largely rational responsiveness of Soviet policy to changes in the world environment, and particularly to changes in power relationships," a "responsiveness to outside conditions which, though in error at times, is not greatly less than what is found in foreign policy anywhere" (pp. 3 and 4). This "rational responsiveness," however, is to be viewed against the omnipresent "Soviet consciousness of the political effect of the military balance" (p. 270).

"Despite a conservative approach toward the hazards of a general nuclear war," Mr. Shulman writes,

the Soviet leadership has made clear its belief that superior weight in the balance of power represents the ultimate sanction in international politics which can produce political gains in specific local situations. In this way, the Russians anticipate that military capabilities can be translated into political advances without general war. . . . Despite the significant ideological modifications [since Stalin's death] concerning the nature of capitalism and the requirements of the present period, there remains an essential element in Soviet anticipations that is profoundly hostile to international stability. In the course of adapting itself to fundamental changes in world politics, the Soviet conception of revolution has changed greatly; not only has it receded in time, but it has evolved from a specific action program into an interacting process involving complex historical forces. . . . The end result would be the voluntary and peaceable acceptance of a new political unity in the world under Soviet leadership. Only when this has been achieved can the Soviet system regard its security as assured, given the character of modern weapons and its fundamental assumptions about the nature of non-Soviet societies. In these circumstances, stabilization in the international system seems remote, but, if events persuade the next generation of Soviet leaders that history offers more variety than their predecessors anticipated, one basic source of conflict may be diminished. (pp. 270-1)

MR. SHULMAN'S principal conclusion—that a turn to the "right" in Soviet foreign policy was in the making in 1951-53—carries conviction when he is done presenting the evidence. However, acceptance of his further proposition—that Soviet policy following the war was an "essentially reactive response to ward off an anticipated effort to recover" the territories won by the USSR since 1939—is more difficult. This latter conclusion does not appear to reflect fully the aggressive character of such Soviet moves as the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in north-west Iran, the demands upon Turkey for Kars, Ardahan, Artvin and bases in the Straits, Soviet support for Communist armed rebellion in Greece, the Communist take-overs in Eastern Europe in the postwar years 1946-48, and the Communist attack upon South Korea.

The picture of Stalin's postwar foreign policy that emerges from Shulman's analysis appears to be somewhat erroneous in that it depicts Stalin as more rational, more coldly calculating, and more responsive to outside pressures than he actually was. The point at issue here is not so much the question of whether Stalin and the Soviet leadership ultimately responded rationally to changes in the world environment—which sooner or later they usually did—as why it took them so long to perceive those changes, to understand the extent to which they were direct responses to Soviet actions, and to revise their own policies so as to bring about a corresponding change in Western reactions. The doctrinaire quality of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin (and Molotov) and the clinging to certain lines of action even after these had proven themselves to be manifestly damaging to Soviet long-range interests lead one to question Professor Shulman's conclusion that under Stalin Soviet "responsiveness to outside conditions" was "not greatly less than what is found in foreign policy anywhere."

But these remarks do not affect the substance of the argument Mr. Shulman presents. He set himself the task of examining the concrete manifestations of Soviet foreign policy in Stalin's last years, and it is a mark of his success that the reader hopes the author will in the future explore some of the corners left unlit by the present work.

ROBERT TUCKER'S *The Soviet Political Mind* is a collection of essays most of which have appeared earlier in scholarly journals (one of them, "Stalinism and Cold War," was published in *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1957) or were originally written for the RAND

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Corporation. Two essays and part of a third appear here for the first time. Nevertheless, the book is a unity and presents an internally consistent intellectual effort to trace the main lines of Soviet policy in the Stalin and post-Stalin periods.

Mr. Tucker's interpretation differs sharply from that of Professor Shulman, and the publication of the two books within the space of a few months—Shulman's was "signed to the press" in March 1963 and Tucker's in July—compels the student of Soviet affairs to consider some fundamental questions of approach and philosophical attitude. Indeed, it is clear that Shulman and Tucker have met, willy-nilly, in a polemic on the character of the last days of Stalin's rule and, more particularly, on the question of whether or not the old dictator was in fact preparing the ground for a liberalizing turn in Soviet foreign policy. "Stalin *was not contemplating an international détente* toward the end of his life, as some foreign observers have supposed," Tucker writes. "On the contrary, he was defending with all the force of his autocratic authority the opposite view that no détente was possible" (p. 31; emphasis in the original).

Underlying Mr. Tucker's analysis is an attempt to come to grips with the history of the Stalin period through an investigation of the psychological, or "psychopathological," motivations of the man.

What converted the tendency [*towards the rise of the Stalinist autocracy*] *into a historical reality was not the nature of Russia or the nature of Bolshevism: It was the nature of Stalin. His personality was a factor of crucial importance in shaping the history of the Stalin period. Furthermore, once in existence, the autocracy became an autonomous historical force, reshaping its own political milieu, transforming the whole Soviet system into a mechanism for the projection of Stalin's power and personality. In this sense it may be said that the Stalinist political system was a product of Stalin* (p. 47).

Since Stalin was, moreover, a "paranoid autocrat" (p. 142), whose "crucial operative aim . . . was *control*" (p. 169; emphasis in the original), it was inevitable that he should view the world as split into two irreconcilable camps. And since he felt his power threatened by what he could not control, it was equally inevitable that he could not adopt any attitude towards the opposite camp but one of implacable hostility. Finally, since Soviet foreign policy, like the rest of the Stalinist system, was "a product of Stalin" and his paranoid psychopathology, it is inconceivable that in his last days he could have been contemplating a change, even a tactical one, in his attitude towards the outside world.

While Shulman seeks his evidence primarily in Soviet actions that directly involve relations with foreign states and Communist organizations outside the USSR, Tucker relies mainly on developments in Soviet internal politics, applying them analogically to Stalin's intentions towards the outside world. For example, he cites the "plot of the doctor-murderers" in substantiation of his contention that, far from displaying any tendency towards preparing a "right" turn in the Soviet foreign policy line, Stalin was engaged on the eve of his death in concocting "evidence" to show that the "capitalist encirclement" not only continued to exist and threaten Soviet security, but "that the external danger and hostility to the Soviet Union were greater now than ever before, and that there could be no realistic thought of taking steps (*e.g.*, the conclusion of a formal armistice in Korea) to reduce the extremes of tension between the Soviet bloc and the West" (p. 29). However, it could be just as plausibly argued that if Stalin had been contemplating a "softening" of Soviet foreign policy he would have probably wanted to make sure that the turn abroad should not be misinterpreted as heralding any relaxation at home. The "doctors' plot" is thus good evidence that the line within the Soviet Union was about to become harder, but its evidentiary value with regard to foreign-policy intentions is equivocal.

Consistent with his emphasis on Stalin's psychopathological personality as the principal determinant of Soviet policy both at home and abroad, Mr. Tucker deals with the changes that took place after March 5, 1953, primarily in terms of a change in psychology. The "psychological revolution in Soviet foreign policy," as Tucker calls it, was characterized by the abandonment of the Stalinist operative aim of control and the adoption in its place of persuasion as the principal means of influencing the outside world. He explains his view of the role of persuasion as follows:

Foreign policy in the normal course of events is largely an activity of intergovernmental persuasion. Persuasion aims at influencing other governments to do or not to do certain things, such as concluding a treaty, settling a dispute, joining or not joining an alliance. The basis of appeal is mutuality of interest. Recognition of the other government's interest in its own continued existence and security is always necessarily presupposed. (p. 171)

Mr. Tucker thus suggests that by substituting persuasion for the Stalinist aim of control the post-Stalin foreign policy of the

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USSR has achieved a considerable degree of normalcy. But his definition of foreign policy is surely too narrow. It confines itself to the mode of intergovernmental intercourse, neglecting the wide range of means other than diplomacy used in the pursuit of foreign-political goals, particularly the role of power factors which influence every significant political negotiation. Mr. Tucker's definition is really one of diplomacy, and his treatment of post-Stalin Soviet policy suffers because he appears to have insufficiently differentiated diplomacy and foreign policy.

Depicting Stalin and his times as a total aberration, organically unconnected with the Bolshevik past or the Soviet present, the author's interpretation of Stalinism leaves the reader with a sense of historical discontinuity. While contending, in an excellent essay on the enormity of the Stalinist voluntaristic doctrines in biology and psychology ("Stalin and the Uses of Psychology"), that the dictator was in fact unable to achieve the particular genetic and psychic transformations of which he dreamed, the author nevertheless maintains that Stalin succeded in working a general social transformation in which a whole society became little more than an extension of his personality.

In addition to his essay on Stalinist manipulation of psychology and biology, Mr. Tucker offers in his book a good summary of the political significance of destalinization within the USSR (pp. 59-65), an excellent treatment of the alienation between people and state that has characterized Russia under the commissars as it did under the Tsars (pp. 69-90), and some perceptive notes on religious trends in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death (pp. 135-42)—a subject that has received far too little serious attention in the West, mainly because of a lack of adequate data. He is also fully at home in his discussion of Soviet popular attitudes in the chapter entitled "Field Observations in Post-Stalin Russia."

IN *Soviet Foreign Propaganda,* Frederick C. Barghoorn continues the studies which produced *The Soviet Image of the United States* in 1950 and *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* in 1960. His new book opens with an instructive glance backward at the doctrinal bases laid down by Lenin and at the origins of Soviet foreign propaganda between the two world wars. He devotes most of his attention, however, to the practices and themes of the post-Stalin era. The reader is thus supplied with a useful compendium of the elements which make up the current Soviet line directed to the outside world, together with studies of the psychological techniques used to convey it abroad, the media through which it gets there, and an assessment of its effectiveness and limitations.

Like Shulman, Mr. Barghoorn sees the origins of the shift from doctrinaire rigidity to greater flexibility in the 1949-52 period (pp. 46-48). He also emphasizes the continuity of strategy throughout Soviet history. Citing Harold D. Lasswell, he finds that Soviet propaganda aims " 'to economize the material cost of world dominance' " by acting " 'upon pessimistic assumptions about the capabilities of mankind for enlightenment by peaceful persuasion' " (p. 207). "However," he writes, "Moscow —not to mention Peking—has never explicitly repudiated Lenin's dictum that great political problems are decided, in the last analysis, by force" (p. 7). It might have been illustrative to devote more attention than he does to the important part played by the *Schrecklichkeits-propaganda* which accompanied the 1958-62 Berlin campaign and to the perennial rocket-rattling which provides so striking a counterpoint to Soviet peace propaganda. If one strand of the general line is designed to woo neutrals and lull the West, another aims to frighten both, and the use of one or the other depends upon the regime's assessment of the prevailing politico-military balance in the world.

Barghoorn's survey leads him to the conclusion that "Soviet propaganda has succeeded in intensifying and channeling in directions desirable to the Kremlin attitudes such as fear of war, anti-colonialism, and anti-western nationalism" (pp. 300-1). While he recognizes the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, he also points to its important limitations. "Although increased Soviet power, and . . . [post-Stalin] doctrinal revisions . . ., imparted unprecedented flexibility to Soviet propaganda by giving it a wider choice of means, they could not free it from the necessity of proclaiming adherence to an allegedly infallible doctrine, nor release its ties to a centralized, conspiratorial political leadership. In this situation, Soviet and other Communists are forced to choose between such radical reforms as, for example, the repudiation of a manipulative style of political discourse, which might destroy communism as a messianic, though opportunistic, semi-religious movement, and continued adherence to their traditional tactics of secrecy and deception. Thus far, they have obviously preferred the latter, which from their point of view represents the lesser evil" (pp. 316-17).

Professor Barghoorn's book is required reading for an understanding of the current stage of the struggle for the minds of men.

ALEXANDER DALLIN'S focus on Soviet motives and objectives at the United Nations provides

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a relevant counterpoint to the Shulman-Tucker debate. Mr. Dallin has not attempted to chronicle Soviet actions at the UN *in extenso*. Instead, he has examined the Soviet performance in the UN in terms both of the general sweep of Soviet foreign policy and the particular attitudes exhibited by the Soviets towards the constitution, organization, and activities of the world organization. With a sure hand, he leads the reader through the alternating cold and warm periods of Soviet involvement with the United Nations, amply illustrating in the process the subsidiary role the UN plays in Moscow's calculations.

In particular, Mr. Dallin provides an intriguing discussion of the period of Soviet optimism (1957-59) when the USSR believed—as the emerging nations made common cause with it—that it might soon assume the leadership of a majority within the world organization. The author's conclusion nicely sums up an important aspect of Soviet imperceptiveness:

Soviet analyses and expectations have, in the Khrushchev era, tended to be fairly realistic about power relations, capabilities and vulnerabilities of states. . . . But a substantial lack of realism intervenes when Soviet analysis concerns a pluralistic world. As bipolarity is the natural shape to

HE WHO IS NOT WITH US . . .

The evidence points overwhelmingly to the continued acceptance of the two-camp view [by the Soviet Union]. Neither one nor three, but two, remains the magic number. Whatever its appeals to universal goals and values, Moscow does not see the world as one international community. And, however vigorous its assertions of solidarity with the Afro-Asian world, it does not in fact recognize the permanent fissure of the globe into three homogeneous and mutually antagonistic blocs. As the 1961 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declares, "The basic contradiction of the contemporary world [is] the contradiction between socialism and imperialism." The events of recent years have undoubtedly reinforced the Soviet belief in the correctness of its bifocal vision and in the inevitability of the shift in the balance of power in favor of the "socialist camp."

Premier Khrushchev's frequent and facile comments bear this out. They abound in such images as the balance, the see-saw, and communicating vessels in which the emptying of one (the capitalist) is tantamount to the filling of the other (the Communist). The United Nations itself, he reasserted upon his return home from New York in 1960, was the stage for "a struggle of the new and progressive against the old and the moribund." Identifying the Soviet Union, as usual, with the fight for "peace," he continued: "Lining up the forces for peace and war is a process that will quicken and develop and will augment the forces that stand for peace. The peoples of the neutral countries face a historic choice"—between the two camps.

It has become standard for Soviet writers on foreign affairs—and particularly on the UN—to juxtapose "the two lines" or "two opposite approaches" to world affairs, not three.[1] Bracketing the "objective" interests of the Communist and unaligned states, the Communist Party's official organ, *Kommunist*, commented on the 15th Assembly session:

The historic struggle taking place on the world stage in our days finds expression within the walls of that Organization [the UN], where the world is represented in all its manifold and, of course, contradictory complexity. Here a polarization is taking place in the course of which the forces of peace, freedom, and social progress unite, while the advocates of aggression and colonial slavery doom themselves to isolation.[2]

Allowing for the contrived optimism of the prognosis, the approach is clear: It permits of no lasting neutrality. Leading Communists have from time to time spelled out the purely tactical and manipulative nature of their present support of the neutral states. Indeed, in the Soviet definition neutrality no longer means what it did: An active struggle against "imperialism" is a "necessary condition" of Soviet recognition of a state's neutrality.[3]

[1] For instance, *New Times*, No. 3, 1961, p. 3; D. Kraminov, "Ubeditelnyi pereves sil mira," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1960, p. 87.

[2] Editorial, "Za mir, za razoruzhenie, za svobodu narodov," *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1960, p. 5.

[3] N. Inozemtsev, "Razvitie mirovovo sotsializma i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1961.

—From *The Soviet Union at the United Nations*, by Alexander Dallin, pp. 183–85

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which, Moscow imagines, the universe tends, the standard Soviet image of the United Nations, too, has been one of two opposites. So long as the facts can be made to fit such formulas, Soviet analysis is simple and often shrewd, even if its view of capitalism and democracy remains hopelessly out of date. But they don't always fit. . . . In the last analysis, the Soviet assumption that the unaligned world—any more than the Western grouping—constitutes a cohesive, homogeneous, lasting bloc is plainly wrong. (pp. 201-2)

PROFESSOR Zbigniew Brzezinski's ground-breaking work in editing *Africa and the Communist World* illustrates the desirability of dealing with Soviet foreign policy from the vantage-point of specific geopolitical areas. The book is not restricted, however, to Moscow's policy towards Africa. Following chapters by Alexander Dallin on Soviet political activity in the "dark continent" and by Alexander Erlich and Christian R. Sonne on Soviet economic activity, Robert and Elizabeth Bass consider the role of the other Warsaw Pact member-countries, William E. Griffith deals with Yugoslavia's peculiar variety of involvement, and Richard Lowenthal analyzes Peking's interest as well as the effects of the early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict upon Communist strategy in Africa. Professor Brzezinski sums up with a chapter on "The African Challenge."

This book should remain for some time the authoritative text on the beginnings of relations between Communist states and the last great area of the world to emerge from colonial bondage into political independence. Each of the chapters deals incisively and succinctly with its subject, and in the end the editor supplies a useful interpretive summation as well as a shrewd look into the future. On the heels of Chou En-lai's visit to Africa and the proclamation of a "People's Republic" in Zanzibar, Richard Lowenthal's excellent chapter on the Chinese view of Africa and the significance of that view as an exacerbating element in the growing rivalry between Communist China and the USSR makes particularly topical reading. Professor Brzezinski also touches on the bearing of the Sino-Soviet rift, commenting on the belief that the dispute should weaken the Communist threat in Africa. He writes:

. . . while Communist diversity has in many regards prevented the application of a coherent and coordinated strategy, there are certain positive aspects to it [from the Communist point of view]. The diversity also undermines the African image of a monolithic Communist camp and thus diminishes African fears of excessive identification with a particular bloc. . . . This is a very important consideration, given the strong nationalist feelings of the new elites and the Western efforts to present the Soviets as the authoritarian leaders of the other Communist-ruled states. (pp. 215-16)

Brzezinski thus warns that the development of polycentrism may have a result in Africa much different from the weakening of Communist influence and attractive power which thus far appears to be its principal effect in the industrialized countries.

A READING of *Africa and the Communist World* is sufficient to convince the student of the practical significance of the increasingly bitter dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties. In *Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963*, Alexander Dallin, with the assistance of Jonathan Harris and Grey Hodnett and under the aegis of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University, has produced a massive (867 pages) selection of the documents in which the dispute has been articulated since the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961. The volume ends with the CCP's letter of March 9, 1963, to the CPSU. The editors have provided introductory narratives to each subject heading under which the documents are grouped, as well as connective summaries within these groupings. There is an excellent introduction contributed by Professors Dallin and Brzezinski.

The collection contains either the full texts of, or excerpts from, 120 documents published by 25 Communist parties throughout the world, as well as summaries of the positions taken on the dispute by an additional 28 parties, which should offer some idea of the scope of this impressive volume. Students of world communism are thus once more indebted to Columbia University Press, which in 1956 published the very useful documentary collections, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* and *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*. It is to be hoped that, like the invaluable reference aid *Current Soviet Policies, Diversity in International Communism* will become a continuing series. There certainly will be no lack of raw material for future volumes.

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HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

A Conversation in Warsaw

By Georges Mond

EDITORS' NOTE: With the article below we are introducing a new section that we plan to feature from time to time. In it we shall offer historical articles of unusual contemporary interest, and we hope that this occasional glance backward will be refreshing as well as instructive.

Mr. Mond, author of the piece that follows, is a Pole who since 1958 has lived in Paris, studying at the Sorbonne and writing. Before leaving Poland he served as General Secretary of the Polish Journalists' Association and it was in this capacity that he participated in the interview with N. V. Maslennikov, a Soviet diplomat in charge of press relations in the Warsaw Embassy. For his meddling in Polish internal affairs and for his outrageously antisemitic remarks the Polish Government declared Maslennikov persona non grata *in May 1957 and Moscow promptly withdrew its unruly diplomat. It is possible that Maslennikov pursued his instructions in Warsaw a bit too eagerly, but he certainly does not appear to have transgressed them, for by 1960 he was promoted and serving as First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest. The resumé of the conversation between Maslennikov and the two Polish journalists has never before appeared in print.*

ON MARCH 18, 1957, there took place in Warsaw a long and frank conversation between the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, N. V. Maslennikov, and two representatives of the Association of Polish Journalists. The Polish participants were the present writer, then General Secretary of the Association, and his deputy, Jan Dziedzic. In the discussion Attaché Maslennikov touched on a wide range of political issues which were agitating Poland at the time, and the record of his views—reflecting of course the prevailing official Soviet viewpoint—remains of considerable interest to this day not only as a historical document, but as one that in many respects foreshadowed the actual developments in Poland after Gomulka's consolidation of power.

Before presenting a summary of Maslennikov's views, it may be useful to set the discussion in its historical context. The exchange took place five months after the "Polish October," when Poland had recovered part of its independence and the population had begun enjoying some of the civil liberties known to democratic countries. Upon assuming power on October 20, 1956, Gomulka had set out to deal with the four cardinal problems bequeathed to him by his Stalinist predecessors. These were: the question of relations between Poland and the USSR, the critical economic situation, the relationship of the Polish Communist party (PZPR-United Polish Workers' Party) to the various segments of the nation, and, finally, the widespread demand for the reestablishment of basic civil liberties (especially freedom of the press and of religion) and of elementary guarantees of the rule of law.

Gomulka approached his task with much political skill and courage, and in very little time he garnered the support of a majority of

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the nation. The peasants welcomed the retreat from collectivization; the workers drew hope from the promise of better living conditions and participation in factory management; the intelligentsia was pleased with its newly-acquired freedoms and the prospect of renewed contacts with the West; and the Catholic church was gratified by the *modus vivendi* it had reached with the new Communist regime—so much so that it supported Gomulka in the electoral campaign of January 1957.

On the foreign front, the new party secretary gained popularity by his assertion of Polish sovereignty and his firm, if loyal, attitude towards the Soviet Union. In search of allies in the Communist camp, he proceeded to tighten relations with Communist China, and in the West he successfully negotiated for economic aid, obtaining in June 1957 a $95 million loan from the United States.

IN THE MEANTIME, the Stalinists or conservatives (also known then as Natolinists)[1] within the PZPR and the state apparatus were mobilizing for a struggle against Gomulka's reforms, which had the support of the liberal, the Gomulkaist and the moderate wings of the party.[2] The Natolinists, who demanded limitations on the "October" changes and a return to the rule of the iron hand, found strong backing for their effort in the Soviet Embassy, where Ambassador P. Ponomarenko and Attaché Maslennikov eagerly supported their attitude, especially on press and cultural affairs.

Another issue that divided the liberals from the conservatives was the question of antisemitism in public life and in the party itself. According to the liberal journal *Po prostu*, the Natolin group sought "to establish in the party and state apparatus regulations resting not on moral-political principles, but on racist ones, *i.e.*, regulations based on the purity of Aryan blood."[3] The existence of the problem was also openly admitted at the time by Jerzy Morawski, member of the PZPR Politbureau. Asked on February 16, 1957, at the party's propaganda department to explain the emergence of antisemitism in the party, Morawski declared that "the boldness in disclosure of these feelings undoubtedly came in connection with unjust statements made by some associates of the former party leadership during the period of the 7th Plenum [July 1956]. The party is fighting against these feelings, but not adequately."[4] After the issue had been brought into the open, the many Poles of Jewish origin who occupied responsible positions in the party and the state bureaucracies joined wholeheartedly in the contest against the Natolinists.

Yet another point of controversy was the issue of the workers' councils and the workers' right to participate in industrial management, which the liberals, in part even the "Gomulkaists," and of course the workers themselves favored. The councils had sprung into existence during the October days, and the conservatives fought tooth and nail against permanent adoption of this Yugoslav-inspired institution of economic self-rule.

BUT PERHAPS the subject of sharpest dispute, and the one that aroused the most heated political passions, was the question of what role the press and public opinion should be allowed to play in a Communist society. In post-Stalin Poland, journalists and pen-wielding intellectuals had little by little developed into a pressure group. They seized on the enlarged measure of freedom of expression and began not only to report what they saw, but also to explore in depth various questions of public interest. The weight of their words made itself felt as people started reading more attentively, and for the first time in postwar Poland the mechanism of public opinion came into play: the press was exerting real influence on the party and the government. Indeed, so anomalous was the trend of Polish journalism within the Soviet bloc that it was repeatedly subjected to Czechoslovak and East German attacks for advocating "revisionism" and showing enthusiasm for the West and insufficient devotion to the USSR.

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[1] This group derived its name from the Natolin Palace near Warsaw, where it began meeting from the early spring of 1956 to formulate lines of action designed to preserve in Poland the Stalinist *status quo*. During the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in July 1956, it sought to win over Gomulka and bring him into the CC as a member of the group. Gomulka refused, however, and eventually joined the liberals. The Natolin group included: Zenon Nowak, Vice Premier; Franciszek Jozwiak-Witold, Minister of National Control; Boleslaw Ruminski, Minister of Chemical Industry; Kazimierz Mijal, member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers; Major-General Kazimierz Witaszewski, Vice Minister of National Defense; Stanislaw Lapot, Vice Premier; Julian Tokarski, Minister of Heavy Industry; Wladyslaw Kruczek, secretary of the provincial PZPR committee at Bydgoszcz; Wiktor Klosiewicz, Chairman of the Central Trade Unions Council; and Franciszek Mazur, member of the PZPR Politburo.

[2] The liberal leaders included, among others: Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rapacki, and Jerzy Morawski and Wladyslaw Matwin, secretaries of the PZPR Central Committee. The "Gomulkaist" group comprised party leaders who had been removed from influence or even jailed with Gomulka in the early 1950's, such as Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense; Zenon Kliszko, Vice Marshal of the Sejm (Parliament); Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Minister of Education; and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, Deputy Chairman of the Central Trade Unions Council. The moderate or "centrum" group included Edward Ochab, Politbureau member and PZPR CC First Secretary preceding Wladyslaw Gomulka; Roman Zambrowski, Politbureau member until July 1963; and Witold Jarosinski, Central Committee Secretary.

[3] No. 44, Oct. 28, 1956, p. 1, and No. 1, Jan. 6, 1957, pp. 1-2. *Po prostu* was a student weekly which openly attacked Stalinism, but on the basis of Marxism. It often revealed compromising affairs of the leadership.

[4] As quoted in Jerzy Mond, *6 lat temu . . .* (Six Years Ago . . .), Paris, Institut Literacki, 1962, p. 159.

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In the post-October period the Polish press thus developed into an autonomous political force which sometimes cooperated with the party organization, but which frequently would openly oppose the remaining Stalinists in the apparatus and force them to retreat. This development of course created a deep impression in a country where, as elsewhere in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, district and provincial party secretaries had until then been untouchable. At the same time, the unaccustomed public criticism of officials became the source of much antagonism toward the press in both the party and government bureaucracies. For a year after his assumption of power, Gomulka tried to stem these feelings by assuring the embittered party bureaucrats that the press was not governing, but only serving the party. At the same time, however, he did not refrain from criticizing the press. As early as November 23, 1956, he declared before a meeting of provincial secretaries of the PZPR (many of whom sympathized with the Natolin group):

What do we observe among many journalists? We observe that they find it easiest to sail on a wave of demands, a wave of demagogy. It reads well, and it is popular. And many journalists seem to think they are doers, that everything, in fact, is of their doing. I am very curious to know what would happen to this nation if these journalists were placed in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, or in the Cabinet, and were told: "Govern, comrades!" In two weeks everything would be—it would have to be—turned upside down. . . .[5]

Quite apart from his personal predilections, Gomulka was clearly sensitive to the hostility among party officials toward the newly buoyant Polish journalism.

The conservative campaign to curb the press—as well as to advance all the other tenets of the Natolinist outlook—was actively supported by the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw. Ambassador Ponomarenko himself participated in this effort, and his discourses in defense of the Natolin policy line at the House of Journalists (January and March 1957) and elsewhere are still well remembered. But it was Attaché Maslennikov who contributed the most candid and elaborate presentation of the official Soviet view of internal Polish problems, as well as the most detailed evidence of the affinity between Soviet and Natolinist attitudes.

What follows is a summary of the statements made by Maslennikov during the discussion with Jan Dziedzic and this writer at the headquarters of the Association of Polish Journalists on March 18, 1957. This record—presented here in a free and slightly abbreviated translation from the Polish—was set down from memory the following day by the two Polish participants and, because of Maslennikov's attacks on current PZPR policy, was subsequently conveyed by the Association to the party leadership.

The Discourse

1) The Soviet attaché asserted that the Poles themselves were to blame for the unfortunate events in Poland before 1956: that Gomulka had actually been arrested on Polish initiative; that collectivization, or the mistakes in collectivization, had not been the product of any outside pressure; and, likewise, that the lack of progress in raising the standard of living and the collapse of the Six-Year Plan had resulted exclusively from Polish shortcomings.[6]

2) Maslennikov strongly defended conservatism [Natolinism], which in his view represented the outlook of the old party comrades and outstanding specialists, against whom any strictures were unjust. From his words it was clear that only the conservatives offered the "correct" line. He referred to Gomulka as an "honorable man" and reminded us that the conservatives—in the person of Klosiewicz[7]—had been first to call (at the 7th Plenum) for the return of the erstwhile PZPR chief to party and government leadership. Speaking of the derogatory tone used by critics of conservatism, Maslennikov condemned *Po prostu* as insolent. The conservatives were being accused of acting as agents, he complained. "But whose agents, ours?," he demanded to know. He received no reply to this question.

3) On the subject of the press, the Soviet attaché was particularly critical of *Po prostu, Sztandar mlodych, Kurier szczecinski, Nowa kultura* and *Zeszyty teoretyczene*.[8] He specifically singled out articles with

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[6] Gomulka was arrested on July 31, 1951, as a result of Soviet pressure and on the recommendation of the Politbureau of the PZPR. Jakub Berman, the closest collaborator of former President and PZPR First Secretary Boleslaw Bierut, told the 8th Plenum of the PZPR CC of the pressures that had been exerted by Stalin and Beria. *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10/88, October 1956, pp. 87-8 and 93.

[7] See footnote 1.

[8] *Sztandar mlodych* was the daily organ of the ZMP, the former party youth organization. It represented the liberal viewpoint of Jerzy Morawski, Politbureau member and propaganda secretary of the PZPR CC. Currently it is the organ of the ZMS (Union of Socialist Youth), which supplanted the ZMP after its dissolution in January 1957. *Kurier szczecinski* is a non-party daily published in Szczecin. During the post-October period it distinguished itself by the liveliness of its make-up as well as by its frequent non-conformism. *Nowa kultura* was a literary weekly that stood at the vanguard of the Polish liberal press. It was closed down in June 1963. *Zeszyty teoretyczne* is a theoretical bimonthly of the CC of the PZPR. During 1956-57, it published all the criticisms of the Soviet leadership by Togliatti, Mao Tse-Tung, Jean-Paul Sartre and Howard Fast, as well as (for the first time in Polish) Lenin's letters "On Proper Relations Between the Fraternal Communist Parties and on Socialist Democracy."

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revisionist overtones by Stanislaw Brodzki,[9] and on a number of occasions he referred to the press as "disgraceful."

Maslennikov's words carried the implication that the Polish press had become the way it was, and reflected so many revisionist views, as a result of its "Judaization." He declared furthermore that while articles had been published after the 8th Plenum [10] welcoming freedom of religion,[11] the newspapers were finally beginning to realize what it meant to give freedom to the church and were criticizing [12] the problem that had been created. "You praise the students," Maslennikov continued, "for having been in the lead, and yet you know that already before the elections [January 1957] the mood at the Polytechnic was different; you know that students are an unstable element—and now you criticize." He thought that the press had made a great mistake in attacking the ZMP [the Stalinist Polish Youth Union, which was dissolved in January 1957], and that this had resulted in the cessation of all effort to activate youth. He complained that the attention of youth was being distracted by such things as the striptease and salacious pictures, and that this was obviously a bourgeois action designed to weaken ideological fervor in the younger generation.

Nevertheless, in the end, Maslennikov gave the impression that he sensed a change for the "better" in the press and that, since he expected the attitude of the press to change even further, agreement in the future would be easier.

4) The discussion then turned to Stalin, whom Maslennikov described as a man faithful to Leninism. He stressed in particular that criticism of the theory of the sharpening class struggle in the course of socialist construction [13] was appropriate in the Soviet Union, which had become classless, but was improper with respect to Poland, where the kulak in the countryside was again baring his teeth; in other words, in Poland the theory of the sharpening class struggle still applied. Stalin, Maslennikov declared, had never strayed from the Leninist line in his theoretical works.

Asked whether this also applied to Stalin's practice and how the vicissitudes following the "Congress of Victors" [14] could be explained, the Soviet diplomat replied by quoting from a newly published work by a West German historian to the effect that the Great Purge of the 1930's had completely smashed the fifth column in the Soviet Union, which, while it may have been weak, existed nevertheless. Maslennikov admitted that in the course of the purge many innocent people had fallen victim, but in his judgment the purge, in the final analysis, had saved socialism and had to be recognized as a positive event in the historical process because it had led to the strengthening of the Soviet Union.

5) Maslennikov devoted much attention to the role of the Polish intelligentsia, criticizing its performance and demanding greater utilization of workers and persons of working-class origin in leading positions, especially in the press. He charged that the task of raising the social consciousness of the intelligentsia and the question of its relation to the working class had been neglected in Poland for ten years.

He also complained that insufficient attention was being paid to the proportion of students of working-class origin admitted to universities (he here drew a distinction between workers and the peasantry), and that at the moment this whole matter suffered from neglect. In reply, we argued that in the past many mistakes had been made in placing people who had good will but lacked qualifications in leading positions, and that the policy of supplanting them with experts was just; but we fully agreed that those who have a proletarian background as well as the proper qualifications should occupy high office. Maslennikov retorted that such criteria were wrong, since the matter of one's class background was of fundamental importance.

6) On the subject of the Poznan events of the previous year, Maslennikov declared that the activity of the press had been the principal, if not the only, cause of the riots and the outpouring of the workers into

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[9] Brodzki was then Chairman of the Polish Journalists' Association. In October-November 1956 *Trybuna ludu* and other newspapers published several articles by him expressing, among other things, the views of Premier Cyrankiewicz on the "Polish road to socialism."

[10] The 8th Plenum of the PZPR CC (Oct. 20-22, 1956) marked the high point of the anti-Stalinist development toward independence, democracy and religious freedom in Poland.

[11] This was a reference to Jerzy Morawski (then member of the PZPR Politbureau), who on Feb. 16, 1957, defined the party's position on the church as follows: "The correct policy in this area must lie in assuring to the people a feeling of freedom in satisfying their religious needs and in following a religious cult, and in this way impeding any attempts at inciting the faithful against the authorities. . . ." See Mond, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[12] Reference to Stalinist-inspired articles sounding the alarm that intolerance was spreading in schools against children of unbelieving parents.

[13] This theory was first formulated by Stalin in his struggle against Bukharin in 1929 (see speech to the CPSU CC plenum, April 29, 1929, in *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 309) and used again by Stalin in the middle 1930's to justify the terror of that period. At the 20th CPSU Congress Khrushchev declared this theory false, emphasizing the disappearance of antagonistic social classes in the USSR and thus implicitly renouncing the need for large-scale repression.

[14] Because the 17th CPSU Congress (convened on Jan. 26, 1934) announced the completion of the foundations of socialism in the USSR, it is termed in official Soviet history as the "Congress of Victors." The congress was followed by the unleashing of mass terror. An article in *Pravda* (Feb. 7, 1963, by L. Shaumian) admitted that of the 1,966 delegates to the 17th Congress, 1,108 were later liquidated by Stalin; and that the same fate befell 98 of the 139 persons elected by the Congress to the Cental Committee of the party.

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the streets.[15] We pointed out that the 7th and 8th plenums of the PZPR had taken a different view, which had been set forth in detail in *Trybuna ludu* by Jerzy Morawski[16] and, after certain ups and downs, had finally been accepted as the party's official position. Maslennikov's reply was, in essence, that this position was erroneous, and that the party itself could change viewpoints.

7) The Soviet attaché discussed at length and with much emphasis what he called "the problem of a national cadre" in Poland. He said that there were too many Jews in leading positions, and that this was well known; things were especially bad in this respect in the radio and on the staff of *Trybuna ludu*—and here he named some names. Sooner or later, he went on, there would have to be a national cadre. By way of explanation he cited the case of Tadjikistan, where at one time all important positions had been occupied by Russians. This had later been acknowledged as wrong, he continued, and a national Tadjikistani cadre had been trained and installed in power.

When Maslennikov began speaking about the "Judaization" of the Polish Radio, we at first disputed his facts, pointing out—also naming names—that there were many non-Jews in positions of prominence. Then we realized that this was hardly the proper approach: after all, it was a matter of principle. The reference to Tadjikistan, we said, was irrelevant, for in Poland there were only Poles, and the fact that some of them were of Jewish descent made no difference whatever. What the Soviet attaché was saying, I asserted at this point, was unspeakable and reminiscent of Nuremberg. Indeed, how did Comrade Maslennikov propose to put his slogan of a "national cadre" into effect? Let us say that someone is a chief editor. Are we to investigate his grandmothers? Or suppose two people apply for a job and one of them happens to be a Jew—what should be our criterion? Our hand would tremble if we were to guide ourselves by his proposal.

When we meet again in ten years, Maslennikov replied, it will be clear that this is not a matter of wronging people but a goal for which we must aim. As for our suggestion that Marx himself was Jewish, Maslennikov came to the latter's "defense" by saying that Marx had a German-born mother and had himself been converted to Christianity. On a related subject—the emigration of Polish Jews to Israel—he declared that this was something one did not have to regret because the old Communists among them were really traitors: they were moving to a country where *Po prostu*, to be sure, found socialist elements, but where actually there was no socialism, but capitalism.

8) Finally, Maslennikov strongly attacked the institution of workers' councils in Poland, saying that it was in contradiction to the principles of party leadership and the wrong path for the Poles to take. He charged that Yugoslavia, which originated the institution, had learned nothing from experience, and that despite swallowing billions of dollars the Yugoslav economy was failing; that the workers' councils were nothing and would bring nothing, and that Comrade Zambrowski[17] had already criticized them.

Looking Back

Today, six years after that remarkable interview, one cannot but be impressed by Maslennikov's prophetic powers and his detailed knowledge of Polish Communist party affairs.

Thus, when the Soviet diplomat emphasized in March 1957 that the Natolin group was the first to want Gomulka rehabilitated and share power with him, few believed that he (Maslennikov) displayed better understanding of the Polish political scene than the enthusiastic Polish journalists who viewed Gomulka as a liberal and humanitarian bravely resisting Stalinist and Natolinist pressures. The years 1957-59 gradually dispelled these illusions, and today we see the party chief sharing his power with old Natolinists such as Z. Nowak, Witaszewski, Tokarski, Kruczek, Strzelecki and Geda, rather than with the liberals of October such as Bienkowski, Morawski, Matwin, Lange, Bobrowski, Staszewski, Lasota or Gozdik.

Similarly with press relations and freedom of the press. The charges against Polish journalism voiced by Maslennikov were taken up almost in their entirety by Gomulka. As time went on, the tone of his criticism became harsher, until on October 6, 1957, he voiced, in effect, the substance of the Natolinists' early protests and issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the Polish press:

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[15] On June 28, 1956, workers in Poznan staged a demonstration demanding satisfaction of their just economic and social demands, and rioting followed in which more than 100 persons were killed. The entire Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak press reported that the riots had been instigated by Western intelligence agencies, whereas the Polish press, following the lead of the party organ *Trybuna ludu* (July 6, 1956), asserted that the disturbances were caused by the soullessness of the party and the government apparatus. Subsequently Polish Stalinists accused the press of responsibility for the bloodshed. Ever since, the appraisal of the Poznan riot has divided liberal from Stalinist Communists in Poland.

[16] Jerzy Morawski, one of the leaders of the liberals, was at the time editor-in-chief of *Trybuna ludu* and chief of the propaganda department of the PZPR CC. As a result of pressure by the Stalinists, he was removed in the middle of July 1956, but returned to the party leadership along with Gomulka on October 20. Pushed aside more and more after the fall of 1957, he was completely removed from the leadership in the autumn of 1959.

[17] See below and footnote 2.

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It must be stated that a considerable segment of journalists and publicists as well as a number of magazine editorial staffs have failed to reach the proper conclusions from the resolutions of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee and continue to carry on a policy of their own. . . . But . . . the time for sermons is over. Now we shall draw party and political consequences.[18]

Some of the consequences had in fact already been drawn: three days earlier *Po prostu* had been closed down. Thus Gomulka definitively associated himself with the Natolinist view of the function of the press, and if these developments were not soon followed by a general reconciliation between Gomulka and the conservatives in the party, it was mainly because of the stubborn and tactically inept attitude of the latter. A more effective rapprochement did come about in the spring of 1958, when the Natolin group was dissolved (probably partly as a result of the more liberal Soviet attitude toward Eastern Europe) to join the regime under Gomulka's helm.

While to a certain extent the Polish press continues to function as an intermediary between the regime and the people to this very day, Gomulka's fight against the independence of the press did not cease with the suspension of *Po prostu*. Stanislaw Brodzki, singled out for personal attack by Maslennikov, was ousted as chairman of the Journalists' Association, then arrested in 1961 in conjunction with the "Holland Affair,"[19] and relegated after his release to a minor editorial position. In June 1963, *Nowa kultura*[20] was put out of existence, and if one is to judge by the renewed fire aimed at the press at the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee held last July, the party's effort to keep the press effectively under control is not likely to abate soon. "Journalists have a tendency," Gomulka declared on that occasion, "to criticize in a malicious way and broadcast bitterness and skepticism among the people."[21] He could have been quoting Maslennikov.

Official antisemitism at the public-office level—or the creation of a "national cadre," as it was termed by Maslennikov—also appears to have become part of PZPR policy. It is true that the party's task was simplified by the emigration of many of the remaining Polish Jews to Israel; nevertheless, there has been a tendency to push aside the few Jews still active in public life, as evidenced by the departure from the PZPR Politbureau in July 1963 of its last Jewish member, Roman Zambrowski. He now occupies a third-ranking position once given to Gomulka during the period of his disgrace.

Finally, in the matter of workers' self-rule, Moscow and PZPR conservatives have received full satisfaction. The Polish workers' councils were effectively stripped of any independence before the end of 1957, and there has been no sign of a change in the official attitude since. There is little doubt that intransigence on this subject in the Soviet Union has had an effect in Poland as well.[22] All in all, in spite of intervening political changes in Moscow and the Communist bloc, the self-confidence of Soviet diplomats in Warsaw seven years ago has withstood the test of time rather well. It is a telling commentary on the resistance of communism to any change that might threaten the party's totalitarian rule.

[18] See Mond, *op. cit.*, pp. 178 and 181.

[19] See S. L. Shneiderman, "Eclipse of the Polish October," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1963, p. 64.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Nowe drogi*, No. 8 (171), 1963.

[22] See André Babeau, *Les Conseils ouvriers en Pologne*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1960, pp. 291-5.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

THE LABOR PROBLEM: AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

TO THE EDITORS: The articles by Jay B. Sorenson and Albert Boiter in the January-February issue of your journal present important material on the current labor scene in the USSR. They correctly point out that Soviet authorities are concerned over shortages of labor and high rates of turnover, that there are many reports of workers' dissatisfaction, and that there is currently much discussion of ways to deal with these problems. These are not new phenomena, however. They all have been present at least since 1958. I have great doubt whether on the evidence presented or my own reading of other evidence this adds up to the "acute labor problem" or the "growing crisis" that is pictured. Since it would be unwise to overestimate the current economic difficulties in the USSR, may I raise several questions?

1) First, some statistical points. Among the difficulties mentioned is "a leveling-off—if not indeed a declining rate—of labor productivity." What has declined is the rate of growth of productivity. Official reports tell of an increase in the productivity of industrial labor for 1963 over 1962 of 5 percent. The leveling-off in the 1960's still shows a substantial rate of growth, although it is below the higher rates of growth of the 1950's (*Pravda,* Jan. 24, 1964; *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962,* p. 67).

Also, the manpower shortage experienced in Siberia and elsewhere is a serious problem to administrators; but the overall condition is improving, not worsening. The low point of additions to the labor force was in 1961. The annual increase in the working-age population is now more than one million, and is growing. The reported increase in 1963 over 1962 in the number of wage-earners and salaried employees was 2.2 million (See Murray S. Weitzman *et al., Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power,* Washington, D.C., Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1962, p. 628; and *Pravda,* Jan. 24, 1964).

2) I find no justification for thinking that there is a "relatively high level of unemployment." The amount of frictional unemployment was estimated as 2.6 percent, an astonishing suggestion since this would be almost one-half of the current unemployment rate in the United States. Accepting for the moment the method used, based on reported loss of work-days in a year by people who shifted jobs in one area, 60,000 people were found to be out of work *for one month* for the entire country, or an average of 250,000 idle each month. Applied to the number of able-bodied of working age, 114 million, this gives a rate of unemployment of about two-tenths of one percent, not the 2.6 percent suggested.

The same method can be applied to the figure reported for 1962 of a loss from turnover of 100 million man-days for the country as a whole (see *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Nov. 12, 1963). Again on the assumption of an average loss of time of about one month between jobs, we get an average number of unemployed of 333,000 per month, or less than three-tenths of one percent of the able-bodied population of about 120 million in 1962 (Weitzman, *op. cit.,* pp. 615-16).

There are of course many flaws in such estimates. Not all the able-bodied population of working age are in the labor force. We are not sure of the average loss of time between jobs, although 30 days has some support in the evidence. Time losses differ substantially between regions. Part of the loss of time is due to voluntary taking of unpaid vacations, and part to time required

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for moving, first out to Siberia or other eastern or northern areas, and then after a few years returning to the European part of the country. These reduce the amount of actual unemployment in the country at large.

Turnover rates, too, have not been exceptionally high in general. A careful analysis of all available evidence in 1961 showed that average rates of turnover per month were between 3 and 4 percent in most regions and industries, not far from rates in the United States and the United Kingdom (see R. Fakiolas, "Problems of Labor Mobility in the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, July 1962, pp. 16-35). The problem is spotty, with disastrously high rates occurring in some construction projects and other enterprises, especially in the east. The losses of work-time are sufficient to be of serious concern to the state, but this is not the same thing as a problem of unemployment.

Unemployment does exist, in frictional losses between jobs, seasonal lack of work, and irregular work in the plants, though the Soviets do not define any of these as unemployment. Technological change for the most part does not lead to unemployment. Continuing expansion of the economy makes jobs available, and workers can be retrained and shifted to other jobs, often in the same plant; or in some cases surplus staffs are kept on payrolls, to the detriment of the growth of productivity.

Testimony of the availability of jobs, locally and elsewhere, was seen in the notices from innumerable plants on street bulletin boards in Moscow and Leningrad in 1962 and in many other cities in 1959. They called for workers of all levels from unskilled to the most skilled and engineers. Workers do not in large numbers suffer from unemployment, although they suffer from what may be called the Soviet equivalent of unemployment, through temporary losses of worktime and income and the lower productivity and incomes resulting from uneconomic use of manpower.

3) The report of widespread overt expression of workers' dissatisfaction is more impressive, although only the disastrous conflict at Novocherkassk is documented in any detail. It is clear that many different channels are used for expression of grievances, from meetings and demonstrations in the plants, criticisms of administrative, trade union, and party leaders, protests by union committees, individual grievances handled by the labor disputes commissions, letters to the press and to party and other organs, and even strikes and riots, though we lack hard evidence as to whether the number of the latter reaches the "dozens" mentioned.

Again it is necessary to keep a perspective and remember that such expressions of dissatisfaction have been made openly for many years. It is clear that there are reasons for the number of such complaints, which possibly have increased in recent years. There is disappointment over the fact that economic difficulties led to postponement of further increases in minimum wages and in wage rates for certain groups, to postponement of the promised elimination or reduction of income taxes for additional groups, and to increases in meat prices in 1962. There is disappointment over continuing lacks in housing and in consumers' goods and services. There is resentment when managements still violate labor legislation and the rights of the union committees, and when trade union, party, and administrative organs do not interfere decisively. Since workers have been told constantly since 1958 of their rights and those of their unions, and since they are increasingly educated and experienced, it is not surprising that protests occur.

It is a practically insoluble dilemma for the student of the Soviet labor scene to decide on the weight to be given to such published and unpublished reports of dissatisfaction. Do they mean a general worsening of the situation, or a generally bad situation? Or are these exceptions which occur and which are sometimes publicized, all in the effort to eliminate violations of rights and bring the bad cases into line with what is supposed to be and what does exist in many well-run plants?

The methods used by the government in dealing with all these problems are significant. Note that although force was used in extreme cases, and critics have been warned not to go to the point of anti-Soviet propaganda, the protests have resulted frequently in orders to improve services, to stop violations of rights, and to pay more attention to the signals of discontent. It is significant, too, that the authorities seem to be moving very cautiously in deciding on any new measures to reduce turnover. For some years there has been discussion of possible methods to increase incentives for steady work or to penalize those who shift jobs unduly. A year ago Khrushchev, speaking of possible changes in vacation rights for this purpose, emphasized that it was essential to discuss the question thoroughly with workers before any decision was taken. And on February 28, 1964, he gave his approval to the recent proposal for labor passports, to replace the present passport and labor book, and give the citizen's complete work record; but he said that this should be discussed by workers in the plants, then a draft should be drawn up and published for further wide discussion before any decision.

I conclude that workers are more free than some years ago to express their discontent, and that these protests in some cases lead to amelioration. Criticisms and protests are limited by fears of reprisal and by the old experience of futility. But experience shows also that when workers use their right to elect effective union officers and to make use of their union committees for the protection of their rights, they get tangible results. Since the 1958 law on the rights of factory, plant and local union committees (which Mr. Boiter, strangely enough, did not mention), many unions have become more active and won more con-

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fidence from the workers. This is probably one of the factors that has led to more overt expressions of discontent when grievances do not get the needed attention.

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MR. SORENSEN REPLIES: I have long admired Miss Brown's work, considering her to be among the first to recognize the growing importance of Soviet trade unions. I am indebted to her for her criticism of my article. Nonetheless, the evidence overwhelmingly points to excessively high labor turnover, an uncontrolled labor drift, and a high level of frictional unemployment, all of which adds up to an acute labor problem.

1) *Turnover and Unemployment.* The main point is that the labor picture is mixed: a shortage of manpower and a high level of unemployment exist simultaneously. The shortage is indicative primarily of intensive economic development. Unemployment is due to a high level of turnover. It is not surprising to see the two together: a scarcity of manpower and the relative ease of finding new employment frequently results in high turnover and frictional unemployment, particularly if worker dissatisfaction is high. The high turnover has contributed to a serious manpower drift, to a vast number of people changing jobs, moving back and forth across the country, averaging between a month and 60 days between jobs. This high mobility and drift lie at the heart of the relatively high level of frictional unemployment.

In addition to the evidence I cited, a recent article in *Voprosy ekonomiki* (No. 10, 1963) indicates that three billion rubles are lost annually in the USSR as a result of turnover; another article in *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta* (No. 5, 1963) gives the same figure. Three billion rubles represents 10 percent of health, education and welfare expenditures for 1962 and 1.8 percent of the 1962 national income of 165.1 billion rubles. It is unlikely that three billion reflects the activity of a mere two- to three-tenths of one percent of the working force, particularly if the average annual wage is about 1,200 rubles. The articles also indicate that a new approach to measuring turnover is under consideration so that distinctions between normal and harmful turnover can be drawn; and that Moscow University is undertaking a special study of excessive turnover. Khrushchev's support of the proposed work book requirement to curtail turnover indicates that the situation has reached serious enough proportions to warrant the reintroduction of disciplinary measures—measures which, of course, cannot solve the problem, only ameliorate it.

As excellent as is the Fakiolas article, his turnover figures hold for the mid-1950's, prior to the more acute current situation, and Miss Brown's contentions notwithstanding, the turnover level is not comparable with that of the United States or the United Kingdom.

2) *Productivity and Discontent.* The omission of the word "growth" is an editorial error, the responsibility for which is mine. The point, however, is that while productivity has increased, the rate of growth has declined and is now below the level required to meet production quotas. The 1961 plan called for a six percent productivity rise in industry and a 7.4 percent rise in construction. The results were 4 and 3.5 percent respectively.[1] For 1962 and 1963 productivity growth was estimated at less than 5 percent, but the Seven Year Plan called for a 6 percent annual increase. Furthermore, since 1958 it costs twice as much to get a given increase in output per worker. There are a number of reasons for the slow-down, but when a Leningrad study reveals output can be increased by the incredible figure of 22-23 percent merely by satisfying worker wants (see *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Oct. 8, 1963) it is hard to believe discontent is not decisive and that an acute problem does not exist.

3) *Labor Shortage.* Although there is a net increase in the labor force of 2.2 million over 1962, the manpower situation is less favorable than formerly. The rate of increase in employment has decreased from 1.7 percent to 1.3 percent, and it is unlikely employment can be increased beyond 1.2 percent annually.[2] The shortage is and will remain a serious problem, contrary to Miss Brown's contention.

As affirmed in my article, the worker is better off than formerly, unions are more active, and higher levels of expectation have triggered overt expressions of discontent; no one denies that the authorities move with caution and the worker is freer to express his discontent. This is largely attributable to destalinization, but also to the fact that labor is scarce and the worker is in a stronger bargaining position. But I remain impressed by the fact that the worker is not satisfied with channels open to him but chooses to protest by frequently quitting his job, and that the Soviet Union is the only modern industrial power which offers no protection to its unemployed, be they few or many.

I certainly do not wish to overestimate current economic difficulties, yet I see no reason to minimize them or be "astonished" at the prospect of a relatively high level of frictional unemployment. A realistic appraisal is called for, and the evidence supports the contention that Soviet officials face a labor problem which is acute and, at the present time, out of control.

[1] Martin J. Kohn, "The Soviet Economy in 1961—Plan, Performance, and Priorities," *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, Washington, D.C., Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, 1962, p. 225.

[2] *Annual Economic Indicators*, Washington, D.C., Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, February 1964, pp. 91-93.

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MR. BOITER REPLIES: If I correctly understand the essence of Miss Brown's questions, there are two main points. First, she doubts that any significant increase has occurred in worker unrest in the Soviet Union during the last two years and that, in fact, the evidence cited about serious discontent applies to a "generally bad situation" which has existed in more or less similar form since 1958. Judging from the evidence mentioned in the rebuttal, I would assume that it is Miss Brown's view that the situation is not really very bad after all, or has been exaggerated. Second, she objects that due consideration has not been given to certain progressive trends in the Soviet trade union movement toward "tangible results" in the protection of rights of workers.

Since a barometer to measure Soviet public opinion exactly and reliably does not exist, the doubts of one observer cannot unfortunately be shown to be less (or more) valid than the impressions of another. Side-stepping this futility, there exists the admittedly imperfect barometer of the Soviet press, which is not always conclusive or even authoritative, but which offers at least a somewhat internalized point of reference for an inquiry into some of the extreme and partially concealed aspects of the very awkward topic of Soviet labor unrest. Aside from the type of evidence cited in my article, my inclination to perceive a worsening of labor discontent has been influenced, in part, by the enormous increase since late 1962 in items devoted to the topic by Soviet newspapers and journals as compared, say, with a comparable span of months in 1959-60. This is not a wholly satisfactory or scholarly procedure, but I find some comfort in the fact that even less substantial evidence can be proffered to erase skepticism about a contrary state of affairs. How, for example, can it be shown that factory trade union committees in recent years have "won more confidence from the workers?"

There are two indisputable facts about the Soviet labor turnover problem which all Soviet authors readily admit: that the problem is extremely serious and that its root cause is individual dissatisfaction. The main point of the article which I cited from *Literaturnaia gazeta* of November 12, 1963, stresses both strongly. Written by S. Batyshev, director of an important agency under Gosplan USSR dealing with job-placement problems, the article is the first to my knowledge which cited aggregated all-union data on labor turnover, measured both in workdays and financial cost. His most significant revelation was that turnover directly causes an annual loss of three billion rubles in industrial output. The magnitude of the figure can be easily reckoned by comparison with the national budget or with the official ruble-value of all Soviet industrial output (185.6 billion rubles in 1962 and 201.5 billion in 1963). Batyshev emphasizes that this figure of three billion rubles does not take into account a drop of 10-20 percent below plan of labor productivity during a worker's first two or three months on a new job, nor the cost of retraining for the 40 percent of all workers who not only change places of employment but simultaneously change their vocations. Soviet writers show no inclination to minimize this missing 1.5 to 2 percent output due solely to action by people Batyshev calls "rolling stones." Nor do they look upon labor turnover as a temporary or localized problem. The rate was 20-30 percent in 1962 in long-established machine tool factories in Moscow, where a high percentage of the workers are skilled craftsmen (*Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Jan. 19, 1963), a fact which makes it dubious that the Soviet situation is really comparable to labor drift in the United States.

With regard to Soviet trade unions, I am uncertain whether the point being made is actually relevant to the only question I raised, namely, the possibility of the existence in the USSR of an institutionally independent trade union movement whose central aim would be to represent the collective economic interests of the workers. If it is objected that this suggestion would be tantamount to abandonment of socialism, I think it would be proper to inquire whether an independent union is incompatible with a socialist system or only with one-party monopoly in all policy spheres.

It can hardly be denied that Soviet trade unions recently have become more active—including a host of activities having little to do with traditional labor union functions—but a claim that the local committees have become genuine guardians of the rights of workers, even in cases of individual grievances, appears at best premature. To cite an obvious example, Soviet legal periodicals continue to report that in more than half of all complaints brought before the local people's courts by workers charging that they have been dismissed from their jobs illegally, the courts find in favor of the complainant and order his reinstatement. This situation stems primarily from a little-publicized but highly important decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 27, 1959, which authorized a worker who felt he had been dismissed unjustly to by-pass the local trade union committee and take his case directly to the local people's court. (*Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 5, 1959, item 53). Oddly, the statute adopted on July 15, 1958, concerning the rights of factory and local trade union committees had made it mandatory (Paragraph 10) that every case of dismissal of a worker must have the concurrence of his trade union committee in order to be valid. Up to the present, therefore, the arithmetical score would seem clearly to indicate that the local people's courts do a better job of protecting a worker against unjust dismissal than the worker's own trade union committee.

Finally, I find it difficult to suppress my surprise at the equanimity with which Miss Brown refers to

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the proposal to force Soviet citizens to carry labor-book passports. This is a scheme for an all-pervasive surveillance of a nation's citizenry, which under present circumstances would obviously be open to innumerable abuses and indignities. One can only hope that such an Orwellian measure will be quashed, despite Khrushchev's personal endorsement, by those formidable forces which continue to struggle for "socialist legality" in the Soviet Union.

KHRUSHCHEV'S POWER

TO THE EDITORS: I agree with Professor Tucker that the recent controversy in *Problems of Communism* (see issues of September-October and November-December 1963) about the nature and extent of Khrushchev's predominance in the post-1957 period is "overdue and much needed." But I could not disagree more with his conclusion, that Mr. Linden is right in asserting, and Professor Rigby wrong in denying, that

. . . Khrushchev, although he is the top leader and most powerful single Soviet politician, is nevertheless unable autocratically to dictate the policy line of the Soviet leadership and, moreover, has repeatedly been faced with oppositional currents in the leadership that have forced him to retreat, backtrack, mark time, and maneuver. . . .

Professor Rigby rightly stresses the general tendency of governmental elites to concentrate leadership in one person. (The same is true of most modern corporations.) Professor Tucker's and Mr. Linden's view, however, would require us to postulate something closer to the situation when Lenin was still alive, and one which probably applies now to Mao, Tito, and Castro: an unquestioned leader whose authority (as opposed to power) is not seriously threatened by being outvoted, and even faced down, on one or more major issues. But Khrushchev did not found the Soviet government, and his split with China and his capitulation to Kennedy over Cuba can hardly have failed to cause some criticism of him. So, I submit, one must assume that he compensates for his lack of authority by his bold and effective use of power.

But even were we to accept the Tucker-Linden thesis, is it not at the least curious that to date each and every one of the major power struggles that Khrushchev has been involved in has ended in his victory? And that all his opponents who can be clearly identified (and not just deduced, as is the case with Mr. Linden's speculations on Suslov and Kozlov) have ended up in disgrace? Is Khrushchev's batting average likely to encourage further challenges? On the contrary, it would seem to me much more likely, given even normal prudence on the part of the Soviet elite, that there have in fact been no challenges since 1957 to Khrushchev's position, and that while he has on occasion allowed himself to be persuaded on issues and questions of policy, his personal predominance has remained unquestioned.

And what of the KGB? Surely, having come rather close to disaster in 1957, Khrushchev would not be squeamish about taking extra security precautions against the emergence of a new conspiracy? And with the KGB in the wings, how *could* such a conspiracy form without Khrushchev knowing about it? Or, minimally, would Kozlov, or Suslov, or any other Soviet leader be enough of a gambler to risk detection? Should they assume that Khrushchev's treatment of them would be any less firm than—as he himself has declared—it would be toward Soviet writers?

The lessons of history in general and of Soviet history in particular run, I fear, contrary to the Tucker-Linden thesis. Rarely if ever do oligarchies which are not subject to the rule of law and which do not have institutionalized checks and balances survive for long. Khrushchev has appointed and removed so many Central Committee members by now that that body can hardly be seriously considered anything like an institutionalized check and balance; and its very role in July 1957, like that of Marshal Zhukov, made it all the more necessary for Khrushchev to emasculate it.

Mr. Linden, in my opinion, posed the problem wrongly. As Richard Lowenthal pointed out in this journal (July-August 1960) the problem which must now be absorbing the Soviet elite is not that of who will depose Khrushchev but who will succeed him. Maneuvering for the succession becomes increasingly obsessive and all-pervasive as the dictator nears his death. So it was with Zhdanov and Malenkov; so it probably is now. And with every year that Khrushchev grows older, the probability becomes greater that aspirers to his position need no longer challenge him since they will soon be able to challenge other potential successors, their present equals. Why, then, risk losing all now when the prize will be "up for grabs" in the near future? Only if Khrushchev, like Stalin in 1952, would seem about to liquidate his associates would they be likely to rise against him; as yet he has shown no signs of such Stalinist paranoia.

One final point: this controversy carries with it implications regarding our attitude towards Khrushchev. One often hears the view (based, in my opinion, on that expressed by Messrs. Linden and Tucker) that Khrushchev deserves sympathy if not support lest he be replaced by "the Stalinists." I am afraid I cannot agree with this proposition. Just as there is now *no* power struggle directed against Khrushchev, there most likely *will* be one after his death, and it will probably bring with it indecision, uncertainty, and—as a result of absorption with the internal struggle—a possible lessening of Soviet activities in the international arena. Far from fearing Khrushchev's departure from the scene,

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therefore, we should look forward to it, if not with *Schadenfreude*, then at least with equanimity.

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MR. TUCKER REPLIES: Professor Griffith unfortunately fails to take real account of the distinction—central to my argument in "The Conflict Model"—between two forms of opposition to Khrushchev: opposition to his remaining in power (as in the affair of June 1957) and opposition to his policy line or a part of it. My thesis was that while the first kind probably ended with the failure of the anti-Khrushchev group in June 1957, the second continued and still continues. As a result, Soviet policy moves in zigzags as this or that policy orientation becomes ascendant in the ruling group, in which Khrushchev is the foremost figure but not a dictator ruling by fiat. Most of Professor Griffith's attack is wide of the mark because he construes "opposition" in the first sense rather than the second. As for his argument that opposition in the second sense is out of the question since Khrushchev lacks the authority of a Lenin, this not only ignores the indirect factual evidence provided in abundance in the Soviet press but, quite simply, begs the question, which is: How much authority and how much power has Khrushchev at any given time? While it is true that his authority is less than Lenin's was, it is no less true that his power is less than was Stalin's. And this situation of being a supreme leader with less authority than Lenin and less power than Stalin is, in its way, the distinguishing mark of Khrushchev in Soviet history, accounting for much of the drama and instability of Soviet politics in our time.

Professor Griffith's final point, about alleged "implications" of the controversy, is untenable. First, it is not legitimate to attack an analysis on the ground that its adoption by policy-makers would have adverse consequences, since the sole proper business of scholarship is to get at the truth without consideration of consequences. Second, it is not true that the "conflict model" carries some particular policy implication. It is independent of any policy ideas that may be drawn from it. Moreover, it is entirely compatible with various policy prescriptions, depending on all sorts of variables in the minds and values of the policy-makers.

In my own view, for example, what we have a real interest in strengthening is not this or that individual Soviet politician or group, but a particular *orientation* of Soviet policy in foreign affairs, *viz.*, the more moderate and responsible orientation, as against the more aggressive and irresponsible one. The way to do this is not by being indiscriminately "soft" or indiscriminately "hard" toward the Soviet Government, but by responding appropriately to its behavior: firmly in the face of the "hard line" when it is ascendant in Soviet conduct, and responsively when the moderate Soviet position is uppermost, regardless of which Soviet politicians may at any given time be supporting the one or the other.

Finally, I do not believe that we should concentrate so much of our attention on the future succession crisis. The fashionable tendency to view the succession problem as the leading question now for sovietology strikes me as misguided. It encourages us to spend time on inevitably fruitless speculation about the future of various political personalities when we could more usefully deepen our awareness of issues and conflicts and personalities in *present-day* Soviet politics. The great and pressing problem is neither "Who will depose Khrushchev?" nor "Who will succeed him?", but: Which of the conflicting orientations in contemporary Soviet policy, internal and external, will prevail over the long run and with what consequences for Soviet society and our relations with it? This is the "succession problem" rightly understood, and materials for vital studies of it already exist in published sources.

TO THE EDITORS: It is possible and proper to disagree, as Mr. Rigby does, with particular inferences drawn by Mr. Linden from the evidence he cites. It is also reasonable to question Mr. Linden's assumption that the outside observer can know which members of the Soviet hierarchy are protégés of Khrushchev, which are his supporters, and which his opponents. But the essential implausibility of the Kremlinological case is that it gives such great weight to entirely inferential and selective evidence while heavily discounting what appear to be simple and obvious realities. Ought one really to accept, on the strength of an ingenious interpretation of certain contentious data, (a) that either Khrushchev or his rivals could sustain so flawlessly the roles of, on the one hand, the bouncy, self-confident boss and, on the other, the loyal and obsequious underlings, which they consistently perform in public; (b) that an opposition strong enough to overrule Khrushchev would be content for so long to leave him in possession of the chief power- and prestige-carrying posts in both Communist Party and government; and (c) that an individual as tough and combative as Khrushchev, after a number of years during which he has had and used the opportunity to reshuffle the Central Committee, its Secretariat and the Presidium, would not long ago have challenged and repulsed his opponents?

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